



UTOPIAN SOCIALISM

Its History since 1800

LEO LOUBERE

Utopian Socialism

Its History since 1800

LEO LOUBERE

Schenkman Publishing Company
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof,
may not be reproduced in any form without
the written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-81518

Copyright © 1974
Schenkman Publishing Company
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Schenkman books are distributed by
General Learning Press
250 James Street
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

*This book is dedicated to my sons,
Paul and Philip.
May theirs be the gentlest of
utopias.*

Contents

Introduction

1. Rise of Utopian Ideas and Social Conscience 5
Utopian Tradition. The Rise of Social Conscience. Social Conditions in the Early Nineteenth Century.
2. The Utopians as Social Types 15
3. Utopian Forms of Organization 21
Socialism as a Tool for Criticism. Views on Human Nature. Forms of Organization.
4. Utopian Society 43
Nature of Work. Family and Sex. Education, Religion. History as Destiny. A Utopian City.
5. Utopian Politics 61
The State. Patriotism.
6. Experimental Communities 73
Early Settlements. Cause of Failure.

7. Utopians and The Revolutionary Movement in Europe 89
Means to Socialize Life. 1848.

8. Recent Utopian and Co-operative Communities 107
Recent Utopian Experiments. Familistère de Guise.
Kibbutzim. Co-operative Movements. Town Planning.

9. Recent Utopian Thinkers 131
Means to Achieve Utopia. Economic Organization.
Concept of Work. Government. Education. Women.
Semi-Socialist Utopias.

Epilogue 151
Anti-Utopians and Mechanical Progress.

Notes 159

Bibliography 161

Preface

Although ideas often arise from conditions or occurrences, once launched they constitute a force in themselves, and become movers of events. Some of these concepts have had great power in molding society and have played a significant part in shaping our modern world. Most of them have roots in classical medieval, or early modern times, but their present form has evolved mainly in the last two centuries in response to the industrial, scientific and technological revolutions and the population explosion associated with them. In the age of the common man, ushered in by these developments, it has become increasingly important that every movement have its ideology, whether positive or negative, to serve as its justification. The nineteenth century is sometimes described as the age of the "isms," but this title might equally be applied to our own time. Today as in almost all epochs of the past, men's actions are to a great extent dominated by their concepts. Ideas and movements are inextricably mingled. To understand ideas we must study events, and to comprehend the meaning of events we must investigate the concepts that have motivated them.

The purpose of this series, *Great Concepts of the Modern World*, is to tell the tales of a number of such related ideas and movements that have exerted a powerful influence on men in modern times, and to present the reader with a survey of the most recent research on these subjects. The present volume, Leo Loubere's study *Utopian Socialism*, is a significant contribution to the series, and unravels one thread in the complicated tapestry that makes up the modern world.

Charlene M. Leonard

Introduction

Utopian thought is as old as man's social consciousness and is therefore very old indeed. In the long course of his history man has conceived of ideal communities with as much richness of imagination as he has devoted to explaining his origins and to envisioning his heavens and hells. In consequence, utopian thought as a subject can be as large as history. Happily, our purpose is far more modest. The thinkers studied in this volume fall into two general and, admittedly, rather vague categories: on the one hand, there are the utopians who provided quite detailed and elaborate descriptions of their ideal societies; on the other hand, there are those who, without detailing future social conditions, believed some simple contrivance would bring about the millenium. In the former category were Charles Fourier and Etienne Cabet, both men of vivid imagination and of hungering messianic impulses. In the latter were Robert Owen and Louis Blanc, both quite practical theorists who were convinced that proper education and producers' cooperatives would open the gates of eternal happiness. By no means did all these seminal thinkers envision the same future; Fourier could not have lasted ten minutes in Cabet's new world, and the Puritanical Cabet snorted vehemently against Fourier's concept of human passions. So even within these two general categories there were differences of various sharpness. Even from its beginning the left-wing reform movement was hardly to be admired for uniformity or even for mutual sympathy.

And yet the thinkers who make up the substance of this book have more in common than they admitted—above all, their belief in happiness and their conscious efforts to achieve it. In this respect they are representative of a new age, for they are convinced that progress is not only desirable, but also possible. Unlike older utopians who outlined ideal societies with no intention of seeing them brought into existence, those of the nineteenth century set out with remarkable vigor to bring their dream into reality, to found utopian communities.

Our topic is further limited by its concentration on utopians who offered socialist solutions to man's age-old problem of poverty. By

socialism we mean an economic and social system in which the means of production and trade are under public rather than private ownership; mere public control or state regulation of private property do not constitute true socialism. For this reason Henri de Saint-Simon is discussed only briefly even though some historians refer to him as a socialist. He was really an enlightened, social-minded mercantilist and technocrat who planned to use the state to direct and control neo-capitalist forms of enterprise. He is what the French would call a *dirigiste*, for even though he wished to improve the standard of life among the lower classes, he would give them neither property nor power—save to the few among them who displayed talent. A great admirer of talented men, he wished to see them rule regardless of their class origins. The advocates of the extreme division of property and the ownership of it in small amounts are also excluded from the category of socialists. Therefore neither Jean-Jacques Rousseau nor Pierre Joseph Proudhon fit into the school of socialist utopians. Rousseau, of course, exercised a very large influence on most of the authentic socialists of the nineteenth century, almost as much as he exercised over the Jacobins of the French Revolution and after. Charles Fourier was probably the only utopian he did not influence; Fourier was never even a democrat.

The utopians discussed in this book were of a particular social and intellectual type. They were so thoroughly alienated from their society that they rejected it *in toto*. They did not want to reform it but to replace it with another, and they were not in the least doubtful about the appeal of their utopias or timid about proclaiming their views to their fellow men. They were therefore dogmatic and self-righteous in their rhetoric and writing. They never hesitated to assert that their solutions offered man the promise of perfect happiness.

Such extravagant promises and the dogmatic assertion of them soon provoked ridicule and scorn, with the result that the word "utopian" acquired a pejorative meaning. Later socialists accepted the judgment of Karl Marx and Frederic Engels who wrote in their pamphlet *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* that for these early reformers:¹

socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as absolute truth is independent of time, space and the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one's special kind of absolute truth, reason and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and

his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive one of the other. Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average socialism. . . .

To make a science of socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.

Because the "real basis" of Marxist socialism as laid down in the Soviet Union and its satellites has come to seem oppressive and inhuman, many young thinkers today are returning to nineteenth century utopians. They do not wish to revive old and admittedly archaic schemes; they are looking for the utopian spirit, and by no means are they ashamed of their own longing for a society far closer to their dreams than the one in which they live. More specifically, they are studying those ideas which still appear valid. In their distrust of excessive organization, including the manipulation of human personality, they seek the liberating elements in the wide and imaginative variety of utopian theory. They are equally distrustful of the continued emphasis on materialism and determinism and seek in these early utopian thinkers a justification for spontaneity, for the effectiveness of human impulse, for their belief that passion and the will to reform will somehow overcome the disastrous evolution of man toward his own destruction. They are searching out precisely the qualities which Marx and Engels held up to scorn. They are also searching for an explanation of the failures of idealistic cooperative communities and the disastrous lack of achievement by socialists during the nineteenth century revolutions.

Despite this lack of achievement, our book attempts to show that these utopian ideals have been an important element in the total context of western culture, and that the numerous experiments in novel forms of social relations were part of the swift-moving transition of western society. Our problem is to discover the contrapuntal relations between economic and social evolution on the one hand and ideology and action on the other. We therefore conceive of utopianism as a response to a need felt by society to understand its general conditions and to experiment with other conditions. Periods of stress and notable change have also been the richest periods of utopian thought: the Renaissance, the seventeenth century revolutionary period in England, the initial phase of the industrial revolution in the later eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries, and our own times.

The comparative method seems the most useful to achieve our goals. Rather than separating the utopians in order to study each individually, we shall treat them as a distinct group, a social type that

behaved in certain ways. Their behavior expressed itself in both ideas and action: they conceived of ideal societies and then set out to create them. For this reason, a fair amount of space is devoted to their role as social engineers and as revolutionaries, especially in 1848.

History offers us very few examples of utopians in power. There is Thomas More, who coined the word "utopia" as meaning nowhere, and Francis Bacon, who held high office in England, but neither sought to use his power to initiate social reform. Within our period of study Louis Blanc boldly entered a revolutionary government in France and several socialists were elected as representatives of the people. They did seek to change society and they all had to flee into exile. As a Turkish proverb has it, "he who tells the truth will be chased from seven villages." The western reformers with their firm conviction that they had discovered truth and that the truth would make men free, had little to show for their efforts. What, then, went wrong? To answer this question we must look into their society.

1.

Rise of Utopian Ideas and Social Conscience

Utopian Tradition

Encompassed within the utopian tradition were both the reformer and the dreamer, the social critic as well as the planner of new worlds. Since the Greeks at least, every age of rapid social transformation has given birth to reformers urging profound changes in human relations. Plato, it can be argued, laid the basis when he distinguished between the material world and the realm of ideas, and affirmed that reality existed in the latter. Western morals have since insisted that the material world is imperfect and that man must aspire to the ideal. For many centuries churchmen interpreted this aspiration as a repudiation of matter in favor of the spiritual and the divine promise of paradise after death. By the time of the Renaissance there emerged a utopian movement which, even as it incorporated Christian duality, sought to bring about a paradise on earth where men could enjoy life before they died. In a better earthly society men might even find it easier to save their souls and enter the higher paradise of God.

Renaissance utopians, however, were not of one mind, except in their desire to change society drastically. And yet they set the style of utopian thought in several ways. Foremost was their concept of work, their insistence that work, even the most menial, was perfectly honorable. Plato, of course, had preserved the aristocratic belief that menial work was degrading and must not be performed by rulers, his philosopher-kings. Plato used slaves for hard work. Thomas More, himself a noble, was closest to this view, and would have in his *Utopia* (1516) a lower class, not really slaves but not free either, of war prisoners, criminals, and foreign volunteers who would perform the nasty jobs. Tomaso Campanella, in his *City of the Sun* (1623), was far more radical: everyone worked, and work was obligatory for everyone; there were to be no slaves. In this respect he was far closer to the modern utopian than More, not merely in time but in concept. Both, however, were persecuted

for their ideas. It is doubtful that their demands for the end of private property, wages, and trade were the cause of their downfall, for States were remarkably tolerant of such "technical" ideas. More was executed for his religion, not his socialism, while Campanella ran afoul of the Roman Inquisition, was tortured brutally and was imprisoned for his views on human relations, especially sexual relations. This was to be expected because utopians were seeking not merely changes in property and labor conditions—subjects on which the churches had many views—but also a basic transformation of social mores and an improvement of the condition of women.

Differences among early utopians, of course, were considerable. More was a convinced defender of traditional marriage patterns, and so were the Puritan utopians, such as Gerrard Winstanley, of the seventeenth century. This moderate view was continued by Cabet in the nineteenth century. The more radical view goes back to Plato, whose philosopher-kings shared everything including the philosopher-queens. But they were a small minority, and Campanella was far more equalitarian and democratic when he wrote:²

No woman is allowed to submit to a man before she is nineteen years old, and a man must not procreate before he is twenty-one years old . . . Before that age coitus is allowed with pregnant or sterile women to ease physical needs. The matrons are told in secret of those who are more tormented by Venus, and provide for their wants, not however before they have told the chief magistrate, who is a great doctor.

In the eighteenth century Gabriel de Foigny solved the problem of sexes by imagining an ideal society in Australia in which everyone was hermaphroditic and bore children in an undisclosed manner. Foigny shared the eighteenth century interest in exotic places, and he was quite removed from reality. He did not offer a solution, merely an escape from a central problem that nineteenth century utopians inherited and struggled with. Involved was not merely the emancipation of women, but also a new dimension to the pleasure principle.

Concern for pleasure did not lead most utopians to abandon the family; on the contrary, they were firm defenders of it. Their concept of rulership in the family and in society remained within the paternalist tradition. The father governed his wife and children; a supreme head reigned over the happy folk of utopia. Considerable respect was shown for the aged who, most early socialists believed, were the natural leaders because of their wisdom and experience. The eighteenth century thinker Morelly laid out the basis for an entirely paternalistic communist society in his *Code of Nature* (1755). The only distinction would be

that of age and sex; perfect equality would eliminate the barrier between rich and poor. His solution, admittedly imaginative, was as bucolic and as far removed from reality as the most exotic of narratives. Moreover, the lower classes had not yet erupted into the lives of his well-to-do readers; the rise of the masses had hardly begun, and most reformers were, at best, vaguely informed of the living conditions of the lower classes. Not until the nineteenth century did there emerge before the public a vivid picture of poverty. The idea that all men should be happy acquired revolutionary meaning only after 1789 when it penetrated the lower classes for whom life was often "nasty, brutish and short." Long before the arrival of the great socialist prophets of the early nineteenth century, theories about the ideal organization of society were as diverse as regards human relations as they were nearly uniform in their emphasis upon the need for love among men and the goodness of agriculture and the rural life. The democratization and urbanization of the utopian ideal was a concomitant of both the political and industrial revolutions which spread over Europe.

The Rise of Social Conscience

One of the major characteristics of nineteenth-century western history was the rise of social criticism as a forceful form of literary expression. Social critics became particularly zealous when they extended their criticism of contemporary institutions to the planning of new societies. They believed in change. They had learned from the thinkers of the French Enlightenment that the mental and physical improvement of man was not only a possibility but a natural process, a part of the evolution of humanity. The tempo of progress depended merely on the use of reason to discover the laws of nature which regulated social affairs, that is, the relations of man to man. For these optimists who looked to the future the old belief in a society essentially unchanged since the days of genesis was no longer acceptable. Their criticism rejected both the idea of permanency and its use to support an unjust status quo. Why should men of light and reason blindly believe in a society in which vices outweighed virtues, in a society so misarranged that it was a contradiction of the basic teachings of Jesus Christ and his social gospel? There were classes set apart by distrust and hatred, poverty was no longer a state of sanctity but a sign of eternal damnation, excess wealth was proudly flaunted by upstarts who frowned upon equality, man no longer loved man.

The literary ideas of the Enlightenment were important in forming the nineteenth century social reformer, but they were perhaps less

decisive than the accomplishments of the French Revolution of 1789. However much or little bourgeois revolutionaries themselves were activated by ideology, their influence was vastly increased when they passed the Constitution of 1791 proclaiming the natural rights of man—the rights of free speech, assembly, press and religion. Their abolition of the vestiges of the feudal system legally ended the status society of the old regime and of most of the unwritten taboos and legislation which had made it extremely difficult for commoners to rise in the social scale, to win honor and merit for roturian professions, to enjoy legal equality and the rights of citizens rather than the duties of subjects. All men, the revolutionaries stated, are born free and equal. The resulting fluidity of French and eventually of western European society and the rise of obscure men to positions of leadership—Napoleon was a prime example—encouraged the kind of questioning of unreformed social conditions which made for both active propaganda and for the numerous proposals to replace the old world with new ones.

Reform thinkers quickly recognized that the French Revolution had cleared away many obstacles to social change, but did not solve the problem of poverty and human suffering. Indeed the first Napoleonic empire and the Restoration following its downfall in 1815 represented a throwback by suppressing many of the freedoms inscribed in the constitution of 1791. Therefore opposition movements grew up in western and central Europe and in Great Britain bent chiefly upon recovering the rights of man, today called civil liberties. Republicans organized into secret societies to struggle for them. However, this political current of reform is not of prime concern to us, save that it was a necessary vanguard in the movement for change. Its main objective was to destroy the corporate structure of the old status society. Most republicans were quite individualistic, firm defenders of private property, and advocates of a society composed of separate individuals each of whom possessed natural rights which should be recognized in law. All, or nearly all adult males should have the right to vote, and the government or state should represent their several interests. But in most cases the state should leave the individual alone so that he might rise or fall in life in accord with his own merits. Above all, it should never menace his property rights. Not more than a small minority of left-wing reformers wanted more than political freedom and legal equality for each voter. Whether the voter was rich or poor, happy or sad, employed or jobless was of no concern to the government and of no concern to society beyond its traditional role to provide public and private charity for some hardship cases. This attitude, commonly called

laissez faire liberalism, was to dominate the minds of most members of the rising middle class.

Middle class opinions toward reform varied, however, and so did commitment to *laissez faire*. In Britain poverty was attenuated by several reform bills during the 1830's and '40's which curtailed child labor, shortened the workday of women and children, and prohibited them from underground mining operations. The French government also passed a child labor law in 1841 but, unlike Britain, did not provide adequate means to enforce it. Individualism and the sanctity of private property were more deeply rooted in France and on the Continent where middle class reformers were still struggling to win the political rights that Englishmen already enjoyed as a traditional heritage.

These movements for political reform, since they took relatively little account of social problems, did not actively recruit their following from among that segment of society which was the substance of the social problem—the industrial and agricultural workers. Agricultural workers were hardly the concern of anyone in the early nineteenth century, and their lot was certainly a wretched one. Industrial workers, on the other hand, especially in the skilled trades not yet highly mechanized, began to organize trade unions.

The facts that trade unions were given legal recognition in Britain in 1824-25 and that reform bills were passed soon after partially account for the absence of truly violent revolutions there and the relative absence of original social thought. The rapid rate of industrialization shortened the modernizing process and discouraged utopian planners. Social criticism, of course, was widespread in Britain, even though no revolt occurred. There were important critics of the capitalist system but only one utopian of note, Robert Owen. This same absence in central and southern Europe can be explained by economic backwardness, by the highly dispersed or decentralized character of industry and of the working class, and by the lack of public consciousness of a social problem until mid-nineteenth century. By this time nationalism had acquired higher priority for the masses than socialism. Germany was hardly in the race until Marx; she produced nationalists and philosophers but only the imitative Wilhelm Weitling as a socialist.

In between was France, neither fully agrarian nor industrial and beset by violence because of the failure of the 1789 revolution to settle the claims of competing classes. In such a tense and unsettled situation there appeared a host of utopians: Noël Babeuf, Charles Fourier, Etienne Cabet, August Blanqui, Pierre Leroux, Victor Considérant, Louis Blanc, and Constantin Pecqueur. They made up an impressive galaxy, and

yet their ideas were fragile and easily smashed in 1848. None of them survived that fateful year. The great age of utopian thought was the first half of the nineteenth century, and its mecca was France, chiefly Paris.

Paris was a unique city at that time, the center of French life and power, and still a focal point of attraction in Europe. It was said that "When France sneezed, Europe caught cold," but the sniffles began in Paris. More than provincial France, Paris enjoyed and nurtured a revolutionary tradition. Its narrow, twisting streets witnessed more revolutions and counterrevolutions than those of any other city; its intellectual life was urbane, open, and exciting. Of the utopians only Fourier remained in the provinces, but Lyon, where he lived, was second in size to Paris and almost as full of revolutionary ferment; and even he later moved to Paris. France also was the home of the Enlightenment, and the leaders of that movement had left a heritage of political and social concern, along with numerous schemes for reform.

Certainly the most striking novelty of the nineteenth century was, on the one hand, the emergence of public opinion as an important force, and, on the other hand the feeling that poverty was an evil and, even more novel, that it could be abolished. Poverty was certainly not new, not the original creation of mechanized industry or of its capitalist organization; men had always lived with poverty and most of them had lived in it. Social reformers, especially the utopians, vigorously sought to awaken the public to this situation. They differed from other reformers in that they offered a plan not merely to lessen poverty but to end it by a new social system. In this respect they were in the utopian tradition which combined a social critique and a blueprint for an ideal society.

Social Conditions in the Early Nineteenth Century

The conditions of life, chiefly urban life, underwent a major transformation in the first third of the nineteenth century. However, economic and social historians today are not all in agreement about the nature and direction of this transformation. Some insist that it represented a worsening of conditions; others an improvement. What these historians conclude is important—at least for our generation and for future ones who will form opinions about the social consequences of early capitalism. Adding to our confusion are the indications that contemporary thinkers during the early phase of capitalism were just as divided over its impact on their society. But, naturally, the men who directly experienced the changes of this early phase, especially the small owners of

workshops and the skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, did not know or care what future historians would write and therefore reacted according to their own sensitivities. Their own reactions were as mixed as those of contemporary thinkers: many adapted to the rising factory system, prospered modestly in good times and suffered terribly in hard times, a variation which, to them, seemed normal; on the other hand, many domestic workers, especially in the textile trades, resisted mechanization, were unable to compete, and sank to the lowest depths of poverty. These workers were prevalent in large cities, and their conditions were reported by several writers who visited their living quarters. One who knew them closely was a medical doctor, Ange Guépin, a sometime disciple of Charles Fourier. He described a workers' quarter in Nantes:³

Living, for [the textile worker] means simply not dying. Beyond the scrap of bread necessary to feed himself and his family, beyond the bottle of wine necessary to relieve him an instant of his sense of suffering, he claims nothing, he hopes for nothing.

If you wish to know how he is housed, go for example to the rue des Fumiers, which is almost exclusively occupied by this class; lower your head and enter one of those sewers that lie open on the road, below ground level. You have to have been down into those alleys where the air is damp and cold, like a cellar; you have to have felt your foot slip on the filthy ground and feared to fall in the mire, to have any idea of the dismal feeling that arises as one enters the homes of these wretched workers. On each side of the alleyway, and consequently below ground, there is a large, gloomy, icy room, with walls dripping dirty water; the air coming in through a sort of semi-circular window which is two feet tall at its highest point. Enter, if the fetid air to be breathed there does not drive you back. Beware, for the uneven ground is neither paved nor tiled, or else the tiles are covered with such a thickness of filth that they cannot possibly be seen. And you can see three or four beds, decrepit and askew, because the rope which holds them on their wormeaten frames is itself giving way. A straw mattress, a cover made of ragged scraps, rarely washed, because it is the only one; sometimes sheets, sometimes a pillow, there's the interior of the bed. As for closets, you don't need them in these houses. Often a weaver's loom and a spinning wheel round out the furniture . . . There it is that, often without a fire in winter, without sun in the daytime, by the light of a resin candle in the evening men work for fourteen hours for a salary of 15 to 20 sous. . . .

Now, it happens that many philanthropists, chatting between their coffee and liqueurs about the wretchedness of the people and its causes, perchance accuse drunkenness of being one of its principal causes. We think that a bad habit can be destroyed only by putting a better one in

its place. And we ask you, what entertainment is at the disposal of the worker for his Sunday leisure? He has the countryside in summer, and he does not fail to profit from it. But in winter? A room in the Rue des Fumiers or elsewhere, with crying children, and the company of a woman often embittered by want, or . . . the tavern . . .

Children of this class of people, until the day when they can add to the wealth of their family by means of degrading and depressing toil, spend their lives in the muddy gutters. It is painful to see them, pale, puffy, wilted, with red and runny eyes, like a different race, compared to the rosy, slender children who play on the Cours Henri IV. There is, you see, a weeding-out: the most hardy fruits are come to formation; but many have fallen beneath the tree. At twenty, you are either vigorous or dead. In fact, workers in this class only raise, on the average, a quarter of their children.

Amongst the maladies of the weavers, who make up this latter class, the most common are, for the most part, catarrh and pulmonary phthisis, chronic rheumatism, neuralgia, and perhaps most particularly facial neuralgia, angina, ophthalmia. The children, besides the scrofula which breaks out on them in its most hideous forms, are cut down from their earliest childhood by two illnesses which lack of treatment often renders fatal to them: pulmonary catarrh during the winter cold, and, above all in summer and at the beginning of the fall, diarrhea, often connected with a tubercular affection of the mesentery . . .

Many of these contemporary reports of lower class neighborhoods describe the conditions and living quarters of the self-employed workers using primitive tools in their businesses. But even among factory hands, who worked with and not against machines, living conditions in the new and growing mill towns were harsh and began to arouse public opinion. In fact, broad public opinion was hardly concerned about social conditions until the rise of the factory system and the growth of the mill town with its ugliness and poverty brought the social problem vividly into view.

The conditions of the lower classes were seriously influenced by the growth of industry and commerce. Although this influence was far deeper in Britain than in France, the awakening of public opinion which denounced poverty was as widespread in France and even more concentrated there because of the large number of workers in and around Paris. That few of these workers were in large factories until after 1848 and that even fewer were involved in a "capitalist" system was of no importance. Opinion lumped all workers together, the unskilled factory hand with the skilled workshop artisan, and considered them all in a pitiable state.

Hours were long, from twelve per day on the average to fourteen or fifteen in some trades during the peak season. Factory work was tiring and monotonous, foremen were usually harsh taskmasters because they too were under pressure to increase production, and women and children were used extensively in textiles and the clothing trades. Heart-breaking descriptions were printed of small children awakened before the light of day, scantily fed and clothed, and sent off to mills for the long day's toil, not returning until after dark, exhausted. They were unschooled, sickly, and lucky to live beyond the age of eighteen. Housing conditions were more bad than good. Slums grew in size, even in Paris where the poor and rich often lived in the same building, although on different floors, with the upper classes lower down and the lower classes higher up, usually in garrets steaming hot in summer and freezing in winter. In Lille, an industrial city where no well-to-do person lived in the workers' quarters, miserable handloom weavers and spinners squatted in dark, humid, putrid cellars where they died of tuberculosis.

Their lot was as yet unshared by many skilled artisans who were not in competition with mechanized production. Nonetheless, life was precarious for all workers; before the advent of unemployment insurance, generalized sickness and accident benefits, and old age pensions, working class families were constantly faced with periods of slack production and layoffs. Then children had to beg in the streets, mothers and grown daughters to sell themselves as prostitutes, and adult males to turn to crime. Neither public nor private charity could seriously offset such fateful and often fatal consequences. These social sufferings were not really new, nor were they created by the rise of the factory system; what was new were the growing beliefs that *laissez faire* capitalism was responsible for them, that such social suffering was an evil, and that equally evil was *laissez faire* liberalism, which condoned such sufferings as an inevitable part of competition. The rise of socialism began as a humanitarian reaction against poverty and as an ideological attack upon the capitalism held responsible for it.

2.

The Utopians as Social Types

To state that the utopians were soft-hearted humanitarians is too obvious to be of much value because many social critics were soft-hearted without becoming utopian or even socialist. The true socialist utopian, however indulgent he might be toward the working class, was part of a distinct group located chiefly within the rising middle class, and his utopian leanings were part of a general tendency in Europe to "utopianize."

After 1789 this general tendency cut across class lines during a period of considerable restructuring of the class hierarchy. There were, on the one hand, social critics who issued from the declining nobility and who painted the institutions of the Old Regime in utopian or idealistic colors. They recalled in their imagination a rural society of benevolent patriarchs and obedient peasants. They were reacting to the violent struggle for power during the Revolution which had dethroned them as an exclusive ruling class and had opened the way for the upward ascent of some of the middle class. They blamed capitalism as the cause of social injustice. On the other hand, there were ambitious individualists of middle or lower class origins who had risen to positions of power and wealth and, as *parvenus*, clung tenaciously to the notion that all life was a struggle, that the poor were the weak for whom little could be done, and that the nobles were inept and rightfully swept from power. Saint-Simon sought to provide a social conscience for this new category, but its members, who ruled France before 1815 and after 1830, were particularly reluctant to favor social reform legislation. Their utopia consisted of an ideal society of independent, self-willed businessmen fighting to get ahead in accord with the natural economic laws of the market place. Their chief utopian philosopher was not Saint-Simon, who appealed only to the more technocratically inclined; he was Jean-Baptiste Say, an economist more doctrinaire than Adam Smith, of whom he was a disciple. Their ideal type was the self-made entrepreneur, hard-working, thrifty, and materialistic. In contrast, the left-wing

ideologists of the middle class, few in number, having little hope of social reform and of achieving power for themselves, resorted either to secret societies and revolution to achieve political democracy, or to utopian planning to achieve social democracy.

Since political revolution and utopian planning required certain cultural achievements, leadership of the left throughout Europe was in the hands of discontented members of the educated middle class. Particularly, the imagining of an ideal society necessitated a certain knowledge of history, of social structure, of economic organization and of religious thought and practice which were well beyond the limited knowledge of the petty shopkeeper or of the average worker or farmer. The father had to have acquired a sufficiency of capital to provide his son with the education necessary for social planning. On the other hand, the message of reformers would have fallen on deaf ears if there had not existed in Catholic and Protestant countries certain traditions affecting social morality. In the former the cultural level of the lower classes was so low as to exclude their active participation in the reform leadership. Peasants could resort to *Jacqueries* or rural riots against, for example, food shortages and high prices, and urban workers could riot or go on strike in response to a particular grievance. But they could hardly conceive of a new society. Nonetheless, among the lower classes as well as among anti-capitalist land owners, there was a tradition of a "moral economy," an old view, running counter to *laissez faire*, which held that in time of stress and hardship either local or national authorities must control the distribution and prices of necessities in order to protect lower class persons. And in both Protestant and Catholic countries there was a social interpretation of Scripture which saw human relations in terms of brotherhood among men and human equality in the eyes of God. During the great upheavals and changes brought about by industrial and political revolutions there was a reawakening of millennialism among all classes, leading them to believe in the second coming, a new paradise on earth. Utopian thought fitted neatly into these old beliefs, especially by attiring itself in religious trappings and seeming to offer the possibilities of the advent of heaven upon earth for all classes.

Class reactions to the idea of utopia varied. When the idea of utopia was cast as the second coming, as the advent of the old or a new Christ, and had marked chiliastic overtones, it could attract followers from all ranks: landed nobles, middle class businessmen, workers, and farmers. The romantic age was one of considerable religious enthusiasm from the highest to the lowest in society, and this kind of manifestation

could even lead to founding co-operative communities in the old and new worlds, as exemplified by the Rappites and Shakers. But this current among socio-religious movements did not lead to a broader reform of society, for it was chiefly concerned with improving morality and church attendance, with saving souls rather than saving society as a secular form of human organization. Socialists often condemned these efforts as serious obstacles to significant change, as a tactic to draw poor people's attention away from reform and so weaken its thrust.

Truly socialistic utopian thought was largely the product of persons of a middle class culture who rejected religiosity and *laissez faire* as well as the poverty and disorder that the new industrialism displayed before them. The major exception was the German Wilhelm Weitling, a journeyman tailor who was unique because he insisted that the role of social emancipation must fall to the workers themselves. Given the weakness and timidity of the middle class east of the Rhine, his position was not so strange. In England, however, the middle class enjoyed an active role in society, was busy carrying on business and not much given to theoretical speculation.

Robert Owen, a genius and enterprising manager, also was born into the lower class. His father was a saddler and ironmonger, which meant a petty middle-class status. Robert, an omnivorous reader before the age of seven, went to the local primary school in central Wales only long enough to learn the three R's. At nine years of age he was apprenticed to a dry-goods merchant, to whom his father undoubtedly paid a sizable fee; he remained in this trade until he reached eighteen, then entered textiles as a manager. Before the age of thirty he formed partnerships, had become a capitalist, and was director of mills at New Lanark, Scotland. Here he followed in the already established tradition of David Dale's benevolent management and went much further: he repaired streets, enlarged old houses, and built new ones, improved sanitation, dispensed better and cheaper food in company stores, provided education and recreation for children and adult workers, ceased to employ pauper children under ten years, and reduced the work day to less than eleven hours. He would have gone further save that his partners balked even at these measures, which were considered quite advanced for the time. In fact, New Lanark became a showplace, visited by royalty and persons of power. Owen proved that benevolence could pay, that social services did not lead to bankruptcy but to highly profitable business. Yet most industrialists were so engrossed in their *laissez faire* utopia that they refused to believe evidence contrary to their secular faith.

Quite distinct were the bulk of utopians who were neither depressed workers nor successful businessmen. Charles Fourier was a quite unsuccessful businessman, really a *déclassé*. He was born at Besançon in eastern France, in 1772, one year after Owen, and was the son of a wealthy cloth merchant. He inherited about 100,000 francs, quite a fortune for the time, and invested it in cotton goods for foreign trade. During the Revolution he lived in Lyon. He was there when the city, part of a federalist movement led by Girondins, was besieged by the Jacobin centralist forces from Paris. In their desperate defense the Girondins confiscated his cotton and used it to build barricades that were eventually destroyed. Charles himself was nearly executed by the successful invaders; but after a short stay in prison the revolutionary tide ebbed and he was released—without indemnity for his cotton. He became a traveling salesman, a profession for which he had no liking and at which he was so bad that he was on the verge of actual want until he inherited a small pension from his mother in 1812. He always felt that there was a foundation of dishonesty in business; to be successful he would have to accept the contradiction between the ethics of profit he learned in business and the ethics of honesty he learned in school. The latter taught him that he must never tell an untruth, but when he was an apprentice his masters taught him "that noble profession of lying, the art of salesmanship." Like most humanitarians, he was sensitive, loved music and flowers and was truly a farm boy at heart. And like Owen, he had first-hand knowledge of the business world and his social criticism was all the more telling for being the exposé of one on the inside. As a salesman he was also acquainted with numerous rural organizations outside of Lyon, formed on a cooperative basis for the making of cheese and the growing of fruit. In his leisure time he educated himself and, in a crabbed, awkward, unorganized style, wrote *Theory of the Four Movements* (1808).

Etienne Cabet was another misfit of the French middle class. The place of his birth, Dijon, lay in the heart of the Burgundy wine district, where his father was the head of a successful cooperage firm. He received a good education and became a lawyer; however, he practiced for only a short while and then became a journalist in Paris. Louis Blanc was also born into a middle class family, but when he was born his father, formerly a ship fitter, was in dire economic straits. Therefore Louis received a good education thanks only to the royalist political connections of his mother. He, too, became a journalist in Paris and, along with Cabet and a host of reformers, formed a kind of intellectual proletariat, the off-spring of respectable families, without futures

because of their advanced ideas, and whose only hope lay in change. This does not suggest that they became reformers out of personal ambition. In fact, had they compromised with the prevailing powers, they could all—Fourier excepted—have enjoyed prosperous careers. They chose not to. They resisted them by word and pen, their careers as journalists, as professional social critics, and as reformers. In this respect they created a new profession.

Similar to them, and yet distinct, were a small group of revolutionary utopians, that is, men who came to view revolution as a necessary means to achieve a socialist society. Their founder was Noël (called Gracchus) Babeuf. He was born into a family which, although humble, found the means to provide him an education. He became a land agent, handling dues and rent collections of feudal landlords, and a specialist in land questions. Although a professional, he never really acquired a middle-class mentality, married a simple chambermaid, and grew disgusted with his job. He saw at first hand the problems of peasant tenure and later turned to revolution to abolish all private property. His efforts failed and he won the dubious distinction in 1796 of being the only well-known socialist theorist to be executed: He was found guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the new government of France. A fellow conspirator, Philip Buonarroti, fellow conspirator who claimed descent from Michelangelo, escaped death and later revived the ideas and methods of Babeuf.

These were taken up by Louis Auguste Blanqui. He also had a middle class background and a brother who won distinction as a *laissez faire* economist. Even less well known for his ideas than Babeuf; his fame derives chiefly from his conspiratorial activities, which won him the title of *révolté*. This title itself underlines his novelty as a social type. There were, of course, similar types in former times, and especially in backward areas. They were often bandits who robbed the rich, not merely as a way of living but also as a form of social protest, and they enjoyed considerable esteem among the poor. Both Buonarroti and Blanqui were professional revolutionaries, unflinchingly devoted to the overthrow of capitalism. They are classed as utopians here not only because they shared similar ideals with pacifist utopians but also because they were convinced that they and their small bands of followers could bring in the new age by overthrowing the ruling class. Theirs is the utopianism of action.

The utopian thinkers of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries do not depart from the prototype. Edward Bellamy, William Morris, H. G. Wells, and B. F. Skinner came out of the middle class, and were

déclassés in that they rejected the prevailing values of their class. The utopian dream, therefore, has remained a phenomenon of an educated elite capable of rising above narrow class interests in an attempt to speak for all mankind.

3.

Utopian Forms of Organization

Socialism as a Tool for Criticism

However diverse their social origins within the middle class, the utopians agreed in their adverse criticism of capitalism. In particular, they were in harmony about the social results of private industry. For the pre-1848 socialist the major targets of his criticism were, on the one hand, the doctrine of economic competition, and, on the other hand, the capitalist control of industry as private property.

He saw in *laissez faire* a terrible violation of the "natural" law of fraternity. Unlike the philosophers of the eighteenth century who had insisted that individual freedom was in accord with nature, the nineteenth century socialist insisted that the natural structure of society was organic; that is, that all men are brothers, bound to one another by love and by the God-created duty of mutual aid. Individualism was seen as an evil which sets man against man in mortal competition, each struggling to rise above his fellow man and consequently becoming deaf to the pleas of the unfortunates who sink into poverty. Competition led to hatred, mistrust, gross inequality, and human suffering.

Maldistribution of the massive wealth created by modern society was seen by the socialists as the necessary consequence of economic liberalism. Competition was the mechanism of distribution, and it worked to the advantage of the rich and powerful. Fourier, whose solution for economic inequality we shall review later, was a keen, penetrating analyst of the social results of unregulated capitalism. Competition was his chief enemy. Combined with private ownership of the means of production, it eliminated the possibility of a regulated economy, or as we say today, a planned economy. Anarchistic individual efforts to expand production resulted in a periodic overproduction which glutted the markets, causing a fall in prices and massive unemployment. This was the "bust," followed by a period of "boom" or rapidly rising output,

rising prices, and full employment. But then, soon after, came the "bust" again. The economic consequences of such cycles were bad enough: factories and machines were idle, investments destroyed, markets unstabilized, goods and food rotted in the midst of poverty. The social results were worse: not only were laborers thrown out of jobs, local merchants were unable to sell their produce to their jobless clientele, even manufacturers were ruined, thrown into debtors prison and forced down into the proletariat. Capitalism, then, was bringing about the division of society into two classes, the haves and have-nots. There was a concentration of ownership and wealth in fewer hands, and an increase in the number of workers, of unemployed and of poor people.

Utopians, like all social reformers, were also critical of liberal economists for their indifference toward human suffering. They refused to look upon the worker as a mere commodity subject to the pressures of the market and worthy of a higher wage only in times of a labor shortage and of a low wage in times of ample labor supply. The worker was a human being with human needs that were independent of the market. Utopians were humanists, soft-hearted to be sure, but also intelligent and aware. They ably put their fingers on the weak spots of liberal political economy. But unlike many other critics, they did not believe in reform; that is, in the reform of liberal capitalism; it was an utterly hopeless, pernicious system which must be brought to an end. The chief questions for utopians then, were: how to end capitalism, by peaceful or violent means, and with what to replace it? What are the social arrangements most compatible with human nature?

Views on Human Nature

The view a man holds about human nature usually determines the kind of political and social philosophy he will accept. True-blue anarchists tend to observe in the human psyche those forces of reason and restraint which make it possible for persons to live in a community, preferably a rather small one, without need of political authority, without need of control from outside of their own volitions. The nineteenth century extreme conservative at the opposite pole from the anarchist, was convinced that the human species, taken individually or collectively, was irrational, unpredictable and violent. What man required was authority to control his evil, destructive, sinful impulses. This authority was threefold: the crown, the pope and the hangman.

Utopians, in the company of most reformers, had a more optimistic view of man. Several of them were close to the anarchist view, others felt more control was necessary, at least until the best features of human

nature could be brought to the surface by progressive education. Nearly all believed that human nature was malleable; therefore, both social and economic institutions, on the one hand, and man's character, on the other, could be changed to make them compatible with a happy, free existence.

Many thinkers usually not classed as utopians would not deny this possibility, but they posited that such a goal was part of a long, very long, evolutionary process, would require patience, could not be accomplished simply because a few reformers desired it, and might prove undesirable once attained. Voltaire, in his novel *Candide*, described a utopia, "El Dorado", from which his hero fled after becoming bored with perfection. Several modern writers, social reformers also, have written anti-utopian novels to warn that the perfect society would really be a Kafkaian nightmare of tyranny and regulation. Evidently, none of these reformers, by no means conservative in their thinking, displayed that strong, joyous confidence in the benevolent creative capacities of men in utopia. The perfect society was either boring or tyrannical.

Now, utopians were not all of one mind about human nature. In the eyes of Charles Fourier, for example, it was excellent as it was. To distrustful conservatives he replied that man is the creation of God, and a belief in the goodness of God implies a belief in the goodness of all that God has created. A good God cannot have made man with evil impulses and passions against which the state and church must erect the gibbet. There exists no conflict between God and man because God will not make war with himself. In truth, both divine and human nature are in accord and unchanging from age to age. On this point, the immutability of men, Fourier differed most sharply from other social reformers, for he denied that character could be moulded either by ideas or environment. Of course, a restrictive milieu and a theology repressive of the passions could frustrate and cripple the human psyche. Fourier's true aim, however, was not to change the milieu in order to change man's character, but rather to change the milieu to make it fit the character man naturally has. By this he hoped to unharness all men so that they could act freely and enjoy their natural passions.

In this analysis of human nature and of its relation to the environment, Fourier was a sociologist before Auguste Comte invented the term and a psychoanalyst before Sigmund Freud. Man, Fourier thought, was happiest in a social setting which allowed him to exercise his passions, and the frustration of them was the chief cause of unhappiness and mental illness. Clearly, Fourier was not in any sense an ascetic; in

fact, he condemned other social reformers such as Robert Owen for wanting, so he claimed, to set up monastic societies rather than truly co-operative communities. Fourier, whose personal life was not the happiest, wanted his communities to provide normal outlets for human emotions, not to repress them, which, it must be pointed out, Owen did not intend to do either, as we shall see.

Fourier, more so than other utopians who were romantic in many ways, was a classifier. Self-trained in science, he set out to do for the passions what Linnaeus and other savants were doing for nature: to distinguish families and genera of phenomena. The first family were the five senses which he equated with passions and called them the "luxurious" because only the well-to-do could enjoy them all. The second family were the four affective passions of friendship, love, ambition and parenthood. While the first family of passions were individual and could provoke social divisions, the second family brought persons together. More important than these, however, were the "distributive" or "provocative" passions, without which no community of people could live together both harmoniously and functionally. Without them there would be no clustering of members of Fourier's community into small groups for purposes of production. Within this family there were three specific types which he described.⁴ First came the Butterfly Passion, meaning "the desire for periodic variety, contrasted situations, changes of scene, piquant incidents, novelties capable of creating illusion and stimulating both the senses and the mind." This desire, he insisted, is felt moderately every hour and vigorously every two hours. If it is not satisfied man falls into indifference and boredom. He then described the two provocative passions. "The Intriguing Passion and the Composite Passion are in perfect contrast: the first is a speculative and reflective passion, the second is a blind, intoxicating passion, an impulse born of the accumulation of many pleasures of the senses and mind, simultaneously experienced."

The Intriguing Passion, or party spirit, he explained, is the mania for intrigue. This passion burns fiercely in ambitious people, "courtiers, trade-guilds, merchants, and social life." The principal role of the Intriguing Passion in Fourier's mechanical series is to excite discord or emulation between groups sufficiently similar to compete for prizes and balance votes. Although sufficiently similar groups "will not join together in cultivating the early white pear, the late white, and the green spotted variety; although cultivating pears contiguous in color, these groups are essentially jealous and discordant. The same will be

true concerning the three groups cultivating yellow, brown, and green pippins. . . ."

Whatever the benefits of this passion Fourier insisted upon the need to encourage "Composite or Exhilarating Passion" which creates "enthusiastic agreements." The Intriguing Passion alone would not be enough to stimulate groups to labor; there must be put in play the Intriguing or reflective, and the Composite or blind, the latter being the most romantic of passions, the most opposed to reason. The Composite Passion is born of the union of many pleasures of the senses and mind, experienced simultaneously. This passion must be applied to all associative labor so that the Composite and Intriguing Passions may replace the vile forces found in "civilized" industry—forces such as the necessity of caring for children, the fear of starvation or of being confined in the poorhouse.

To sum up, the Intriguing Passion engenders discords and creates rivalry among contiguous groups, provided the groups are closely related in tastes and functions. The Composite Passion arising from the pleasures of sense and mind, produces exaltation. And the Butterfly Passion brings about coordination and supports the other two passions, sustaining their activity by short sessions and by the choice of new pleasures which it presents periodically before either satiety or even indifference arises.

Above all he insisted on the importance of the Butterfly Passion, that is, the necessity of short and varied sessions of work or other activities. In the "material realm" it produces sanitary equilibrium. A worker's health is necessarily injured if he works at the same task twelve hours a day, such as weaving, sewing, writing, or other work which does not successively exercise all parts of the body and mind. "In the Passional realm," he emphasized, "the Butterfly Passion produces agreement of characters, even of contraries. For example: A and B are two people of incompatible humor. It happens that of sixty groups which A frequents, he finds a third of them, twenty, in which his interests coincide with those of B, but in which he finds he must share some of B's tastes although opposed to his own. The same thing applies to B's tastes with regard to A; hence without loving each other they have mutual respect, consideration, and an interest in protecting each other."

Robert Owen also argued that co-operative living would make man happy, but to do so efforts must be made to form his character. For Owen, human character was neither this or that, save as it was moulded by the environment. The root of all evil, he insisted, was the false belief that man has the capacity to form his own character. This belief

enabled successful businessmen to claim that they were successful because of their superior traits, while the poor suffered in poverty because of weak character and evil habits. Owen's views were eventually published in *A New View of Society* (1830):⁵

Before any rational plan can be devised for the proper training and education of children, it should be distinctly known what capabilities and qualities infants and children possess, or, in fact, what they really are by nature.

If this knowledge is to be attained, as all human knowledge has been acquired, through the evidence of our senses, then is it evident that infants receive from a source of power over which they have no control, all the natural qualities they possess, and that from birth they are continually subjected to impressions derived from the circumstances around them; which impressions, combined with their natural qualities (whatever fanciful speculative men may say to the contrary), do truly determine the character of the individual through every period of life.

Owen insists that the individual has no control over his personal traits; man does not make himself in the sense that he forms his own human character. Rather, man is mentally and emotionally formed by environmental forces over which he has had little control up to the present. An entirely new educational system must be created along with co-operative communities to fit man for a new style of life based on association rather than competition.

Owen was in keeping with the sensationalist psychology of the eighteenth century, and so were most French social reformers whether utopian or not. Particularly the reformers in the democratic tradition such as Louis Blanc were strongly influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and by an early communist, Morelly, who wrote *Le Code de la Nature* (1775). In accord with the latter they believed that man combined two forces: one is egotistical which urged him to satisfy his own needs, the other is social or "altruistic," to use Jeremy Bentham's term, which urges him to help others. In accord with Rousseau, they argued that human nature is fundamentally good, in that it has potentialities for goodness. And like the environmentalists, they posit that it is a bad milieu which perverts man's natural goodness. Louis Blanc and Etienne Cabet, both active as journalists in the democratic movement after 1830, were the chief spokesmen for the view that human goodness was perverted by bad institutions, especially by *laissez faire* capitalism and the absolute right of private property and inequality which were fostered by Europe's rulers. What the utopians believed, generally speaking, was that natural man—man unspoiled by vicious environmental

factors—is good, virtuous and sociable; they even gave credence to a curious kind of social law of gravity, the force which draws men together to live in communities.

The question that remained to trouble some of them was this: given man's natural goodness, were all men equal in mental ability and physical force? To this, there was no unanimous answer. Fourier recognized differences of skill, force and fortune, and provided for different social levels in his community. Owen and Cabet came closest to insisting upon nearly full equality of talent. Inequality was the vicious consequence of capitalism and competition; in the socialist community the natural equality among men would emerge and make for justice. Noël (Gracchus) Babeuf would have agreed with the latter view when he argued that inequality of talent was a fiction, or a myth resulting from the inequality of power and wealth. Once there was no longer a struggle among some men to get more goods than they needed, men would settle down to a regime of equality of work and remuneration, natural to human equality.

Forms of Organization

The reform ideal of utopians was not fundamentally different from most socialist theories before 1848, hence they all sought to replace *laissez faire* individualism and competition with co-operation and community integration. All socialisms since time immemorial have sought to adapt man to a truly communitarian life, based on an agrarian economy with land serving as the bond of all human relations. The utopians of the eighteenth century, Morelly, Mably and Babeuf, were still primarily rural in their outlook, as well as Spartan in their values and puritanical in their morals. City life, as well as a factory economy, still seemed the solvent of the collective spirit. The utopians of the nineteenth century did not fully repudiate this heritage, but they did take into account the achievements of the industrial revolution, especially the second generation utopians who came to socialism after 1820.

It was precisely among these utopians that ideal forms of organization revealed increasing diversity. The agrarian thinkers had placed strong emphasis on equality, with identical dress, work, play and thought. Cabet, who was born in the eighteenth century, remained close to this tradition. In his imaginary country, called Icaria, production is arranged so as to produce, in massive amounts, suits, dresses, hat, shoes, all articles of attire, according to a few simple, almost puritanical patterns. Therefore all the Icarian men look alike, as do all Icarian women, and children. The only difference is based on sex and maturity. The French

say *Vive la différence*, and the Icarian can shout this even louder because sex is the *only* difference. In public restaurants everyone eats the same food, at the same time, sings the same songs, reads the same newspapers, gets up and goes to bed at the same hour.

Owen seems to have aimed at a similarly regularized schedule. After all, utopia was a land of economic regulation and collective ownership in the interest of equality. Individual vagaries and whims were of far less interest to the socialist reformer concerned with mass happiness than to a defender of individual freedom such as John Stewart Mill. Equality was their primary aim, personal freedom only secondary. Owen, for example, firmly believed in the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Happiness was possible, not always for man as an individual, but certainly for a community of men.

Routine is as necessary in a socialist as in a capitalist economy for the adequate production of the wealth upon which living standards depend. In Icaria, the imaginary utopia of Cabet, as in New Harmony, a real community founded by Owen, there was equality of wealth in the sense that each member enjoyed the right to obtain what he needed for a healthy, comfortable life. Apart from a few exceptions, utopians tended to believe that each person should produce in accordance with his strength and consume in accordance with his needs. They assumed that under the socialist, or really communist economy, consumable goods would be abundant, placed in public stores, and available to all. As Louis Blanc once put it in a moment of ecstatic vision, goods would be as plentiful as air, and no one would consume more than necessary for the same reason that no one breathes more than necessary.

Of course, not all utopians were of one mind, and some were ambivalent about equality. In 1817 Owen drew up a plan for Villages of Unity and Mutual Co-operation and made provision for four classes with different amounts of property and levels of consumption. Later, when he founded a co-operative community in America, he became more equalitarian.

More consistent was Charles Fourier who flatly rejected full equality. In fact, some socialists have disclaimed Fourier as one of their own, for he looked to capitalists to provide him with the money to set up his communities, and he offered a return on their investment, special living quarters for them and a more delectable cuisine in the public restaurant. Fourier called his co-operative community a "phalanstery," and the goods it produced were to be divided threefold; as he explained:⁶

We finally arrive at the principal object, the terrifying problem of establishing a strikingly just and completely harmonious distribution

of profits and a recompense satisfactory to everyone in accordance with his three industrial faculties: *labor, talent and capital* . . .

We now see the triumph of that cupidity so much defamed by moralists. God would not have given us this passion if He had not foreseen a useful means of employing it for general equilibrium. I have already proven that epicurism, likewise outlawed by philosophers, becomes the road to wisdom and industrial concord in the *passional Series*. It will be seen that cupidity produces the same effect, becoming a road to distributive justice, and that in creating our passions *God does well all that He does* . . .

I distinguish between the general and particular impulsions which lead every harmonian [Fourierist] towards equity.

1. *General impulsions* applied to the three faculties, capital, labor and talent: Alcippus is one of the rich stockholders. Such a sum as would yield him three to four per cent interest in "civilization," [competitive society] in the phalanstery will produce twelve to fifteen per cent, at a rough estimate, if agreement is reached in regard to the distribution. This means that he will favor distributive justice and reject every measure which would wrong one of the three faculties. If by right of strength the capitalist wished to allow *capital* half the income (for example: capital six-twelfths, labor four-twelfths, talent two-twelfths), the two numerous classes which receive an income only on the other two faculties, labor and talent, will be dissatisfied: attraction will slacken, productivity and concord will diminish, and with the third year the associative bond will be dissolved. Alcippus sees that for his own interest he must fix distribution as follows: capital four-twelfths, labor five-twelfths, talent three-twelfths. Calculated on this basis the distribution will still give Alcippus an income quadruple that which he had in "civilization"; in addition it will guarantee the contentment of the two less fortunate classes and the maintenance of the associative bond. . . .

In this case cupidity, which would have impelled him to vote a share of one-half for capital, is counterbalanced by two honorable impulsions. These are: his affection for various associative series which he frequents and in which moreover he has some shares of labor and talent to collect on. He also has the conviction of finding his interest in the collective interest, in the contentment of the entire phalanstery, and in the progress of industrial attraction which is the source of future riches. . . .

Let us analyze the same balancing-forces, the same equilibrium, in the impulsions of the poor class.

Jeannot has no capital, no stock; will he vote to favor labor at the expense of capital or talent? to fix the proportion at: labor seven-twelfths, capital three-twelfths, talent two-twelfths?

Here the dominant impulsion is to favor labor to the detriment of the two other faculties, capital and talent. Such would be the opinion

of every "civilized" poor man; the peasant says: It is I who produce everything. He believes he is entitled to everything he can steal from the lord who, for his part, thinks he has a right to take everything from the peasant. Such is the equilibrium of passions in the "civilized" state, a struggle of pillage and cunning called "perfectibility."

In a harmonious community the poor Jeannot will think very differently. His strongest impulse is to favor labor since he has no pretensions to the dividends allowed to capital. But two other impulses come to counterbalance this brutish impulse of cupidity. Jeannot has some claims on the share allotted to talent; he shines at certain tasks, therefore, it is desirable for him that talent should maintain its rights. On the other hand, he knows the importance of capitalists in a phalanstery, the advantages which the poor receive from all their expenditures on free shows, carriages and horses, public meals, desserts at rich tables, and industrial adoption of his own children. Even if he could not appreciate all these opportunities of profit he would learn it in the company of the forty groups which he frequents, for the corporate bodies never misunderstand their own interests.

These two impulsions dispose Jeannot to protect the interests of talent and capital, and reduce the share of labor from seven-twelfths to five-twelfths. This reduction, all things considered, is to his advantage, for his only happiness consists in maintaining the phalanstery and attraction, which would be in jeopardy immediately if capital and talent were badly rewarded.

The allotment to talent, limited to three-twelfths and perhaps to two-twelfths, is, after all, very plentiful, because in each branch of industry there is a mass of novices without title to the share allotted to talent. They number at least a third in each undertaking, often a half; this assures a large portion to the other half who alone are rewarded for talent. The allotments to labor do not present this opportunity, because each member of a group working in it to a greater or less degree, has a right to participate. For that reason labor merits at least five-twelfths of the profit, and it is doubtful whether it should not be raised higher, according to the relationship: *Labor three-sixths, Capital two-sixths, Talent one-sixth.*

On another occasion, he suggested a $3/6$, $1/6$, $2/6$ division for labor, capital, and talent. Whatever the division, capitalist investors were promised a good return on their capital. On the other hand, Fourier was aware of a danger to co-operation in the unlimited accumulation of income by investors, and proposed to check it by reducing the interest rate on additional shares of stock beyond a fixed number. He thereby created a form of progressive tax on income from stock. His socialism or quasi socialism consists in his desire to provide each member of the

phalanstery with stock so that the community will eventually belong to its inhabitants collectively if not necessarily in equal portions. He also planned to do away with wages; each person would receive what he needed on credit and pay at the end of each year when profits were divided. Any excess due the worker or manager was to be paid off in stock.

Whatever the degree of economic equality proposed by Fourier and other utopians, they all rejected *laissez faire* as a basis for the distribution of wealth. If some persons may, because of skills and acquired wealth, be rich, no one would be poor. Even menial labor would provide an adequate standard of living, poverty disappearing along with unemployment and unhappiness. All the utopians, therefore, conceived of a vast increase of goods, though their conceptions of the means of production and of types of social organization show marked diversity. Most prominent were those who preferred artisanal industry performed in small communities.

Fourier conceived of a society broken up into rather small communities of producers, between 1800 and 2000 members, mainly involved with agriculture and organized into "passional" series and groups. In his view the group is the basic productive unit, and several groups compose a series. As in the animal world, the series represents the species, and the groups the varieties of the series. For example, a series may be devoted to the production of roses (Fourier had a deep fondness for flowers). If there are twenty varieties of roses, there will be twenty groups in the rose producing series. One group produces red roses, another group white roses, another yellow, and so on. With great detail Fourier, a utopian's utopian, explained that for efficient functioning, a group must consist of at least seven members and a series of at least three groups:⁷

The term group is applied to any assembly whatever, even to a troop of nincompoops united by boredom, without passion or aim; empty-headed people occupied with killing time and waiting for news. In the theory of passions a group is understood to be a mass bound together by identity of taste for an exercised function. Three men dine together: they are served a soup which pleases two and displeases a third. At this moment they do not form a group as they are discordant on the function which occupies them—the soup creates no identity of passional taste.

The two whom this soup pleases form a false group. To be a true one, susceptible to passional equilibrium, a group must consist of at least three persons—just as scales are composed of three forces, of

which the means maintain the equilibrium between the two extremes. Briefly, no group can consist of less than three people homogeneous in taste on the exercised function . . .

I have spoken only of *sub-groups*, of which the minimum is three persons. A *full group* in associative mechanics, must have at least SEVEN, because it must contain three sub-divisions, called *sub-groups*, of which the middle one must be stronger than the extremes, so as to hold them in balance. The group of seven furnishes three sub-divisions, — 2, 3, 2 — applied to three portions of one function. In this case the groups of 2, although false in isolated action, become admissible by alliance with the others.

If the center, formed of three persons, is in balance with the sub-groups, two and two, forming the extremes, then the center is always drawn to the most attractive function. Accordingly, it has a numerical superiority of one, and an attractive superiority of one . . .

In this way there will be two wings and a center, both absolutely necessary. In Fourier's view the two wings create a salutary tension, balanced and mediated by the center. A sufficient size will guarantee that each series and its groups will be "contrasted," that is, differentiated so that within each group its members will become enthusiastic, the red rose producers going all out for red roses, the white rose producers going all out for white roses, and so on through all the colors. There will, he reasoned, spring up common sympathies and alliances within each group and among groups with similar tastes. They will also become "rivalized," a second condition necessary to create emulation among the groups in a series and encourage superior performance and devotion. Fourier distinguished between emulation and capitalist competition. The latter led to gross inequality and the destruction of the weak and unlucky; emulation is a necessary stimulant to enhance the total amount of consumable goods, a result from which the entire phalanstery will profit because phalansterians do not allow the weak and unlucky to be crushed. Neither does it engender hostility because groups are also "interlocked," that is, they do not spend the entire work-day producing one product. Rather members separate from each group to form new groups every two hours or so in order to perform a new function perhaps the production of yellow pears, for which Fourier had a special fondness. The butterfly passion comes into play and obviates permanent and harmful competition, the *manie d'écraser* (mania to crush) as Fourier called it. But of course the passions could function properly only in the type of community he proposed.

Fourier personally preferred agriculture and horticulture to industry. Artisan industry would turn out good, solid merchandise which, unlike

the flimsy produce of large factories, would last a long time. As a traveling salesman, Fourier had little respect for manufactured goods and factory interiors. He preferred the outdoors, the land, succulent food and fragrant flowers. He believed that workers should spend as much time with nature as possible and he saw no need for a large industrial labor force. In this respect he was at one with the rural-minded Babeuvians as well as with the romantics who glorified natural settings in their paintings and poems.

Owen, albeit an industrialist, also tended to give greater importance to agriculture than to industry. But unlike Fourier he preferred large-scale industry in which machines would free workers for agriculture. He advocated co-operative communities of a rather small scale, 300 to 2000 persons.⁷

Within this range more advantages can be given to the individuals and to society than by the association of any greater or lesser number.

But from 800 to 1,200 will be found the most desirable number to form into agricultural villages; and unless some very strong local causes interfere, the permanent arrangements should be adapted to the complete accommodation of that amount of population only.

Villages of this extent, in the neighborhood of others of a similar description, at due distances, will be found capable of combining within themselves all the advantages that city and country residences now afford, without any of the numerous inconveniences and evils which necessarily attach to both those modes of society.

But a very erroneous opinion will be formed of the proposed arrangements and the social advantages which they will exhibit, if it should be imagined from what has been said that they will in any respect resemble any of the present agricultural villages of Europe, or the associated communities in America, except in so far as the latter may be founded on the principle of united labour, expenditure, and the property, and equal privileges.

Recommending, then, from 300 to 2,000 according to the localities of the farm or village, as the number of persons who should compose the associations for the new system of spade husbandry, we now proceed to consider—

Second—The extent of land to be cultivated by such association.

This will depend upon the quality of the soil and other local considerations. . . .

Society, ever misled by closet theorists, has committed almost every kind of error in practice, and in no instance perhaps a greater, than in separating the workman from his food, and making his existence depend upon the labour and uncertain supplies of others, as is the case under our present manufacturing system; and it is a vulgar error to

suppose that a single individual more can be supported by means of such a system than without it; on the contrary, a whole population engaged in agriculture, with manufactures as an appendage, will, in a given district, support many more, and in a much higher degree of comfort, than the same district could do with its agricultural separate from its manufacturing population.

Improved arrangements for the working classes will in almost all cases place the workman in the midst of his food, which it will be as beneficial for him to create as to consume.

Sufficient land, therefore, will be allotted to these cultivators, to enable them to raise an abundant supply of food and the necessaries of life for themselves, and as much additional agricultural produce as the public demands may require from such a portion of the population.

Under a well-devised arrangement for the working classes they will all procure for themselves the necessaries and comforts of life in so short a time, and so easily and pleasantly, that the occupation will be experienced to be little more than a recreation, sufficient to keep them in the best health and spirits for rational enjoyment of life.

The surplus produce from the soil will be required only for the higher classes, those who live without manual labour, and those whose nice manual operations will not permit them at any time to be employed in agriculture and gardening.

Of the latter, very few, if any, will be necessary as mechanism may be made to supersede such operations, which are almost always injurious to health.

Under this view of the subject, the quantity of land which it would be the most beneficial for these associations to cultivate, with reference to their own well-being and the interests of society, will probably be from half an acre to an acre and a half for each individual.

An association, therefore, of 1,200 persons, would require from 600 to 1,800 statute acres, according as it may be intended to be more or less agricultural.

It follows that land under the proposed system of husbandry would be divided into farms of from 150 to 3,000 acres, but generally perhaps from 800 to 1,500 acres. This division of the land will be found to be productive of incalculable benefits in practice; it will give all the advantages, without any of the disadvantages of small and large farms.

Much like Fourier, Owen drew sketches of his model community to show the general layout in the form of a parallelogram, and the location of private apartments, of store rooms, of public kitchens, the infirmary, the church or places of worship, schools, parks where there would be ample free space for light and air, promenades, and everything conceivable for a pleasant existence. Industrial buildings were to be placed near the farmland so that persons could easily alternate

between manufacturing and farming. Owen did not believe in the butterfly passion and therefore did not envisage alternation every two hours or so. On the other hand, he repudiated a minute division of labor and over-specialization which, he felt, made for imbecility. He believed, it appears, that machinery will do all the hard and specialized tasks and workers will merely tend them and perform the tasks requiring intelligence. With "comparatively light and always healthy employment" the co-operative community would produce more goods than needed for a high standard of living and for trade with other communities. Therefore the lowest worker would be far superior in his comfort to the workers in private enterprise who were, he affirmed, mere clodhoppers in agriculture and in industry mere pin-pointers or nail-headers or cogs in the machine. The machine would no longer be the enemy of the laborer, threatening to deprive him of his job, but the servant producing unprecedented wealth.

Since most Owenite co-operators would cultivate the land, Owen had in mind what he called "spade culture." In about 1817-18 he drew up a plan for a co-operative village where jobless workers could live and cultivate the land with spades rather than plows. This idea received some popularity and some of Owen's philanthropic backers always thought his utopia was a public works project for the unemployed. But Owen eventually adapted this system for his socialist village. It was a form of intensive cultivation, requiring a sizable labor force because the spade replaced the plow, and therefore it promised to augment crops on a limited amount of arable land and also to improve the land. Evidently Owen's knowledge of farming was rather limited; it is difficult to understand how he could refer to spade work as "comparatively light and always healthy." Few occupations are more devastating to the back, as any old fashioned land worker knows.

Not all utopians were so enamoured of agriculture and devoted to small communities. In fact, one can refer to those who broke from these ideas as a second generation of utopians. The first, Babeuf, Fourier and Owen, published their seminal works between the 1790's and 1820. Those who followed burst forth suddenly, like a flower in the spring rain between 1839 and 1848. The 1840's was a particularly fruitful decade with a rich harvest of books and pamphlets advocating both political and social reform. Increasingly shrill cries for republican forms of government and national unification provided an awakened political consciousness for the new utopians and encouraged them to conceive of the national state as the geographic seedbed of socialism. Possibly they were influenced by Johann Fichte, a founder of German national-

ism, who advocated the creation of a national state and attributed to it the ownership of all the means of production; both national and socialist feeling would serve as the living bond holding a large community together. Whether they knew of Fichte or not, the second generation of utopians was quite patriotic, even jingoistic; they dropped the idea of small communities and sought to transform the entire nation. In addition, they experienced the industrial revolution, and although critical of its social results, discerned the utility of mechanized production. Their utopian thought was really an imaginative, humanitarian facet of the broad ideology which formed part of the process of modernization. To them the older agrarian communitarianism in which industry was only grudgingly admitted was obsolete. Indeed, several of them scarcely gave attention to agricultural organization because they distrusted peasants. And this distrust would attenuate their enthusiasm for political democracy.

Wilhelm Weitling appears here as an example of the change, and also of the hesitation that accompanied it. He was not really a transitional figure in that he adopted most of the socialist ideas of the second generation, and he published his major book, *Garantieen der Harmonie und Freiheit* in 1842, two or three years after the seminal works of the French school. He reflected the still dominant place of artisan production in central Europe, his ideal a paradise of handcraftsmen, a utopia of skilled workers organized into co-operatives producing highly finished goods for a population of roughly one million. In his love of artisanship and small-scale industry he differed from the French.

Even the oldest member of the Gallic utopians, Cabet, was firmly committed to mass industrial production and a division of labor so minute as to make his brothers in reform wince. It is unfortunate that Cabet's name has become associated with a few unsuccessful experimental villages, chiefly agrarian, in America. His imaginary utopia, Icaria, was really a transformed France, not a small community. In Icaria the state would own all means of production, in fact, practically all consumable goods. Cabet, unlike most social reformers, referred to himself openly as a communist, and probably coined the term, or, at least, brought it into current usage and understood by it not only complete equality but also the complete abolition of private property. Neither Fourier nor Owen had gone this far. Nor had Weitling who would allow artisans to produce luxury goods after hours and to offer them to other workers in return for their after-hours creations. But Cabet was more devoted to large-scale production. Therefore he advocated state ownership, centralized control and standardization. He

designed his system expressly to encourage an ample abundance of merchandise by means of an original pattern or prototype of each article, as simple as possible so as to facilitate mass production. In chorus with Owen, he wanted machines to do all heavy disagreeable work, but industry would not occupy a secondary place. By means of it the male workday could be reduced to seven hours, from the eleven or twelve hours that were common in the 1840's, and without a decline in productivity; on the contrary, the rate of productivity and therefore total production would rise appreciably. There would not result an equality of poverty but an equality of well-being and happiness.

Now, Cabet, city born and city bred, knew that his industrial set-up would appeal to the working class. He was one of the few utopians with a large working class following in Paris and in some provincial towns. On the other hand, he was well-informed of peasant conservatism and love of the land. Therefore, in Icaria, farming would be based on the family as a kin and economic unit. Farms, although the property of the state, would be allocated to individual families, all living within a radius of not more than two-hours distance from a town. Clearly Cabet was reacting here to the isolation and intellectual backwardness of many farm communities. Moreover, the family farm had to become more efficient so as to produce a surplus for the city dwellers. Sons, therefore, were to obtain a year of agricultural education, at the end of which they would return to the land, retaining the farm within the family. And of course Cabet had in mind the extended family including at least three generations from the grandparents to the grandchildren. Such a unit can attain a population of forty or more, enjoy self-sufficiency in labor resources, as well as in the simple enjoyments such as singing and games.

Just as decidedly oriented toward collectivized industry organized within the context of the national state were Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, Constantin Pecqueur, and, as part of this trend, the leading disciple of Fourier, Victor Considerant. The latter attempted to adapt the original phalanstery to the rising republican movement, without much success. Louis Blanc, in his famous little book, *Organisation du Travail* (1840), put forward the idea of setting up, within French society as it existed, co-operative social workshops (*ateliers sociaux*).⁹

As this would require a considerable outlay of funds, the number of workshops initiating the new order would be rigorously limited; but by virtue of their very organization . . . they would be endowed with an immense power of expansion.

The government being considered the sole founder of the social workshops, it would draw up the articles of association. This draft, deliberated upon and voted by the national representatives, would have the form and force of law.

All workers who offered guaranties of their responsibility would be called to labor in the social workshops—as many workers, that is, as could be employed by the capital first assembled for the purchase of the instruments of labor.

Although the false and anti-social education of the present generation makes it difficult for anyone to find a motive for emulation and encouragement elsewhere than in higher rewards for the laborer, wages would be equal. An entirely new education would be necessary to change ideas and habits.

For the first year following the establishment of the social workshops, the government would regulate the respective functions of the members. After the first year it would no longer do so. The workers having had time to estimate each other's ability and being all equally interested . . . in the success of the association, the functional hierarchy would be determined by elections.

Every year there would be drawn up a statement of the net profit, separated into three parts: one would be divided equally amongst the members of the association, another would be set aside (1) for the care of the aged, sick and infirm; (2) for the alleviation of crises in other industries, since industries would owe each other aid and succor; the third part, finally, would be devoted to furnishing the instruments of labor to those who wished to join the association, so that it could expand indefinitely.

To each of these associations, formed for industries which can operate on a large scale, would be admitted persons in occupations which would by their very nature be dispersed and localized. Thus each social workshop would be composed of various occupations grouped about a great industry—different parts of the same whole, obeying the same laws and participating in the same advantages.

Each member of the social workshop would have the right to dispose of his wages as he saw fit, but it would not be long before the evident economy and undeniable excellence of commercial life would cause association in labor to produce voluntary association in obtaining the necessities and enjoyments of life.

Capitalists would be invited into the association and would receive interest on capital deposited by them. This interest would be guaranteed by the budget, but they would share in profits only if they became workers.

Once the social workshop is established on these principles, one may understand what would result.

In each principal industry, in the engineering industry, for example, or in the cotton or printing trade, there would be a social workshop competing with private industry. Would the struggle be very long? No, because the social workshop would have over every individual workshop the advantage which results from communal life and from a mode of organization in which all the workers, without exception, have an interest in producing quickly and well. Would the struggle be destructive? No, because the government would always be in a position to moderate the effects of it by preventing the price of goods produced in the social workshops from falling too low. Today when an extremely rich individual enters the arena against others less wealthy, the unequal struggle can only be disastrous if the individual seeks merely his personal interest; if he can sell twice as cheaply as his competitors in order to ruin them and remain master of the field he does so. But when this individual is replaced by governmental authority itself, the question changes its aspect. . . .

Thus, instead of being the master and tyrant of the market as the big capitalist is today, the state would be its regulator. It would use the weapon of competition not to overthrow individual industry violently, it would be interested above all in avoiding this, but to lead it gradually toward capitulation. Soon, in fact, in every sphere of industry where a social workshop had been established, one would see workers and capitalists hastening toward that institution on account of the advantages it offered to the associates. . . .

As an industry is not always carried on in one place, as it has different centers, it would be necessary to establish, as between all the workshops belonging to the same kind of industry, the system established in each individual workshop. For it would be absurd, after having killed competition among individuals, to let it exist among corporations. Therefore, in each sphere of industry which the government had succeeded in dominating there would be a central workshop upon which all the others, as supplemental workshops, would depend. Just as M. Rothschild possesses banks not only in France but in various parts of the world which are in communication with the one where the principal seat of his business is fixed, so each industry would have a principal center and branch establishments. . . .

From the solidarity of all workmen in the same workshop we have proceeded to the solidarity of workshops in the same industry. To complete the system it would be necessary to achieve the solidarity of different industries. It is for that we have deducted from the quota of profit gained by each industry a sum by means of which the State could come to the aid of any industry suffering from unforeseen or extraordinary occurrences. Moreover, in the system which we propose, crises would be much more rare. Whence do they arise nowadays in great part? From the truly atrocious conflict to which all interests devote

themselves. . . . By killing competition, the evils it generates would be suppressed. No more victories, therefore, no more defeats. . . .

What we have just said regarding industrial reform is sufficient to indicate the principles and bases on which we should like to see agricultural reform operate. The abuse of collateral inheritances is universally recognized. These would be abolished and the values they were found to consist of would be declared communal property. Each commune would in this way succeed in forming a domain for itself which would be rendered inalienable, and which, since it could only expand, would lead without broils or usurpations to an immense agricultural revolution. Moreover, the communal domain would have to be exploited on a grand scale and in accordance with the rules governing industry. . . .

Blanc's social workshops were truly socialistic and unfortunately often confused with the national workshops set up by the French government in 1848 and which existed merely to hire unemployed laborers. These latter were like the old charity workshops (*atelier de charité*) which governments had traditionally set up during times of economic depression.

Unfortunately Blanc referred to his organization as workshops; in truth, he should have used the term factory for that is what he intended them to become. From relatively modest beginnings they were to grow, install the latest machines, use steam power and expand their labor force until all workers were drawn to them in search of higher wages, shorter hours, and the benefits of brotherly relations. Eventually each local shop would federate with a national center so that in each trade there would be national regulations governing the organization and production of each shop. Blanc's objective was to eliminate competition among shops; hence his insistence that they owe aid to one another when in distress. Since within each shop there was to exist a regime of industrial democracy, that is, the election of managers by the labor force, presumably the economic hierarchy within each trade also would be democratically organized. This hierarchy was not to interfere excessively in the activity of each local workshop. Blanc insisted upon the need for autonomy lest local initiative and spontaneity suffer extinction. Central organizations could only lay down general principles and policies; local units applied these in accordance with local needs. The same system held for commerce, with each industry providing for its own stores and warehouses.

Blanc was particularly favorable to national bonds among workshops, not merely because he was a champion of a large-scale planned economy, and a French patriot distrustful of strong regional or separatist sentiment, but also because he keenly distrusted competition. He therefore rejected the demand for competition among workers' co-operatives

as a stimulant: The very principle of competition must vanish, for to retain it even among co-operatives would eventually bring about the same ruthless rivalry among them as among capitalist concerns, and the same state of injustice. In competitive conditions the necessary feeling of fraternity cannot take root and soon the new economy, even with its form of class structure, would hardly differ from capitalism. "Association constitutes progress," he warned, "only on the condition of being universal."

A truly socialist society, in the eyes of Blanc, requires substituting the idea of social duty for that of personal interest. Social duty means the obligation to help others, and it is incumbent upon each member of a social workshop to contribute to the progress of his shop. To encourage each to do his best, to practice "fraternal emulation" as Blanc put it, he devised a scheme of meritorious rewards. The best workers were not to be rewarded by money, but by medals and membership in an elite corps, a Legion of Honor of Work. Blanc took this idea from Napoleon I. As an historian Blanc was well aware that reasonable men could be induced to acts of bravery and devotion merely by offering them a ribbon and a title. Why not, he asked, put this passion to use for socialism. One can argue that fraternal emulation was really competition under another name, at least within the workshop. Perhaps so, but since Blanc insisted upon the payment of equal wages, men would have to compete for honors rather than money and this was a sign of the love of others rather than the love of self.

Blanc's plans were chiefly for industrial workers. About the peasants he had little to say until they voted massively against socialists in 1848. And even then his outlook remained that of the urbanite, scornful of the ignorant and backward rural folk. His main criticism was that they were too easily dominated by priests, were egoists and traditionalists. Therefore he believed that socialism would begin in cities and, after its benefits became manifest, would continue to the countryside. Then small peasant farms would be consolidated into large, mechanized co-operatives modeled upon those of industry.

Unlike Cabet, Owen and Fourier, Blanc did not found a school of socialism with clearly identified disciples. His system, considerably attenuated, later merged with left-wing republicanism and contributed to a movement known as radical-socialism. There were, however, several socialist thinkers with ideas quite similar to his and, without forming a school, Constantin Pecqueur and François Vidal rallied to him in 1848 to indoctrinate the workers of Paris with their socialist program. These thinkers wanted to change not merely the relations between employers and employed but the very nature of work.

4.

Utopian Society

Nature of Work

Utopian socialism meant not only co-operative arrangements for production and distribution of goods, it meant a basic reorganization of social values and class structure. Primary to its ideal of equality was its new view on the whole process of work. The Christian culture of Europe had always exhibited an ambivalent attitude toward man's way of getting a living. On the one hand, all men were equally condemned to earn their living by painful toil. On the other hand, there was a hierarchy of "toil." The work of churchmen (saving souls) was more honorable than that of laymen; the work of nobles (ruling and fighting) was more honorable than that of wealthy commoners (managing); the work of managers and professionals was more honorable than that of hand laborers. There was a hierarchy of honorability and one's position in society was determined by the kind of work one performed, and in most cases, the kind of work one performed was determined by the social status of one's family. The value of work, therefore, was defined by inherited social status and there were honorable or noble tasks, there were nonhonorable (not dishonorable) tasks, and there were menial (almost dishonorable) tasks which included nearly all wage labor. Moreover, work itself, regardless of status, was a sign of man's fall from Eden, a symbol of his sinful nature. Christianity had condemned man "to eat bread in the sweat of his brow." Work was a punishment for original sin. By the nineteenth century, this view was most common among pro-clerical monarchists whose ideals remained rooted in the value system of a rural society. But even middle class liberals who had sought to raise the prestige of the urban entrepreneur and especially those with Calvinist leanings such as François Guizot, continued to insist that wage labor was a necessary restraint upon man's sinful nature. Work, good hard work over long hours, saved men, women, and children from debauchery.

Utopians repudiated these views. First, they found repugnant the assertion that work was the result of original sin; in fact, they firmly rejected the Christian view that man is sinful. And the work performed by man, any kind of work, is a necessary and laudable part of the sphere of human activity and deserves its just reward, both materially and honorifically. Their educational system and their culture emphasize the positive value of labor, and teach that everyone, save the incapacitated, the juvenile, and the old, must work. Weitling was most emphatic on the high value he attached to artisan labor. His is a paradise of skilled workers, which retains many of the egalitarian features of the old guild system and, in particular, its insistence on the high level of quality in workmanship. Work is honorable because its final product gives birth to pride in the worker.

In the theories of Louis Blanc and Cabet, both of whom anticipated a highly advanced mechanizational division of labor, it is difficult to discover in what precise way physical work proves beneficial to man. Of course, mechanization makes for group effort and therefore reinforces the numerous other activities which serve to integrate each individual into a collective community. Both of these utopians feared that skilled workers overly prideful of their special skills would tend toward egotism. They are a menace to good social bonds and can even become trouble-makers. Work performed in large factories evokes as much satisfaction as work carried out in small shops, and the greater efficiency of the machine cuts labor time and adds to the hours of leisure. Work is a definite good, but so is leisure.

A second consideration in the utopians' views on work is their rejection of a hierarchy of professions. The shoemaker becomes as highly esteemed as the medical doctor or scientist. An Icarian affirmed, "our laws make a doctor as honored and as happy as possible. Why, then, should he complain if a shoemaker is equal to him in this respect?" Most utopians feel that there should be equality of reward for all kinds of work. Fourier, of course, is the exception here, but he best represents another innovation of the socialists, the firm belief that work will be joyful in their ideal society. Lest one's immediate task becomes boring, one may and should change it frequently. In a system fully open to talent and inclination, each man will work at jobs befitting him. The idea of careers open to talent is a common trait among all socialists. Personal ambition for one's own career, of course, is discouraged. Work is a joy only when performed as a means of helping the entire society achieve progress, and as a means of fulfilling one's sense of pleasure in creation or performance. Hence the common emphasis on honorific titles for leadership and inventiveness and devotion.

Work becomes a pleasure not simply because of changed attitudes but also because of changed conditions. Indeed, attitudes and conditions must complement each other. Somehow, in utopia, there is no dirty work. The only thinker to touch on this problem is Fourier who suggests that tasks involving garbage and filth can be readily performed by children who naturally enjoy dirt. The vigor of juvenile gangs, such a menace to property in capitalist society, can be put to use by letting youngsters form into series and groups according to their bent toward particular kinds of filth. As their butterfly passions dictate, they shift from one dirty job to another, to the content of their little hearts. For other utopians, child labor is to disappear. Hard, back-breaking labor, as distinct from mere dirty work, is to be performed by machines. Moreover, factories and workshops in ideal societies are clean, well-ventilated, free of dust and lint, and generally pleasant. Those employed in them sing and converse if they desire.

In all of these respects the utopians were far in advance of their times, for the workers' surroundings tended to be quite bleak and inhibiting in privately owned factories. There were fines for talking or singing in the shops, there were stern foremen to keep the pace moving, and there were sterner employers eager to reduce the costs of labor, to preserve long hours and to improve productivity. They were not greatly impressed by Owen's social improvements at New Lanark, even though his profits were quite high. Those who were still struggling to rise looked upon leisure as humbug for themselves as well as for their employees.

Not so the utopians. They all limit the workday to seven or eight hours, provide adult education courses and facilities for all kinds of cultural and leisure activities. Of course, each utopia is only an imaginary place of study halls, libraries, parks and terraces, and of bright immaculate buildings outlined against the blue sky, and of men and women lounging in the shade and children playing. Every task seemed easier. As we shall see, the reality of experimental communities did not come up to the hopes of experimental planners. The real-life utopians never managed to get beyond an agrarian stage of development, or to overcome the prime consideration men had traditionally given to their own needs and to the demands of their families.

Family and Sex

As an institution in utopia the family held an ambivalent position. Comparable to the individual, it appeared too atomistic to suit a truly collective society. It demanded loyalty to one small group whereas the socialist ideal demanded loyalty to the entire collectivity, whether the small co-operative village, or the nation as a unit. The village or the

nation were really large humanitarian families superimposed upon the small kinship group, and far more important. Owen and Cabet recognized the possibility of a gradation of loyalties and accepted the family as an institution albeit of a low order. Certainly the strongest critic of the family was Pecqueur; he set out "to socialize individuals," and discerned a serious conflict of interest between the family and the socialist state. Customarily, he reasoned, each family has been a self-contained unit, attracting the full interest and energies of its members who consequently neglect their duties toward society at large. The spirit that animates the family is part of the individualistic, egoistic frame of mind opposed to social reform and seeking to accumulate property which is passed on and augmented from generation to generation. This is the source of gross inequality. A strong sense of family is inevitably based on love of private property and therefore an obstacle to the rise of the socialist cause. Yet, few of the utopians willfully set out to destroy the family; rather, they hoped to shift the center of man's attention away from it.

Really the only utopian who favored the family was Cabet. Agriculture, he wrote, is to be carried on by the extended family and the traditional powers of the father seem little diminished in his description. In fact, Icarian law not only sanctifies the family, it makes marital relations nearly indissoluble. However, the bonds of the family are somewhat tenuous in as much as Icarians spend most of their time in public places, even dining in socialist restaurants. They have individual apartments, but little inducement to use them save for sleeping and procreation. Curiously, Fourier, a bachelor who did not have a high regard for domestic life and who earnestly disliked children, allowed the family more privacy in his phalanstery. They could even dine in their own apartments and could enjoy and inherit private wealth. Owen, on the other hand, was happily married, loved his children, and yet frowned upon private dining and fully private and separate living.

Devaluing the family was a major point of attack by anti-socialists, and even by some social reformers such as Proudhon and the social Catholics. Like all socialists the utopians replied by referring to their liberal and conservative critics as hypocrites. Capitalist exploitation, they affirmed, has already destroyed or seriously weakened the working class family. Long hours of labor and physical exhaustion leave neither the time nor the will for members of a working family to enjoy one another's company. Poverty drives parents to exploit the labor of their offspring, therefore inadvertently encouraging the latter to run away as early as possible. In a socialist society the family will be far better

off, with time for singing and games and enjoyment. Parents will become benevolent toward their children and the bonds of kinship will be strengthened by sincere love. But for love to unite each family, the nature of the family must undergo modification.

For most utopians the family is not considered permanent, either as an institution or as a bond uniting two individuals of opposite sexes. In consequence they all favor divorce, but differ as regards its availability. They insist that divorce will not become widely practiced in utopia, first because marriages are to be based on love rather than on monetary considerations, second because parental authority in such matters would diminish. Young people of marriageable age are to choose their own partners, are free to become acquainted before deciding upon marriage and therefore able to choose as their hearts and reason dictate. Utopians, however authoritarian they may be as regards economic production and distribution, are as a group remarkably tolerant about greater freedom for youth, and about sex relations. On the whole, they do not advocate free love or polygamy, but they do not reprove greater mixing of the sexes, as in schools, or the possibility of sexual experiments prior to marriage, and desire that young persons become better educated in sex life. They are not at all prudish or "Victorian."

Of course there were exceptional cases, at both extremes. Fourier, while he approved of marriage in the bulk of the work he published in his lifetime, also revealed eccentric notions about sexual relations, at least for his own times and to the embarrassment of most of his followers. But hardly known to the public were manuscripts in which he described the freest of relations, in which he advocated full use of the butterfly passion in the selection of partners, one for the act of love, another for friendship, another for philosophical discussion, etc. Each harmonian could enjoy the right to a minimum of sex gratification and normally satisfies fully the cravings of his appetite. Moreover, love may be indulged in under any form, from hetero- to homosexuality, and from single unions to orgies involving larger numbers. In Fourier, Campanella seems reborn.

At the other extreme was Cabet, a quite firm advocate of the family, and past fifty when he wrote *Voyage in Icaria*. In Icaria mingling of the sexes at an early age is common, but as young people approach marriageable age, they become increasingly separated, in school, at work and at play. Marriages are preferably arranged by a young couple after consultation with parents and after they have become well acquainted. Getting acquainted, however, can be quite a problem. The couple may visit and walk and talk—provided they are chaperoned by a parent. In

addition, all the forces of society, from education to public opinion and direct supervision, are marshalled to prevent secret liaisons. During courtship the engaged couple receive education in the duties of marriage, because their union is for life in most cases. Divorce is permitted, but only after the families consent. And after divorce either partner may remarry. The Icarians take marriage seriously because it is seen as a fundamental institution; in fact, celibacy is looked upon with distrust, as a source of discord in as much as adultery and concubinage are crimes so horrible that they simply do not occur. Rape, wife-beatings (presumably husband-beatings), abortions, infanticides, extreme jealousy are all unknown.

Most utopians stand in a middle ground between strict and lax sexual mores, and are more critical of the bourgeois-style family than of the family as an expression of mutual devotion or a system of child-rearing. They do not banish it, but rather make it a smaller unit with relationships based on love and greater equality. This means that the family ceases to be an economic group involved in home industry. The children are to go to school and become integrated mentally and physically into the larger community. There will be no family property as such, save in Fourier's phalanstery, and so no inheritance to arouse discord among heirs, and an end to paternal autocracy and maternal submissiveness. Even in Cabet's system the institution of marriage, however sacrosanct, does not give the parents absolute or long-time authority over their children, nor the husband Napoleonic control over his wife.

All these changes in family relationships have as a major objective the emancipation of women: When the utopians proclaim equality for men, they mean it for women as well. In the family the father's power is reduced precisely to increase the positions of children and of mothers. The utopian couple consists of equals, the female partner enjoying the same rights as the male. All females receive schooling equally with males, enjoy the same opportunities of employment, advance as talent permits and have equal rights and powers. As mothers they receive special services and instruction in order to produce healthy children, and early in the child's life society takes over its care and education so as to relieve the mother from such chores and allow her to return to work. Good education is particularly important for girls because, after becoming mothers, they nurse and train their children for several years. Like Owen, utopians believe in character formation at an early age; therefore, the young mother's role in forming socialist attitudes becomes quite important. Public dining and other public services are also considered means of female emancipation from the housework, perfectly

honorable labor but drudgery to intelligent women, a certain kind of bondage which capitalist society had imposed upon her in addition to the vast legislation it elaborated to make her subordinate to her father as a girl and to her husband as a woman.

To understand their position on sexual freedom, it is necessary to recall that even highborn women had fewer rights than simple male workers. They could not directly manage their money or property, they were subject to their fathers, brothers, uncles, or husbands, were badly educated, if at all, save in how to keep house and sew. They were married, often against their will, to whomever the parents chose, could not divorce unless the husband brought his mistress into the house. They had few rights or powers over their children, and suffered, if sexually frustrated, from the rigors of a double sex standard which was tolerant of the man's immorality but grossly condemnatory of the woman's to the point of ostracizing her for life. Of course there were exceptions to these generalizations, but they were not of great interest to utopians who attacked the marital institutions of their time in the interest of justice for all.

Education

Most utopians did not really believe that they could create a just society within the space of the present or even the next generation. An equalitarian society, in whatever fashion it might be established, would survive as a just one only so long as children were educated to live in it. Although highly optimistic about human nature, and they were optimistic because character could be formed, they felt that the present society was so corrupt that only an enlightened minority was prepared for deep change. Hence the resort to experimental communities. In these the future generations of utopians would be formed and their numbers spread.

Education and culture in general were discussed by all the utopians, but only a few developed their ideas in detail. On the whole, there was considerable improvement of the intellectual aspect of socialism after Babeuf. He and his followers revealed a marked anti-intellectual strain, suspicious of education, of science, of art. In their time education was designed for the upper classes and encouraged both class consciousness and snobbism.

Fourier, who considered children a separate sex, was the first of our utopians to envision a full-scale system of education. With his usual love of detail and ranking, he divided pupils, according to age, into two "vibrations" and four "phases." From about the age of three, the young

harmonians began to frequent the workshops and to take part in the activities of groups and series. Children also carried out physical exercises to improve their bodies as well as to perfect dexterity. Fourier proposed that when a child reaches its ninth birthday it take an examination to test agility in the use of arms and legs either separately or together. While still quite young, children must also pass through a kind of moral education, learning serially the three properties of God: the economy of means, distributive justice and the universality of Providence. Apparently the young learn more by doing than by intellectualizing, and what they learn depends on the groups they choose to join.

Fourier was really more concerned with developing the senses than the mind. Therefore at the heart of his system he placed the opera and cooking. Opera enhanced sight and hearing; cooking enriched taste and smell. The singer enjoys a high rank in any phalanstery, and the cook is a "scientist of the primary order."

Upon reaching nine years of age, pupils enter the second vibration and the third phase of education. Now they learn to enoble their souls, and therefore two-thirds of the boys and one-third of the girls join the Little Hordes. This is a series in itself, a kind of chivalry of mounted youngsters who do most of the repugnant and some of the perilous work, presumably to satisfy a natural penchant for filth and heroism. Fourier likened them to the Tartar hordes and would costume them as such. The remainder of the children, more gentle and patient by nature, join the Little Bands. Mounted on zebras they are to care for and protect the vegetable world. For example, flower arranging falls within their duties.

The last phase of training emphasizes love: love of beauty, of devotion, of fellow-harmonians, of all the ideals common to the new society. After passing through it, young men and women are assumed to be educated for life and are fully integrated into the community.

Other utopians preferred a regular school system teaching general knowledge until the late teens. Since they were more decidedly collectivist than Fourier, they felt the need for mental preparation to live in a society quite different from the present one. In time professional and technical training would come, as each student's aptitudes and preferences came to light. But utopia, whether called New Harmony or Icaria, would never be quite right until the population was collectivist not merely in its distribution of goods, but even more so in its mind and heart. In this respect utopians were not merely economic and social reformers, they were moralists and new-style educationists. Socialism

was really a means to an end: the improvement of man, physically, mentally, and morally, in particular the latter. The good life would not be one consisting chiefly of bodily pleasure and economic security; it would be one devoted to "higher things": brotherly love, family affection, the pursuit of goodness for oneself and for all men, service, duty and spiritual happiness. By no means were the utopians mere hedonists; they were moralists and humanists of a high order.

Schools then were not merely to cram students' heads with learning skills such as reading and writing or the memorization of facts. Education was to mould character, to provide the knowledge and wisdom needed to distinguish right from wrong in a communitarian society, to teach the identification of one's own happiness with the happiness of others. As Pecqueur put it, education was the first condition of progress, for economic evolution was subordinate to the moral evolution of individuals.

In the methods of education, utopians clearly reveal the influence of reformers from Rousseau and Lancaster to Pestalozzi. For the same reason they want violence removed from society they want it removed from the classroom: used by the teacher, it makes for low moral character, sets a bad example by weakening love and sympathy, wounds gentle susceptibilities, creates inequality between the perpetrator of violence and the victim of it; violence is, in a word, the opposite of brotherly (and sisterly) love. There is, they believe, a natural way to teach. First by example, expressed in the love of learning, by kindness, by patience. The child who does not learn, who violates the rules of good conduct, is not to be physically punished but to be pitied. He will discover that he not only harms others but himself. His self-interest lies in the happiness of others. Self-interest is important to utopian educators, but it should be nurtured under control lest it weaken the child's concern for society. To prevent the latter from happening, Owen, for example, excludes all notions of personal reward and competition among students. Character is to be formed for children without exciting their baser passions, but rather by drawing out their nobler instincts. This can be done by using the latest techniques: visual aids, games carrying a social message, especially those which ally the individual to the group as in dancing and singing. Children must not be glued to their seats and stuffed with factual knowledge; they must be called upon to act, to participate.

The results of such education, if we are to judge by Icaria, will be a society free of crime, of poverty, of base jealousy, of courts and prisons, and of policemen. Each individual Icarian represents an advanced social

type, just as Icaria represents an advanced social organization. There is no impulse to commit criminal acts because no one is poor, and because everyone is wise, philosophical and happy.

Unfortunately there is another side to this coin, the unidimensional measure of the utopian mind. Utopian society presupposed a remarkable level of agreement and uniformity. The idea of like-mindedness and equality placed a damper on spontaneity, variety, and individual awareness. Icaria sounds like an interesting place to visit, but who would want to live there? Even the would-be Icarians who founded a small-scale utopia in America, rejected Cabet because they could not abide his imperious character and his authoritarian rule. Icarian culture was restrictive of the mind and imagination. Authorities distinguished between good books and bad books and burned the latter; there was only one national newspaper for the entire state, only one provincial paper for each province, only one local journal for each commune. All others were banned as a menace to Icarian happiness. There was strict censorship and prohibition; there was an official morality imposed on everyone.

Not all utopians were as dogmatic as Cabet. Blanc praised civil rights, personal freedom and opposition to tyranny. However he, like Cabet, demanded freedom to oppose capitalism and its defenders; as for their ideal society, they and most utopians were in the Jacobin tradition of Robespierre, meaning an all-powerful state basing its autocracy on moral considerations.

Religion

Because utopians were moralists they were naturally interested in religion. They repudiated or paid little attention to the official churches; that is, church organizations supported by the monarchical governments of their time, the "established" churches. The hierarchies, the Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox and Lutheran churches, dependent upon and closely allied to the landed or financial ruling classes, vehemently denounced socialism and its optimistic view of men; indeed their hierarchies were generally peopled by clergymen hostile to reform of any kind. Any progressive clergy were usually expelled if they showed marked sympathy for reforms affecting property rights (slavery excepted). Traditional religion, if not the opiate of the masses, was certainly an obstacle to change.

Although hostile to the churches, utopians were not antireligious. Only one, Blanqui, rather a maverick anyway, was openly atheist. Pecqueur was anti-Christian since he denied the divinity of Christ;

others were rather ambivalent on this issue. In chorus with Babeuf they referred to Christ as the first socialist; they admired his high morality, his devotion to the poor and his self-sacrifice. But they admired him as a great man rather than as the son of God. They could not but reject any doctrine so other-worldly as his, so bent on preparing man for happiness in the next world rather than in this one. Our utopians were social reformers of the here and now, of this world; what lies beyond was not their major concern. Their morality was a secular one. With Fourier they often claimed that they were acting in accord with God's will; that they were following the laws of nature, and natural law is the creation of God. Joyously they were doing God's work. However, they could do his work without the aid of the old theology and without creating a new one. To be sure, their own doctrines took on the trappings of a cult. They assumed the role of holy disciples; they were proselytists; and they were intolerant of nonsocialists as well as of one another. Their utopias give off the aura of religious fervor in the name of human salvation. In their blueprints there are provisions for places of worship, built as part of the architectural arrangements and at public expense. Volunteer preachers may even hold services and win converts.

But the utopians were not prepared to tolerate religions hostile to their creeds. Religious practice was rather intended to reinforce the co-operative, secular morality placed at the base of their educational systems. The school, they argued, rather than the church, was the true center of moral teaching, and the teacher was the secular equivalent of the clergyman, more esteemed, more powerful in the communitarian scheme of things. Traditional religion, with its ten commandments, was necessary to preserve order in a vicious society. The rich found it useful to teach the poor not to steal, not to kill, not to disobey their masters. These were all negative admonitions. But, they admonished, in a community without rich and poor, without private property, without class hatred, without oppression and ignorance, the commandments made no sense. All that is needed, they insisted, was an ethical code teaching reverence for justice, the brotherhood of men, the glory of humanity, love of country and willing obedience to enlightened authority. There was nothing mystical or miraculous involved in this message. It called upon men to be reasonable, just and good.

Reduced to its essence, the religion most common to the utopians was the deism of the eighteenth century *philosophes*. Their religious fervor was the fervor of reformers who wanted to change the world because it was full of evil and suffering. Convinced that God was good they were equally convinced that man, his creation, must be good.

This does not mean the utopians believed in a second coming, or that God was imminent and helping the birth of justice directly. Long ago God created the essential character of man and nature, and laid out the broad and long course of history so that eventually mankind would attain full equality. But the day-to-day task of achieving progress was left in the hands of man and his leaders.

History as Destiny

Utopians have been accused of lacking a sense of history. Such a blanket accusation is erroneous; Fourier, Cabet, and Louis Blanc were very much concerned with the past and even wrote history books and had philosophies about it. In this respect they revealed, Fourier excepted, the influence of Saint-Simon. Cabet, Leroux and Pecqueur were members of the Saint-Simonian school for several years; Louis Blanc was deeply attracted by it. Condorcet, as well as the idea of progress of the Enlightenment, were also influential forces. So utopians did acquire a sense of man's development over a long period of time, and firmly believed that God, often called the "great architect", had laid out the long course of history which led from barbarism to utopia. On the other hand, it can be cogently argued that the utopians, however knowledgeable they were about the lengthy transition from one period to another in the past, believed that the shift from capitalist to socialist society could and would occur either within their lifetimes or soon after, and they set out personally to fulfill their prediction. What they lacked was not a sense of history, but a sense of reality, at least for their era and for western Europe. What history did not give them was an accurate notion of time; they were more reform-minded than historical-minded. This emphasis did not change them into revolutionaries, it simply made them false prophets.

What utopians lacked was a willingness to accept the past on its own terms and values. In this respect they were at one with the *philosophes* and the romantics, and believed that the writing of history could serve only one purpose: The revelation of how man had evolved from some lower, barbarous age, into an age of feudalism, then into an age of capitalism, from which he would move into a collectivist or utopian age. During the early nineteenth century there was a marked tendency to divide all past centuries of human existence into three main periods. The teachings of the Saint-Simonians are most apparent here. Blanc, for example, saw European society progressing through three ages, each characterized by an ideal. First there was the medieval period during which the idea of authority predominated. This was the principle

"which causes the life of nations to rest on beliefs blindly accepted, on superstitious respect for tradition, on inequality, and which, as a means of governing, employs constraint." The growth of a capitalist class undermined the social basis of the above principle and, championing individual freedom, inevitably came to grips with the feudal aristocracy. A class struggle resulted, but Blanc was less concerned with the class conflict than with the conflict between ideas which reflected the interests of the classes. What was important was the contest between the principle of authority and its antithesis, the principle of individualism. But bourgeois rule, based on *laissez faire* individualism—crass egoism—would give way to social democracy and its ideal of fraternity, the thesis of Blanc's triadic layout.

The utopians, where they considered history at all, were not materialists but thoroughgoing idealists. Progress meant, as for Condorcet, progress of the human mind, and ideas were the chief motivating force in history. From this belief came their own conviction that the teachings of utopian ideas and propaganda would lead men to favor social reform. Some of them were not unmindful of the influence of technology: Fourier, Blanc, and Pecqueur argued that industrial concentration and competition were, on the one hand, destroying the lower industrial middle class and, on the other, concentrating workers in larger factories. Social structure was in the process of simplification so the rich would grow richer in wealth but fewer in number, while the poor would grow poorer but much larger in number. Since the latter were turning to socialism, the acceleration of industrial growth placed utopia within easy reach. And within even easier reach for those who favored the use of political action as a means to reform.

In bygone times, people had moved toward their destiny in various ways; the future—the utopian future—would be attained chiefly in one way, the initiative of one or a few leader-heroes who would ascend to political leadership. Whether the leaders would act on their own as dictators or as elected heads of the people was not a matter of fundamental difference, it was merely a matter of style.

A Utopian City

What they would ultimately create would become a model city and at this moment of creation, after long centuries of human suffering, class hatreds and revolution, would begin the era of fraternity. Then time would seem to come to an end with perfection achieved and everyone enjoying the pleasure of life. Timelessness will have arrived. One senses

the euphoric state in Cabet's description of Icaria. He tells us as much about the large city of his time as about that of the future.¹⁰

"Envision a city more beautiful than any which have preceded it; you will then begin to have a notion of Icaria, especially if you bear in mind that all its citizens are equal, that it is the republic which is in command and that the rule invariably and constantly followed in all matters is: *first the necessary, then the useful, and last the pleasing.*

"Now, where shall I start? That's a problem for me! All right, I will follow the rule that I have just mentioned and begin with the necessary and the useful.

"I will pass over the measures taken to promote good *health*, to assure the free circulation of pure *air*, to decontaminate it if required. Within the city there are no cemeteries, no noxious products manufactured, no hospitals; all these establishments are on the outskirts, in open places, near swift-flowing streams or in the country.

"I could never tell you how resourceful they are in devising methods to keep the streets *clean*. That the side-walks are swept and washed every morning and are always perfectly clean goes without saying: but in addition, the streets are so paved or constructed that the water constantly drains out of them into *subterranean canals*.

"If *mud* forms, it is collected in one place by ingenious and handy equipment and washed down into the same canals by water from the fountains; but every conceivable means is employed to minimize the accumulation of mud and *dust* in the first place.

"Examine the construction of the streets! Each has eight *tracks* of iron or stone to accommodate four coaches, two going in one direction and two in the other. The wheels never jump the tracks and the horses do not stray from the middle ground. These four areas are paved with stone or pebbles, all the other strips with brick. The wheels stir up neither mud nor dust, the horses practically none, the engines on railroad-streets none at all.

"Note too that the big workshops and warehouses are situated along the canal streets and railroad streets; that the wagons, which incidentally are never overloaded, move only on these streets; that streets with tracks are reserved for omnibuses; and that half the streets do not even admit omnibuses or wagons but only carts pulled by big dogs for making daily deliveries to families residing there. . . .

"In each street, *fountains* supply the water for cleaning, laying the dust, and refreshing the air.

"Thus everything is arranged, as you see, so that the streets are naturally clean, not misused, and easy to tidy up.

"The law—you will be inclined to laugh but this will give way to admiration—the law has decreed that the pedestrian must be *safe*, that there are never to be any accidents caused by vehicles, horses or other

animals, or anything else. Reflect, and you will soon realize nothing is impossible for a government that *wants* the good of its citizens.

"First, *frisky saddle horses* are not allowed inside the city; riding is permitted only outside it, and the stables are located at the city limits.

"As for stagecoach-, bus-, and draft-horses, apart from all sorts of precautions to keep them from running away, they can never leave their tracks or mount the sidewalks, and their *drivers* are obliged to lead them on foot as they near pedestrian cross-walks; these *intersections* furthermore are surrounded by every sort of necessary precaution: they are usually indicated by columns extending across the street and forming a sort of gateway for vehicles, and by a kind of intermediary platform where the pedestrian can halt until he ascertains that it is safe to proceed. Needless to say, these cross-walks are almost as clean as the sidewalks. In some streets, the passage is even underground like the *tunnel* in London, while in some others in it a *bridge* beneath which vehicles move. . . .

"You understand also that *drivers* of vehicles, all of them workers for the Republic and not in anyone's private employ, have no interest in exposing themselves to accidents and are on the contrary eager to avoid them.

"You realize further that since the whole population is in the workshops or at home until three o'clock, and the transport vehicles circulate only when the omnibuses do not run and when pedestrians are few, and the wheels never jump the tracks, accidents and collisions are pretty much eliminated. . . .

"Pedestrians are protected even against the caprices of the weather; for all the streets are equipped with *side-walks*, and all these *side-walks* are covered with glass panes to keep out the rain without excluding the light, and with awnings to combat the heat. One even finds some streets entirely covered, especially those connecting the great warehouses, and all the cross-walks are likewise covered. . . .

"You see, dear friend, that one can go all over the city of Icara, in a carriage when one is in a hurry, through the gardens when the weather is fine, and under the porticoes when it is bad, without ever requiring a parasol or an umbrella and with perfect confidence; while thousands of accidents and disasters, which each year overwhelm the people of Paris and London, point a finger at the shameful impotence or barbarous indifference of their governments.

"You are right if you think that the city is perfectly *illuminated*, as well as Paris and London, even much better, because the source of light is not absorbed by the shops, since there are none, or by the factories, since nobody works at night. Illumination is then concentrated on the streets and public monuments; and not only is the *gas* odorless because means have been found to purify it, but the illumination combines to the highest degree the pleasing and the useful, through the elegant

and varied forms of the street lamps and the thousand shapes and colors which they give the light. I have seen fine illumination in London in some streets on certain holidays; but in Icara the illumination is always magnificent, and sometimes it creates a veritable fairy-land.

"You would see here neither *cabarets*, nor roadhouses, nor *cafés*, nor smoking joints, nor the stock-exchange, nor gaming or lottery houses, nor establishments for shameful or culpable pleasures, nor barracks and guard-rooms, nor gendarmes and stool-pigeons, just as there are no prostitutes or pickpockets, no drunkards or mendicants; but instead you would find everywhere *PRIVIES*, as elegant as they are clean and convenient, some for women, others for men, where modesty may enter for a moment without fear for itself or for public decency.

"You would never again be offended by the sight of all those *cartoons*, drawings, scrawls which defile the walls of our cities even as they make one avert one's eyes with shame; for the children are trained not to spoil or dirty anything, and to blush at whatever might be indecent or knavish.

"You would not even have the pleasure or annoyance of seeing so many *signs* and *posters* above the doors of the houses, nor so many notices and *advertisements* which usually disfigure buildings: instead you would see beautiful *inscriptions* on the monuments, workshops, and public depots, just as you would see all the useful hand-bills, attractively printed on papers of many colors, and posted by the Republic's placarders on special bulletin boards, in such a way that the notices themselves are ornamental.

"You would see no more those rich and pretty *shops* of every sort that one finds in Paris and London in all the houses on commercial streets. But what are the finest of these shops, the richest of these stores and bazaars, the most extensive of these markets or fairs, compared with the *factories*, *shops*, *stores* of Icara! Imagine that all the goldsmith and jewelry *workshops* and *stores* of Paris or London, for example, were merged into one or two of each; imagine the same for all branches of industry and commerce; and tell me if the stores for jewelry, watches, flowers, feathers, piece goods, fashions, instruments, fruits, and so on, would not inevitably cast into the shade all the shops in the rest of the world; tell me whether you would not feel as much and perhaps more pleasure in visiting them than in touring our museums and artistic monuments. Ah well, such are the shops and stores of Icara!

"And all of them are purposely spread through the city to enhance its beauty and serve the maximum convenience of the inhabitants, and to make them even more decorative, they are built to resemble on the outside monuments where simplicity and the marks of industry are the dominant notes.

"I have just mentioned utilitarian *monuments*: I need hardly say that all the monuments and *useful* institutions that exist elsewhere are,

with all the more reason, found here—the schools, hostels, temples, courts, places of popular assembly, even arenas, circuses, theaters, museums of all sorts, and all the establishments whose agreeableness makes them more or less essential.

"No aristocratic *mansions*, likewise no private *carriages*; but no *prisons* or *almshouses*! No royal or ministerial palaces; but the schools, hostels, popular assemblies are as impressive as palaces, or, if you like, all the palaces are dedicated to public purposes! . . .

"The sidewalks or gracefully-columned *porticoes* which border every street, already magnificent, will be something enchanting when, as is planned, all the colonnades are bedecked with foliage and flowers.

"Shall I undertake to describe to you the *fountains*, the *squares*, the *promenades*, the *columns*, the *public monuments*, the *colossal gates* of the city, and its magnificent *avenues*? No, my friend: my vocabulary would be inadequate to depict my admiration, and besides I would have to write you volumes. I will bring you all the plans, and will limit myself here to giving you only a general idea. . . .

"Nowhere would you see more *paintings*, *sculpture*, *statues* than here in the monuments, on the squares, along the promenades, and in the public gardens; for, while elsewhere these works of art are hidden in the palaces of kings and rich men, while in London the museums, shut on Sundays, are never open to the People, who cannot leave their work to visit them during the week, here all the curios exist only for the People and are displayed only in the spots frequented by them.

"And since it is the Republic under whose auspices the painters and sculptors work, since the artists, fed, clad, lodged, and equipped by the Community, have no other motive but love of art and glory, and no other guide but the inspirations of genius, you can imagine the results.

"Nothing useless and especially nothing harmful, but everything directed toward the goal of utility! Nothing favoring despotism and Aristocracy, fanaticism and superstition, but everything favoring the People and their benefactors, liberty and its martyrs, or opposing the old tyrants and their minions.

"Never those paintings of *nudes* or voluptuous scenes which are publicly shown to cater to the tastes of influential libertines, all the while that hypocrites pay endless lip service to decency and chastity. Such pictures no husband would want his wife and the mother of his children to behold.

"Never more those works which betray only ignorance or lack of skill, works that elsewhere poverty sells for a pittance to buy bread, and that corrupt public taste while they dishonor the arts; for here nothing is passed by the Republic without examination; and as in Sparta weak or deformed children were destroyed at birth, here they mercilessly thrust into oblivion whatever productions are unworthy of the radiance of the God of the arts.

5.

Utopian Politics

The State

The utopians, in their political ideas, ranged from the communitarian anarchy of Fourier to the unified state prescribed by Louis Blanc. In other words, there were several trends or movements.

The origins of a new society certainly would have an immediate effect on the form of its political organization. Revolutionaries like Babeuf and Blanqui called for a dictatorship of reformers. What remains vague is the type of rule destined to follow the temporary dictatorship. Since neither thinker favored a permanent revolution or a permanent dictatorship, they believed that at some time in the future collective ownership of all means of production would complete the destruction of their enemies and make possible the emergence of a truly democratic state based on popular sovereignty.

This is the path followed by Icaria. Cabet himself, by the 1830's, was strongly opposed to revolutionary tactics; however, he had been a carbonaro earlier and had favored the revolutions of 1789 and of July 1830. He therefore did not feel it incongruous to have Icaria founded by the legendary hero Icar, who was the leader of a successful revolution in the 1780's and who, as a benevolent autocrat, laid out the plans for a communist democracy. His political arrangements did not provide for the withering away of the state, but rather for its integration as a permanent feature.

The Icarian state is the agency of all the citizens. It regulates the economy by an elaborate process of planification; it arranges for production and distribution in order to satisfy everyone's need and to avoid useless duplication and loss. All citizens must submit to its rule and to the discipline which that rule demands. In Cabet's mind, the Icarian state is not autocratic; it is rather fully democratic because it does no more than that which the sovereign people demand of it. The people are the master and equal among themselves. Since the death of Icar there

are no dictators because there is no longer a need for them. As sovereign the people exercise their rights by means of a popular assembly of 2,000 deputies elected by a fully democratic suffrage and renewed each half year. Voting is open, since no one has anything to fear. Deputies make all the laws, save for constitutional changes which are decided customarily by a referendum. The executive, also chosen by the people, consists of a president and fifteen ministers elected every half year, and lest they become too powerful they are subordinate to the elected assembly. This is the national government.

There are comparable provincial assemblies and executives, and at the communal level there is direct democracy. Every member of the commune or town may take part in debates relating to local matters. All debates, from the assembly down to the commune, are published in the state's *Journal* and sent to each and every citizen. In addition to these political assemblies there are other deliberative bodies to discuss agriculture, industry, food, clothing, housing, furniture, education and so on. In every case the majority decision is willingly accepted by the minority, after full debate.

It is clear that the constitution, drawn up by Icar, leaves no recourse to the minority against a decision of the majority. Cabet, whether mindful or not of this lack, clearly does not concern himself with the problem of minority dissent. Rather, the harmony and mutual agreement within the Icarian state are continuously underlined. The proper environment and education bring into existence an almost perfect unity of values and goals. There exists in the minds of most Icarians a perfect right clearly distinguishable from any wrong, and the majority, continuing in the tradition of Icar, the enlightened despot, can normally discover it. Governmental policy therefore is always right.

Given the state's propensity toward perfection, any opposition to it must be wrong. Hostility to the majority decision becomes anti-social and criminal; therefore, to obviate such crime the government continually acts to prevent its spread. All "bad" books were burned after the revolution, save some copies kept for special purposes. At present only approved books can be published and approval is granted by Councils of Censors. Good books are published free, as is the official history of Icaria. Likewise there is only the official press, one paper for the nation, one for each of the provinces and one for each commune. Freedom of the press in the old sense no longer exists, neither does freedom of speech. These freedoms, desirable in the prerevolutionary era because men were victims of inequality, injustice, tyranny and poverty, are no longer needed. In Icaria such evils have been ended and therefore no one has a

valid reason for dissent. There is sufficient freedom of expression in that any citizen can speak in the communal or any legal assembly and his statements will be published verbatim in the appropriate official journal. Since everyone reads the journal, he has enjoyed an audience far larger than he could have under the old regime of a free press. In such a perfect arrangement everyone is content and political crimes simply no longer exist.

In contrast to Cabet was Fourier. Having nearly been a victim of Jacobin rule in 1793 he was ferociously hostile to the extreme left and even to the revolution of the 1790's. He accused it of having brought *laissez-faire* capitalism into full fruition. Unable to find an ideal model of government in either the old regime or the new regimes after 1789, Fourier ended by not trusting most governments and sought instead to ignore political questions. He saw no connection between the form of government and his ideal community, and he made no particular effort to find state support for it. He looked rather to private wealth and initiative. Having proclaimed that he had discovered God's laws of social organization, that he was the Newton of the social sciences, he expected rich men to rush to his aid.

Undoubtedly the source of the support he expected so optimistically was uppermost in his mind when he drew up plans for the governance of the phalanstery. There is to be an "areopagus". This body consists of the heads of industrial series, of "reverends, venerables and patriarchs," and of the stockholders whose vote is weighted according to shares. Its impressive membership notwithstanding, the legislative role of the areopagus does not appear significant. It neither makes nor enforces any statutes, because there is no need for them. All phalansterian activities are regulated by attraction, just as all matter in the universe is governed by gravity. And who in his right mind would make a law affecting the attraction of matter when Newton has proved that such a law already exists? Attraction, based on the passions, is the force leading phalansterians in and out of groups and it would be folly to regulate passions. Precisely what is at fault in all societies is the constant regulation and resulting suppression of passions. Fourier wishes to free men's passions, not regulate them, not even forcefully channel them in a particular direction. In consequence, he does not think in terms of good or bad governments save to the degree of non-interference they exercise upon social experiments. Within the phalanstery, the ruling body may make suggestions to series and groups about the need for this or that product. Its suggestions are welcome, but are not obligatory upon the series or groups, because all activity is to be regulated by the

inclination or disinclination of the members of each series. They may change a crop despite the opinion of the areopagus if their passions lead them to do so. Fourier could not understand why anyone should be forced to produce spinach if he loves pears. Fourier also believed that individual phalansteries should form a loose federation and set up a governor or "omniarch" to rule it. But this official's role is chiefly that of a coordinator, and he has no more power over the phalansteries than the areopagus has over anyone or anything.

The disciples of Fourier, the phalansterians, led by Victor Considérant, hoped to continue their leader's apolitical views, but found this increasingly difficult. Disciples had come late to Fourier and he had died before the school was well established either in France or America. Considérant was left on his own as regards policy, and came increasingly under the influence of the republican movement. During the 1830's and especially during the 1840's there were serious and largely successful efforts to republicanize socialism and less successful efforts to socialize republicanism. Between republicans and socialists there was an exchange of terminology rather than of ideas. Many of them adopted the word "socialist," but not the goal. Nevertheless, Considérant attempted to set up a *parti social* which was to be the political arm but not the brain of the harmonian school. Political action seemed necessary because the July Monarchy, while not as oppressive as other monarchies, was actively against left-wing opposition groups. Therefore Considérant looked forward to a political regime which would make available the freedom needed by his followers to propagate ideas, and to form phalansteries. Of course he continued to oppose any but pacific measures to achieve political reform, and until the 1840's refused to identify co-operation with a particular form of politics.

As late as 1847 he was convinced that constitutional monarchy was quite compatible with social reform. After the revolution of February 1848 he came out strongly for a republic and even wrote of it as the means to progress. But he seems never to have accepted the idea that political reform must come before social and economic reform, nor did he voice the opinion that only a democratic state could become the instrument of socialist innovation.

The thesis that the state must be used as a means to attain a socialist regime was most strenuously argued by Louis Blanc, and even more strongly put by Constantin Pecqueur. Pecqueur had early opposed Fourier as an anarchist; the phalanstery, he argued, led without wishing it to license and anarchy because it denied the legitimacy of a coercive power, because it claimed not to need any constraint. Blanc and Pecqueur were

both Jacobins and socialists, and intended to establish a socialist regime throughout France and eventually everywhere; Fourier's small communities seemed to them a diversion from the true cause and ignored the realities of class difference and class conflict. Fourier believed that passionate attraction would overcome class distinctions and there was no need to abolish them by law. The Jacobin socialists, however, did not believe that benevolent capitalists would help to end social injustice. Only a socialist state could accomplish that. Revolution, however, did not appeal to them as the best means to create a socialist state. Propaganda and party organization were preferable means of winning over public opinion and the urban masses. Their primary thrust was against the July Monarchy which they hoped to capture and destroy by means of peaceful political action. Exactly what would prevent this action from becoming revolutionary is not made clear. They seem to have convinced themselves that enlightened public opinion would compel the July Monarchy to adopt a system of universal male suffrage.

With this accomplished, they reasoned, a convention will draw up a democratic constitution for all of France. There will be a weak executive and an all powerful assembly of elected deputies, greater communal autonomy, a progressive income tax on the rich, nationalization of public services and transportation, absolute equality before the law, and a national bank created to finance workers' co-operatives at low interest rates. In this way, social classes disappear as capitalist enterprise falls before the competition of co-operative socialist enterprise. In short order the land will also be organized on a co-operative basis. Blanc was emphatic on the state's role:¹¹

The emancipation of the proletarians is too complicated a work, it involves too many questions, upsets too many habits, thwarts not in reality but in appearance too many interests for anyone to be foolish enough to believe that it can be accomplished by a series of partial and isolated efforts. All the power of the state must be applied to it. What the proletarians lack to emancipate themselves are the instruments of labor; the function of the government is to furnish them. If we had to define the State as we conceive it we should say: the State is the banker of the poor.

The State would found the social workshop, it would give it laws, it would oversee their execution on behalf of, in the name and to the profit of all; but this would be the extent of its role; as such a role—can it be—tyrannous? Today, when the government has thieves arrested because they entered a house, is it on that account accused of tyranny? Is it reproached for having invaded the domain of personal life, of having penetrated the internal regime of the family? Well! In our

system the State would be with reference to the social workshops only what it is today with reference to the whole of society. It would watch over the inviolability of the statutes in question as it does today over the inviolability of the laws. It would be the supreme protector of the principle of association, without being entitled or able to absorb the action of the associated workers, just as today it is the supreme protector of the principle of property, although it does not absorb the action of the proprietors.

The state, apart from initiating the evolution toward socialism, must also serve as chief regulator of the economy on the national scale. It founds super social workshops to co-ordinate the production plans of local shops and to create commercial and financial bonds among all shops in the same economic sector, such as textiles, or metallurgy, or chemicals and so on. The local co-op, then, is by no means imitative of the phalanstery; it is really a different type of enterprise, more innovative, aggressive, equalitarian and also more precisely geared to the demands of the national economy. In the central organs of government, its elected representatives will replace the politicians traditionally elected to represent geographic areas. Representation of geographic areas and their population, therefore, would give way to functional representation or the representation of economic groups.

For Pecqueur, both the political and economic roles of the state must remain a permanent part of the socialist regime. And to make it more responsive to the needs of the socialist economy, he demanded that the elective principle, at first limited to politicians, be extended to the bureaucratic hierarchy as well. But not anybody at all may be elected to a bureaucratic office; a candidate has to fulfill certain requirements by passing several qualifying exams and by displaying a proper civic attitude. Once elected to a lower office, his promotion will come about as a result of his experience and the efficacy of his work. If qualified, his superiors will choose him for promotion. Pecqueur remained attached to the Saint-Simonian ideal of rule by an elite; however, he insisted upon the election of the ruling group.

Blanc, in unison with most Jacobins, also favored an elected bureaucracy, and he went further in his views. After the state completed its initiating function it will wither away. As soon as the co-operatives are in full control of the economy, industrial democracy will replace political democracy. The chosen leaders of local, regional and national or central workshops, all elected by the workers, will do the simple administrative tasks demanded by a planned economy. Most, if not all, tasks can be done within a communal administrative and economic set up and

the average worker will hardly have any contacts with higher officials because of the large dose of autonomy at the local level. The workers will know their local leaders and elect only the best men. The real core of Blanc's socialism, therefore, resides in the local workshops, not in the higher bureaucratic offices. And he demanded frequent elections lest officials become complacent and lose contact with the people.

There are other differences between Blanc and Pecqueur. The latter was more insistent upon giving women equal political rights with man. Blanc was not opposed in principle to the equality of the sexes, but felt it was dangerous to give women the vote until they were thoroughly educated and cleansed of their age-old prejudices. In particular they must be detached from the priests and the reactionary church. To be sure, it is not their fault that they are ignorant and conservative; they are the innocent victims of centuries of backwardness, of old institutions which have deliberately subordinated them to men as wives and mothers. Nonetheless, it would be suicide to let them vote without re-education; they would support all the reactionaries—at the bidding of priests.

Both socialists agree upon the principle of popular sovereignty and both insist that sovereignty is a collective force residing in the entire people as a unit, not in each person individually. But Pecqueur goes far beyond Blanc in his statism. For Pecqueur sovereignty belongs "to man's sense of morality, to his reason, to truth, to God from whom flows all reason and truth." What belongs to the people is "the interpretation of the generative principles of societies, of moral prescriptions, of the goal they announce." People collectively are "the voice, the interpreter, the approver and the judge of what is good, of reason, of justice." It would seem, then, that the people are sovereign on condition that they understand and interpret justice, goodness and reason. Does this mean that there is some higher judge than the sovereign people to decide whether they are good interpreters? The question is not really answered by Pecqueur other than to affirm, as though trying to escape from his mystical verbiage, that the sovereign people have the right to elect their representatives as well as to judge their peers and leaders. Representatives have no independence from their voters, they are merely agents, revocable and responsible, to carry out the popular or general will. In this, Pecqueur sounds like a Jacobin in the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But his imagination goes far beyond that of the Jacobins in his concept of popular sovereignty.

Presumably it is the general will that constitutes the mind and force of the state. As such it is most powerful, for it, through its agent the government, is the only property owner. The people, as the sovereign

state, is one vast association; it elects representatives to regulate trade, fix wages, and determine production, trade and consumption. Its far-reaching proprietary rights and activity bring all economic liberty to an end: "Economic liberty can never be anything but license." The essence of association is harmony resulting from obligatory agreement upon goals, objectives, means, and efforts. "But there where one finds all of that, there one finds necessarily also an authority, a center, a force which directs, which attracts and which repels." The government of such a state must be highly centralized and with power to intervene directly in all affairs. The state is omnipotent; the individual disappears before it. The state owes the individual the means to life, but that very life belongs to the state.

Louis Blanc, who has often been accused of statism, seems almost a liberal next to his colleague of 1848. Although he too was part of the democratic and authoritarian tradition of Rousseau and the Jacobins, he never allowed his socialism to cause him to lose sight of the individual; as a result the rights of man with its emphasis on civil liberties remained central to his thought. Pecqueur, although he added his own notion of popular sovereignty and a highly democratic electoral system, left intact the awesome power of the state and gave it that truly totalitarian element by adding the will of the people. Over this will there was not the hope of appeal either to constitutional limitation or libertarian tradition. Before the power of the people the small group, the minority, were helpless. When their views conflicted with the popular will they were branded as irrational, unjust and evil. Indeed, in such a system, war might become peace and peace, war.

Utopian political thought tended toward authoritarianism. Two exceptions were Fourier the anti-Jacobin, and Robert Owen who was as vague about political principles as Fourier. Both men were similar in that they believed that once co-operative communities were set up, government would somehow take care of itself. Owen had no hard and fast ideas about socialist government. If land owners and capitalists financed and set up a co-operative village, they would govern it. So would parish authorities if they founded it, and they would decide on how to govern it.

On the other hand, if the middle and working class established the co-operative upon a complete reciprocity of interests among themselves, they should rule it themselves "upon principles to prevent divisions, opposition of interests, jealousies, vulgar passions, etc." For their government Owen came up with a quaint and curious notion reminiscent of Morelly, the eighteenth century utopian. Morelly had favored

government by the heads of families, elder men of proven experience. Owen suggested a committee of members between the ages of 35 and 45, or 40 and 50. The age is not important; ruling is not a taxing enterprise. In little time, he assured, the ease of governing will render it a "mere recreation." Happily, he continued, the "numberless evils of elections and electioneering will be avoided," by the system he proposed. In time there would be no desire among the younger to wrest power from their elders. The same would be true of workers in villages set up by rich men. "They will therefore have every motive not to interfere with the honors and privileges of the existing higher orders, but to remain well satisfied with their own station in life." But among the inhabitants of the villages the only just distinction would be that of age and experience.

One can imagine the French metaphysicians of unity and reason shaking their heads at this cavalier treatment of the great science of governance. And worse, Owen failed to explain how a small village of co-operation could be integrated into the nation.

Patriotism

The socialists who conceived of their utopias on a national scale, Cabet, Blanc, Pecqueur, were also quite patriotic. Since they were all French they were heirs of the Jacobin revolutionaries who mobilized France in her war against Europe during 1793-1795. Their heroes were national leaders, their oratory was bombastic and threatening to foreign powers. They were jingoistic and hoped for war against England (which partly explains their dislike of Owen) and hoped to incite unification and democratic movements in Germany, Italy and Poland.

Their utopias displayed all the paraphernalia of patriotic countries. Cabet was typical and went into the greatest detail. Icar is a national hero, a widely respected symbol of national unity. To him and other early leaders are sung hymns of devotion, expressing love of fatherland and willingness to serve it. In school, children are taught the virtues of their country and learn its history, its geography, its language and literature, and celebrate its festivals. All religion is equally founded on high-minded morality and love of country. Icaria is holy Icaria, blessed of God, home of the brave and the virtuous, land of equality and fraternal love.

Love of fatherland carries the obligation to defend it. Therefore all males, upon reaching twenty-one years of age, become not only citizens but also national guardsmen. A great and impressive ceremony is regularly held for them, reminiscent of the pageants of the Jacobin

republic: girls in white, garlands of flowers, altars dedicated to Icar, lines of colorful uniforms, impressive leaders to make speeches, poems to the Almighty Architect, and choirs singing patriotic hymns before and after the new citizens take the customary civic oath by which they swear full devotion to Icaria, obedience to its law and the fulfillment of their duties. The new guardsmen promise solemnly to treat one another as brothers and to love their neighbors.

The nationalist content of early utopian doctrine was almost identical to that of the revolutionary republicans who were far removed from that brand of nationalism already appearing in central Europe and best expressed by the German Johann Gottlieb Fichte. His was an economic and psychic conception of a self-seeking, and self-perpetuating state, concerned more with the preservation of its German character and "soul" than with the material well being of all men. It is a closed state in a highly narrow sense, and really a Germanic utopia comparable to Icaria only in that the state regulates the entire economy so as to achieve national greatness. For all his patriotic outpourings, Cabet remained a republican mindful that Frenchmen (that is Icarians) are a part of humanity and are burdened with the duty to liberate all the oppressed of the world. Louis Blanc agreed and, despite passages remarkably similar to the nationalist prose of Fichte, he never lost sight of France's international mission. In its vaguest form the reader can discover here an early notion of the doctrine of permanent revolution.

The reader looks in vain for this enthusiasm in Owen and Fourier. Neither was particularly patriotic, and both encouraged the founding of socialist communities outside as well as inside of their native countries. Cabet, of course, also helped found several communities in America, but this was an aberration from his grand design, an expedient of which he never fully approved and which became his undoing. Weitling and other lesser known German utopians were more cosmopolitan than nationalist; most of them lived many years in exile in foreign lands and had little chance to be patriotic. Weitling himself, strongly influenced by French thought, preferred an international organization of artisan workers.

The patriotic socialists were also internationalists in their fashion. Despite their strong dislike of the English—a malady of the entire French republican movement—they felt that their brand of socialism was suitable for all men, and they looked forward to an international community of national utopias engaged in the active exchange of ideas and commerce. Patriotic brotherhood, even if it has special meaning for nationals of one country, is a feeling destined to bind all humanity into one universal utopia.

And they are pacifistic. For the same reason that they reject revolution and class struggle they repudiate international war as an ideal. War is the opposite of happiness and love. A democratic crusade to liberate an oppressed people may become necessary, but once all men enjoy equality and comfort in life, there can no longer be a need for conflict. The end of war will naturally follow the end of monarchy, inequality and *laissez faire* capitalism. War is really competition in a more violent form, and it produces identical results as *laissez faire*: business practice; the rich get richer and the poor poorer. No socialist can accept that.

6.

Experimental Communities

Early Settlements

The utopians of the first half of the nineteenth century differed from their predecessors in that they really tried to set up communitarian societies. Perhaps this was their error because none of their experiments in socialist living was successful. Of course, as J. F. C. Harrison has suggested, they certainly made it possible for some Europeans to settle down in America, and these immigrants would probably never have come otherwise for lack of capital, or if they had come they might have perished save for the co-operative arrangements which helped them to learn farming and to clear land. For these people the communitarian experiments were not wholly failures. But most of them became independent farmers and ceased to be socialists—if they had ever been socialists in the first place. For everyone who came, whatever the motives, settling in a new land was an awesome undertaking. Most of the experimental communities being set up in America required the uprooting of whole families from their known surroundings and a long voyage across the ocean. Those who came must have been desperate or adventurous, perhaps both.

Certainly the most adventurous and the most enthusiastic of the leaders was Robert Owen. Fourier never left France and probably did not intend to. Cabet came to America only reluctantly, for he planned to transform all of France, not some little isolated community, into an Icarian commonwealth. Louis Blanc, like Cabet, was a Frenchman to the core and when he left it was not to set up social workshops in America but to flee from persecution in his homeland. He settled in England, a country he heartily disliked and considered most unripe for socialist experiments. Wilhelm Weitling was not a communitarian utopian, and therefore did not try to set up small communes. He eventually came to the United States but, unlike Cabet, as an exile, without money and without followers.

Most of these continental socialists were fundamentally intellectuals, Weitling excepted. They formed part of an old social type, the alienated commoners who had to live by their wits and who used their pens as vigorously as the conquistadores used their swords to conquer new worlds. But they did not envision the conquest of a new world; rather they sought to build a new one on the ruins of the old. At most, they vigorously called for the French conquest of North Africa, and some French soldiers, retired from the army, set up socialist colonies on conquered Arab soil. None of these, however, proved viable and the ex-soldiers who survived struck out on their own. Algeria never did successfully serve as a land of social experiment. On the contrary, huge tracts of land owned collectively by nomadic tribes were broken up by French invaders and disposed of as private plots for land-hungry immigrants from France and Corsica.

Owen, however, was of another social type more common in Protestant Britain than in Catholic France. He was on the one hand a utopian and on the other a philanthropist looking for new ways to remove poverty from society. In this latter capacity he was one of a host of wealthy men, many of whom inherited social conscience along with their wealth. They established hospitals and schools as well as orphanages for the poor. These things wealthy persons had always done as acts of Christian charity and to save their souls. The nineteenth century, however, saw the appearance of a relatively new style philanthropist, an advocate of social reform without being a socialist, an investor in co-operative villages as a means of relieving unemployment and even of offering poor families a new start in life.

These philanthropists, of course, had no intention of destroying the old society to rebuild on its ruins. Owen's views here joined theirs. He and many of them looked to the New World as a suitable place for experiment, and on his return from there he wrote:

The United States but particularly the States west of the Allegheny Mountains have been prepared in the most remarkable manner for the New System. The principle of union and cooperation . . . is now universally admitted to be far superior to the individual selfish system and all seem prepared . . . to give up the latter and adopt the former. In fact the whole of this country is ready to commence a new empire upon the principle of public property and to discard private property.

In truth, Owen could afford to be adventurous and innovative; he was personally rich and could therefore readily supply most of the capital needed for an experiment to mold human character. He was a very exalted pioneer when, accompanied by some of his followers, he

arrived in New York on November 4, 1824. There he was welcomed by some Quakers who presumably were attracted by his communitarian ideas. Owen, however, was not a religious reformer, he was seeking to create an environment in which he could mold human character and he had no intention of doing this in accordance with Quaker or any specifically religious ideas. Rather he set out to win over the wealthy and powerful of the New World. With the complete self-confidence of the self-made man, he conversed, or, more accurately, lectured to both houses of Congress, President John Quincy Adams, his cabinet, and leaders in business, religion, education and the press.

He arrived with elaborate plans for his co-operative village, drawn up in England and without knowledge of the conditions of life in America. So, as a practical businessman, he set out to study frontier conditions. He inspected a Shaker settlement, and another set up by the Rappites. He studied factories and toured the East from Washington to Boston. He spoke and listened to proposals quite different from his own before he settled down in 1825 to found the first utopian community in America. That is, he founded the first secular communist community. Long before him various religious groups had come to the New World in search of spiritual salvation. In fact, one such group, led by the German George Rapp, had settled in Indiana and named their religious experiment "Harmony." Owen was in luck because the Rappites decided to move on and were searching for a buyer for Harmony. Since a "second-hand communist colony" was not to be found everyday on the real estate market, Owen bought it for \$125,000 and invested an additional \$75,000, quite a fortune. He then christened it "New Harmony." The village, once a stronghold of mystical Christians, became a center of free-thinkers.

But did it become a real village of co-operation in which man's character would be reformed according to Owen's model? At first it seemed that it would. His model was readily adapted to wilderness conditions, for although he had made his fortune in cotton textiles, his utopian ideal was an agricultural society with handicrafts as an appendage. A curious twist had developed in his thinking which led him to believe, like the physiocrats of the eighteenth century, that substantial wealth is derived only from land. The Rappites had certainly enjoyed a high standard of living, by wilderness standards, and Owen acquired a huge tract of land consisting of 20,000 acres of land and a fully developed village. One-tenth of the land had already been broken to the plow, there were orchards and even a vineyard—presumably the Lord's. About 900 co-operators moved in at Owen's invitation. It is doubtful that other co-operative villages began with as much optimism.

But such optimism had little basis in reality, and dissipated before long. Owen was partly at fault: For a man who wanted to improve human character he was not a good judge of it in its present state. The first settlers did not come from England but from towns and farms beyond the Appalachians, as well as from nearby settlements. Some English emigrants also came from a twelve-year-old colony across the Illinois border. These men and women, many from the backwoods, knew how to get a livelihood in the frontier, but it is highly doubtful that they understood Owen's ideas or how to apply them to a communitarian experiment. It is also evident that "The industrious and well disposed of all nations" did not answer his call. Probably most of the settlers were well-intentioned, but too many did not remain so. And however laudable were the intentions of Owen, he did not live long enough in the village to convert them. He left his son William as head and New Harmony began to break up with considerable disharmony during 1825. Tillage of the land and stock raising came nearly to a halt. Political factions appeared during the first elections for a directing committee, and acrimonious quarreling ensued over the distribution of dwindling supplies, over cramped quarters and over work loads. Instead of producing wealth and good character, New Harmony was living off of Owen's capital and giving open play to the worst in human nature.

Under these conditions there was little to be gained in the short run by the transfer of William Maclure's Pestalozzian school (and its array of intellectuals) to the village. In the long run the school could have formed a new sense of community, a compelling commitment to mutual aid, but its presence in 1826 rather contributed to the general malfunction. The teachers and their imported pupils pursued their narrowly defined goals, and lived remote from the economic and social malaise undermining the experiment.

Owen returned in January 1826 but could not bring himself to remain long in the wilderness. In the spring competent workmen were brought in; they could not, however, do all the labor required by a population of several hundred. There was widespread recrimination because some colonists would not contribute their share of manual labor. Therefore a method was devised, based on Owen's idea of labor value, of equating supplies to be received to the amount of time each person contributed to the general work load. To add a moral sanction, the number of hours each person worked was made public. All this involved an inordinate amount of bookkeeping and red tape, and intensified the grumbling of radicals who condemned it as anti-socialist.

In addition, there was a rather rapid turnover of members, which

weakened the bonds of mutual interest and the sense of community. Although these people worked together they seemed not to know one another. Some of them also played together, especially the younger settlers, in a ceaseless round of concerts, dances, philosophical debates, political speeches, militia drills and ball games. These social activities certainly relieved the dullness and monotony of frontier life, but the easterners, unused to the rigorous demands of a frontier economy, apparently exhausted themselves as well as the resources of the settlement in these "frivolities" as the moralists called them.

Factionalism led to disillusionment and the moving away of independent-minded colonists. Some members set up for themselves, others became distrustful of Owen's agnosticism. Separate communities were created, some not of true Owenite inspiration, others as dissident branches preserving some particular form of Owenism. There were many true co-operators who migrated to other socialist colonies. For them collective living was an unalterable way of life and they became migrants of a sort, pulling out of one defunct community only to enter or create another.

In Great Britain the movement to found colonies arose from complex motivation. Certainly Owen's ideas on co-operative living and his emphasis on agriculture appealed to some rich, philanthropic landlords. They shared the anti-industrial bias of many of their class and saw in Owenism a means of keeping the farm workers on the land; the flight to industrial jobs would be stemmed. They were also concerned with the plight of the poor and the unemployed and saw in Owen's schemes a means of providing jobs on the land. Even though the creation of a community would require considerable outlay of capital, many looked upon it as an investment and expected some return in the form of interest payments. Others looked upon the program as a means of relief from heavy taxes used to keep up poorhouses. And finally there were a few well-to-do men who shared Owen's communitarian views and collaborated willingly with him. Archibald James Hamilton was one of the latter. He and others helped to create the British and Foreign Philanthropic Society for the purpose of collecting sums to found colonies in Britain and the New World.

The Hamilton family owned an estate of 290 acres at Orbiston in Lanarkshire. Here Hamilton and another philanthropist Abram Combe supplied most of the capital to form a colony. In 1825-26 a large stone building was partly completed to house several hundred settlers, and over 300 finally came to live there. Since there was also a quite prosperous foundry connected to the community, and Combe served as first

director, the enterprise began with much hope. But Combe died in 1827, and soon the small populace began quarreling over organization and ownership of the property. When the holders of the mortgage insisted upon payment, the first Owenite experiment in Britain came to an end.

Under the leadership of a young Owenite, Edward Craig, another colony was founded in County Clare in Ireland. Here the owner of a 618-acre estate hoped to appease the peasants who had risen in revolt against him. The peasants agreed to rent the land and to work it co-operatively. This was in 1831, when a system of labor notes replaced money for exchange and a school was set up. Two years later, however, the owner of the land lost it gambling and fled the country, whereupon the creditors sold the estate for their own profit. Craig was ruined trying to redeem the labor notes previously distributed to the peasants.

Craig was a typically committed co-operator, and five years later he reappeared as school teacher in another community of 200 acres in Cambridgeshire. Founded in 1838 by William Hodson who invested in it the sizable sum of 6000 pounds, it came to an end three years later when he could no longer continue his financial support. The same fate befell a community in Wales, as well as the much more elaborate organization set up in Hampshire in 1838. Harmony Hall, as the latter was called, consisted of over 1000 acres, and enjoyed a capital of about 30,000 pounds. Fifty-seven families resided there carrying on mainly agricultural pursuits. Local artisan production was consumed within the community. Although there were too frequent changes of leadership the community survived for seven years, almost a record, but in 1844 serious opposition gathered head against the Owenites. A group of workers captured control. By this time the colony was in financial trouble because it consumed more than it produced. Undoubtedly Owen's ambitious educational schemes and the elaborate housing built by his architect were luxuries far beyond the means of the members, and they departed in 1845.

A similar fate came to the last of the Owenite colonies, set up in Wales in 1845. It distinguished itself by lasting for ten years, and by paying all of its debts, as well as by distributing a small dividend to the few remaining colonists.

From 1825 to 1855 Owenite or neo-Owenite communities were founded in England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales and North America. Without doubt the multifarious disciples of Owen were the most enterprising of utopians, and Owen himself remained active urging them on even after it became clear that the grandiose goals he had proclaimed could not be accomplished by small and sometimes minute communities.

Fourier was not so enterprising a utopian; he did not make a serious effort to set up phalansteries. Some of his disciples, however, tried to do so. In 1833 they founded one at Condé-sur-Vesgres, near Paris; it was short-lived. In 1841 another was established by an Englishman at Citeaux, not far from the medieval abbey, and its life was even shorter. Fourier, incidentally, disowned both these trials because the men responsible for them either did not consult him or did not follow his plans to the letter. His leading disciple, Victor Considérant, was not more helpful. Failure in Europe, however, did not discourage some of his self-proclaimed disciples in America.

Albert Brisbane was the American most responsible for bringing the communitarianism of Fourier across the Atlantic. He had met and admired Fourier and became a remarkably devoted follower. From 1840 to 1843 he propagandized in the United States, at the same time that Considérant was actively organizing a phalanx movement in France and winning a few disciples in other parts of Europe. Considérant, however, became involved in politics while Brisbane set out to create a communitarian movement quite independent of the state. Brisbane condensed and clarified Fourier's belabored and awkward prose, and pruned away most of the old master's really odd notions, such as seas of lemonade, the excessive classifications of the passions, and, fearful of American prudery, Fourier's views on marriage and sex. The school was considerably aided when Brisbane awakened the interest of Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*. Before long his American followers called themselves Associationists rather than Fourierists; their enemies mischievously called them "furyists".

Like Brisbane, they deviated considerably from the ideas of their French founder. First, they emphasized an undogmatic belief in Christianity, and secondly, they were willing between 1842 and 1845 to set up phalansteries with severely limited capital. Here, undoubtedly, is the explanation of why all these experiments failed. The first of them, the real pioneer, was set up by some unmarried machine workers from Brooklyn. After scraping together a few hundred dollars these city workers bought some barren land in the Poconos. Inevitably such an undertaking was doomed to failure. Indeed those in New York State rarely lasted more than a growing season. Those founded west of the Appalachians, however, managed to endure two or more years.

One important exception among the short-lived eastern communities was the North American Phalanx, near Red Bank, New Jersey. It was the most socialistic of them and it survived for eleven years which was a record of endurance for all the utopias. It was founded in 1843

by New York and Albany pioneers who were experienced farmers. They specialized in truck gardening, hominy and other milling and in 1849 produced a gross income of \$42,000. Although the net profit was only 1 per cent, the stockholders obtained 5.6 per cent and dividends for the first six years averaged over 5 per cent. Despite interminable debates about management, work loads and profits, these farmers held as best they could to Fourier's principles. They managed to adjust their differences, make concessions to noisy dissidents and balance small industry with agriculture. T. S. Bassett has concluded that the Phalanx, as an economic concern, made undeniable accomplishments in the areas of soil conservation, horticulture and truck farming. Productivity and earnings rose rapidly, relations between owners and workmen were good, industrial democracy produced able foremen and managers, and women enjoyed equal rights with men.

Yet, the Phalanx did not make money faster than did private farming and, for all of their commitment, its members continued to think of it as a money-making enterprise. In consequence they were disappointed with its too limited success. Dissolution finally came in 1854. Two years earlier Considérant had visited it, but his chief goal lay in founding a new, more orthodox Fourierist settlement in Texas and he made no effort to revive the flagging interest of its members. Its failure was less the outcome of economic than of moral bankruptcy.

Quite distinct from the North American Phalanx was Brook Farm. Although it was even less Fourierist it incorporated several of his ideas, especially his emphasis on pleasant living. It was far more similar to New Harmony in that it attracted a rather large number of learned people whose chief interest was education. This attraction resulted from its origins. It had been set up as a community in 1841 by Transcendentalists from Boston, and it was not reorganized along the ideas of Fourier until 1844. At that time a general council, consisting of subcouncils of industry, finance, and science, was set up. There were also three series of members: the farming series, the mechanical series and the domestic series. Then each series was broken down into groups. For example, the farming series had groups for cattle raising, milking, plowing, planting, hoeing, weeding, haying, horticulture and so on. The domestic series operated the houses and was divided into kitchen, laundry, chamber and waiters' groups. All activities were so organized, even recreation being in the hands of the festal series. In practice one could be in a farming series one day, to dig carrots, and in the domestic series the next, to wash clothes. Such variety was widely appreciated.

However, the Farm's life was relatively short, coming to an end in

1849. A small but persistent debit in its accounts may have contributed to its demise; but the immediate cause was the closing of its school because of smallpox, and fires of unknown origin that destroyed three buildings. Discouragement set in and members gradually departed.

The Icarias of Cabet, largely devoid of intellectuals, seemed destined for a longer life. But Cabet was far from a brilliant organizer, and founding isolated communities was not part of his broad plan. He really hoped to transform France into a national Icaria, fully equipped with the resources of a large territory and with the patriotic sentiment needed for unity. One might question the compatibility between his desire to include millions of Icarians and his insistence upon drastic uniformity and Puritan ethics. Indeed, such uniformity of dress, morals and manners was better suited to a small group based, like the Rappites, on religious beliefs. But physical hardship and privation discouraged many of his followers. Some even sued him for being a swindler after he used their funds to purchase vast tracts of barren, isolated land in Texas in the late 1840's. As it turned out, however, he was inept, not dishonest: he had neglected to investigate the site before purchasing it. He finally managed to buy a large tract of land in Nauvoo, Illinois, where a band of his followers finally settled down and lived reasonably well for five or six years. Cabet joined them for awhile, returned to France in 1852 to face the suit levied against him by some disciples, won acquittal, and finally came back to Nauvoo where he sought to play the role of Icar, the legendary founder of the legendary Icaria. In the hard world of reality nothing worked out as he had hoped, and this pigmy Icaria went the way of its predecessors.

Utopian experiments in eastern Europe were not more successful than those in western states. The east since the eighteenth century was the receiver of new social ideas rather than a creator of them. Enlightened aristocrats and some members of the educated middle class were highly receptive of western political and social views, but they concentrated their main efforts on reform of the government and the abolition of serfdom rather than on the broad change of social institutions. A few disgruntled members of the bureaucracy, the liberal professions and the army, however, sought to formulate plans for the improvement of society, and insisted that these had to be considered along with political reform.

Among this latter group were some young Russian men who from 1845 onward began to meet in the roturian drawing-room of Mikhail Butashevich-Petrashovsky. The latter's only accomplishment till this time was the publication of a dictionary of borrowed words which he

used to explain the doctrines of Owen, Fourier and other reformers. When the police seized all the copies he turned to his Friday meetings. These became a focus for young reformers who came primarily from the middle class: petty officials, school teachers, university students, lower army officers, and writers among whom was the young Dostoevsky.

The general conversation included current news, abuses of high government officials, and the need for change. There were even speeches, debates and lectures. Petrashevsky was himself an ardent follower of Fourier, seeing in the phalange the means to achieve reform peacefully. He and his guests, however, condemned "communism" because they identified it with violent revolt and they were hostile to this kind of action. When one of Petrashevsky's guests suggested that change of government might require a temporary dictatorship the host replied sharply that he would strangle the dictator with his own hands. He preferred a federal republic like the United States, an admission that the Russian Fourierists were not indifferent to politics and could not be, given their hopeless situation *vis-à-vis* the Tsar.

Several of the guests claimed to be socialists and also looked upon Fourier as their mentor. They followed with interest the communitarian movements in America, and were enthusiastic enough to plan a co-operative for Russia. Since Petrashevsky owned a small estate and the serfs who worked it, he decided, so runs a story, to initiate the plan. He went to his serfs filled with enthusiasm—the enthusiasm of a savior—and sought to explain to them the mechanism of the new society, and to instill in them the desire to become new men. They simply replied that they would do what he, their master, wished them to do. Since he wished them to build a new communal village they obediently did so, but when he urged them to move into it, they burned it down.

Peasant apathy or hostility was not the major problem faced by these reformers. The most formidable was the government: in 1849 the circle was closed, its members arrested, convicted of treason, and several of them sentenced to death. Fortunately for them the death sentence was commuted to exile in Siberia, a place hardly inviting to utopian reformers. Petrashevsky died there and his plans with him.

Fourier influenced a few other educated Russians and east Europeans; in fact, a phalanstery was actually set up in Roumania in 1835. It lasted only two years, and was disbanded, finally, by the local authorities because it was considered subversive.

Another utopian current fairly widespread in the east was of less import than a nativist effort to find the roots of socialism in the peasant society. Alexander Herzen, as he became disenchanted with western

doctrines during 1848, turned his gaze eastward and claimed a major discovery: true socialism was not to be found in artificial communities set up on strange lands, but in the collective life of the Russian peasant village called the *mir*. This notion was simultaneously taken up by anti-socialist and antiwestern writers who looked to the peasants as the bulwark of the autocratic tsarist regime. As a result of the decline of Herzen's influence and the hostility of most peasants to innovation of a socialist nature, this belief about the *mir* did not become an important part of utopian thought.

Utopian experiments, therefore, were as great a failure in the east as in the west. In both areas antisocialists seized and held power for nearly a generation.

Causes of Failure

The reasons for this tragic finale to the utopian experiments are not difficult to find. The members, not in their aspirations but in their performance, left much to be desired. Too many of them failed to shed the petty wants, the envies, the egotism which supposedly they had acquired in the old world and were to cast off in the new. True equality was perhaps too rich a nourishment for those mental and physical forces which, it was believed, would become easily adapted to equalitarian living. In truth, most of the communities failed to adopt full equality or abolish private enterprise. Only the Icarians remained more or less communistic. The land and buildings in Nauvoo were really held collectively and the produce shared more or less equitably. In Owenite villages, however, persons were paid on the basis of Owen's labor theory of value. That is, each article produced was evaluated according to the quantity of labor required to make it. This practice led to disruptive bickering over the value decided upon and dissatisfaction grew, followed by dissolution. In the Fourierist North American Phalanx wage income remained too low. Since it was located near Red Bank, New Jersey, its members could compare their co-operative profits with those of independent farmers and many decided that they were at a disadvantage.

This attitude indicates another weakness: too many members were overly concerned with profit and cash rather than associated living; they really tended to conceive of the co-operative as a capitalist enterprise in which they were shareholders. The belief that it was a cradle in which a new society would grow was weakened by the hardships of frontier farming or the breaking in of virgin land in already inhabited areas. There was a group of devoted communists who, as explained above, traveled among co-operative villages in the hope of finding their

dream. But even this hard core became disenchanted and with the passing years fought among themselves and began to divide up the land so that the surviving socialist communities became typical frontier villages based on private property and limited co-operation. But, apart from these hold-outs, too many of the original settlers were not mentally prepared—not adequately converted—for truly communalistic living. Too many of them did not even have the requisite agricultural knowledge needed for survival on the frontier. Most of them were artisans whose skills were geared to the needs of advanced societies and whose products could find no market nearby nor transport to distant markets.

The repeated failure of socialist communities has led historians, such as Arthur Bestor, to reject the widely accepted belief that frontier conditions made for co-operative forms of life. On the contrary, most people accustomed to social life in the old world found it impossible to adapt themselves to the co-operative requirements of utopian ideals. Certainly people on the frontier practiced mutual aid so as to build homes, harvest crops and defend themselves. But the egalitarian co-operation of utopian thought was apparently more than pioneers, even under frontier conditions, could accept for longer than a few years time. Refractory mental attitudes hindered putting the theory into practice. Fourier's assertions notwithstanding, most of the utopian settlers found it difficult not only to change work every two hours (which no colony accepted) but merely to adapt to new skills and a new environment. The butterfly passion was the glowing dream of a bored salesman who was the most routinized of mortals in his own uneventful life. He also glorified the intriguing passion, but undoubtedly failed to take into account how destructive it could be. Nearly all of the villagers became divided into partisan groups, who spent an inordinate amount of time in their assemblies condemning one another.

Another unforeseen danger was the tendency of settlers in the more remote areas of the American wilderness to become so preoccupied with the daily toils of their hard existence they forgot about socialist ideology. This was the case with the Fourierist and Owenite colonies in Wisconsin. Mutual aid proved desirable during the initial stage of settlement, but once the worst obstacles were overcome, the collective type of life no longer seemed necessary and its bold and competent members set out on their own. Their latent sense of individuality asserted itself over their co-operative impulse.

Perhaps in its claim to improve man utopian socialism made the least impression on nineteenth century society. Those settlers who were co-operative by temperament, who were truly socialistic, were naturally attracted to the communities and they became the core of the transients

who refused to accept the failure of one colony and formed another. Many of them were dogmatic and opinionated and their wrangling contributed to many failures. But communal living hardly changed their habits. On the other hand communal living does not seem to have improved the habits of those immigrants who were not truly co-operative by temperament, who were not socialistic, and who joined colonies to escape either from poverty or boredom or—in many cases—the extreme difficulty of going it alone under frontier conditions in America. But having acquired the skills of frontier living, they departed from the colonies where their desire for improved material conditions was hardly met. The experiments, therefore, changed neither the society nor the men in it.

The utopian villages lacked adequate social control. Owen and his associates discovered this in New Harmony when they could bring no pressure upon the lazy or unco-operative save moral sanction, such as publishing the hours of work of each person. And moral sanction proved ineffective in communities still disconnected, lacking a history and tradition, lacking the visceral bond which only long experience, not abstract ideas, could establish. There was no regular police force in any of the colonies. Utopian organization was designed to obviate the use of physical force. There were expulsions of the worst offenders against the ideal of equality. But expulsions and moral sanctions simply underlined the weakness of human character, at least as it was formed by the "old world." Neither Owen's desire to mould man by the environment nor Fourier's to adapt the environment to man's passions proved realistic. Their rationalizing was undoubtedly faulty in important respects. But, then, so was their leadership.

The problem of leadership is a difficult one to deal with. The numerous religious sects which set up quasi-utopian communities, inspired usually by mystical and chiliastic fervor which was worked up by a forceful leader, had varying histories. But most failed to remain united as religious communities despite a membership chosen by much narrower credentials than communism. Certainly the longevity of a community as a distinctive force, whether religious or social, depends on how many black sheep are in the fold. It also depends on whether the wolf of disbelief and egoism is within or without the fold. Ultimately, therefore, the role of the shepherd is of major importance. If social control cannot be effectively carried out by the flock, it must be carried out by the leader.

It is significant that none of the utopian schools produced forceful leaders. Fourier, Owen, Cabet, Blanc, none of them could provide that constant guidance in daily activities and problems which could make

or destroy a movement of people. But then, the utopians were too narrowly utopian. Other leaders—Marx, Lenin, Jean Jaurès—had their utopian side, but they were chiefly able leaders. The utopians had their practical side, the architectural plans of their model communities were quite ingenious, but they were not effective chiefs. At any rate, they were not able to overcome the factional feuds which destroyed their experiments.

Owen was probably the ablest and certainly the most experienced, but he never remained long in any community. He seems to have become afflicted by Fourier's butterfly passion and went through numerous phases of reformist inspiration and finally shifted from atheism to mysticism. Fourier never came to America nor did he visit the phalansteries set up in France, and his disciple *Considérant* was highly critical of them all because they did not organize along the lines of passional series. Cabet was the only utopian to spend more than two years with his followers. He finally settled in Nauvoo where, upon his return from France in 1852, he took the colony in hand. Because members had begun to divide up the land and to work for themselves, he set about a thorough reorganization. Like Icar he wanted to become a provisional dictator. He might have accomplished this objective had he not tried to impose his strict moral code upon the community, especially upon the women who insisted on wearing jewelry and enjoying more personal freedom than he felt compatible with his ideal of female virtue. What he lacked, of course, was the personal magnetism to influence large numbers of people. Since the male community would not restrain its own members who enjoyed drinking, smoking and tobacco chewing, he sought the power to do it by changing the relatively democratic constitution. But his proposals were not only voted down, he was defeated in his bid for re-election as president of the assembly. Relations between pro-Cabetists and the opposition became hostile to the point where physical violence broke out, and buildings held by one side were violently assaulted by the other. Since he refused to accept the majority decision, he was expelled, much to the delight of many women members. They complained of his hypocrisy because he had never given them equal political rights with men. By this time, 1856, Cabet was seventy years old, out of touch with younger people, autocratic but incapable of imposing his authority. He left to establish a new colony with nearly 200 of his disciples, but in 1858 he died from the effort. This group of Icarians, living with the aid of money sent from Paris, lasted until 1863. The settlers at Nauvoo moved to Iowa where the younger men in 1877-78 revolted against the older men who moved on. By this time they were only a handful in

number. They could not recruit new members, became conservative, and sterile in ideas. The few survivors finally divided their common land into private plots and so ended the longest experiment in communism.

In the long run, survival depended upon a community's ability to produce enough for its own consumption and to acquire a profit to pay off its debts, chiefly its mortgage. In the short run, existence depended on adequate financial backing. Most experimental villages were brought into existence with capital supplied either by rich philanthropists or by small contributions from numerous lower class sympathizers, or by a combination of the two. Official administrative or political bodies were, if not hostile, certainly not sympathetic to these villages even when their backers sought to disguise them as unemployment relief schemes.

Because of this diversity some experiments were more or less adequately financed, but clearly most were not. And the latter, poorer ones, usually disintegrated either from internal dissension and the depletion of their treasury, or the refusal of their backers to supply additional loans after a year or two. In several cases the backers ruined themselves financially. Even well financed villages often exhausted their capital because of mismanagement or because most members knew nothing of agriculture and had to buy food at high prices as well as hire laborers while they learned to farm.

The manner of capital backing also became a source of conflict. Nearly all rich philanthropists refused to make an outright gift of large sums of money to the utopians; rather they granted small sums and loaned the rest either at an interest rate or free of charge. They naturally took a paternal as well as financial interest in the community, indeed, they sought in various ways to influence its policies. Naturally resistance to their interference grew. The truly socialistic villages wanted complete equality of status and of goods, and the lower class members tended to vote for persons of their class to leading positions. To many rich supporters these acts seemed both ungrateful and frightening. Also constitution making brought on numerous quarrels over the ownership of property and the mode of distribution and created tense feelings between the financiers of the village and the desire of members to become their own masters. In most villages there were weekly or monthly general assemblies of all the members, and when these meetings became the center of heated conflicts and sometimes of physical violence, then the village's days were numbered.

All this does not suggest that communal living is impossible as a way of life. It does indicate that success, or simply longevity, required more than the gospel of a social reformer. Co-operative communities have

survived, remarkably intact, when there was some spiritual bond inbred among the members. For the Rappites this bond was the religion of their ancestors, a long held interpretation of the Bible that was built into their mental fabric from early childhood. The founders of the Jewish kibbutzim after 1900, as we shall see, were also capable of survival and integrity as regards their goals. And they too, even when their members claimed to be Marxian atheists, had an inherited cultural tradition based on Jewish history and the fact of Jewish existence. That this culture and reality were not accepted as religious phenomena did not destroy their unifying and inspirational force. In distinction, the utopians of the early nineteenth century had only an acquired doctrine, a set of beliefs picked up as a new message rather than a traditional—visceral if you like—part of their being. And none of the colonies lasted long enough to produce a new culture, a new tradition, and a new generation of children to inherit the message. In consequence too many utopians lacked that deep sense of the past which fortifies one's belief in the future and therefore imposes a kind of resignation and discipline upon each generation. For survival, each generation must conceive of itself as a link in a long chain of being. The utopians, uprooted from their culture, valiantly struggled to create a new one of their own but could not agree upon its content and so failed to acquire both a sobering sense of mission and the self discipline needed to endure.

By the 1850's the age of significant utopian experiments had passed. Utopian thinkers continued to appear and a few experimental communes were projected. But utopianism as a definable, active movement had come to an end. New forms of socialism appeared in Europe which called for the transformation of society either by revolution or political democracy, and along lines laid out by historical forces which prepared the way to new societies in the confines and institutions of the old, not at all by flight from the old society.

7.

Utopians and the Revolutionary Movement in Europe

Means to Socialize Life

Because utopians became identified with the founding of communities in isolated areas, most historians usually dissociate them from the revolutionary movement in Europe. There is, of course, some basis for this, but their role in Europe from 1789 to 1848 is too complex to be dismissed with a generalization. Among them there was a group who repudiated the use of force. Owen, for example, invested his own money to found experimental communities. He resorted to this method after failing to convince the British government and the Poor Law Boards to finance his scheme. He also had rich friends who invested in several co-operative ventures in Britain, all of which failed. Among the utopians here studied Owen was the only one with considerable wealth. It has been estimated that he lost most of the money he invested in these projects; however, the wild land his followers broke to the plow rose greatly in value and his losses were consequently minimized. Less fortunate was Fourier. He too believed that his proposals would attract the interest of wealthy philanthropists. Disinterested in politics and scornful of revolutionary means, he sent out a call to the rich and powerful; he announced publicly that he would wait everyday in a particular café or at home to explain his project and welcome the "angel." None flew in and, in fact, he did not even attract any disciples until the last years of his life. Fourier was probably his own worst enemy. Although endowed with a vivid imagination, he lacked initiative—was perhaps indolent—and never learned how to write in an attractive, easily read style. It is clear that Fourier and Owen abhorred the use of force. They and most of their followers persistently held to the belief that social reform would be achieved by means of reason and persuasion.

Not even the truly political-minded utopians, Blanc, Cabet, and Weitling, were proponents of violence. They were, however, ambiguous in that they were defenders of past revolutions and, significantly, the first two wrote histories glorifying the revolutions of 1789 and 1830. In addition, they were quite willing, as we shall see, to seek to profit from revolutions made by other people to advance their own cause. Without advocating violent overthrow they were convinced that its use could be justified and *might* be the social reformers' only recourse.

For other utopians, violent revolt *was* the reformers' only recourse and therefore to be used. With them, and with many non-socialist reformers, the resort to insurrection, given the conservative policies of the men in power, was not merely a topic for history, it was a program of action.

The socialist movement assumed a revolutionary form almost from its birth. Such an outcome was perhaps inevitable given the fact that it was really an outgrowth of the French Revolution of 1789. There had not, however, been any effort to implement its ideas, and the Revolution itself did not directly produce a socialist or even a neo-socialist movement inasmuch as none of its influential leaders came out in favor of collective ownership. Therefore, a collectivist movement, in utopian swaddling clothes, could hardly emerge until the reformist phase of the Revolution had run its course. It was then that disenchanted reformers felt the need to resort to violence and, in consequence, to follow the leadership of Babeuf.

Fairly widespread discontent came to a head, at least in Paris, after the founding of a new government, the Directory, in 1795. France now fell under the rulership of five Directors who symbolized and enjoyed the backing of the many persons who had gained power and money by the revolution. They and their large following of enterprising businessmen, stock and money speculators, honest and dishonest government contractors and land hungry peasants—those who had a stake in the new regime—were as opposed to further socio-economic change as they were to a restoration of royalist government.

But there were large segments of Parisian society who had not gained from the new regime. There were numerous skilled workers whose wages fell behind the rising cost of living; there were the unskilled poor who had been unable to win advantages under any government; and there were small tradesmen, professionals and functionaries who suffered severely from food shortages and inflation. The Babeuvists drew their followers mostly from this latter group and some skilled artisans. In addition there were men and women who had been active Jacobins,

followers of Robespierre, and who now sought revenge against his executioners. Undoubtedly these discontented groups numbered many thousands and possibly as many as 20,000 were prepared to rally to the conspiracy. Had these forces been united and effectively led they might have achieved some success—if, of course, they could have found a following among professional soldiers. There were several conditions which Babeuf was not able to master precisely because of the extremist character of his program and of his inadequate plans to carry it out. His blueprints were hardly adapted to the conditions of the time.

In October 1795 appeared the Society of the Pantheon. Its appearance marked the initial step in the Babeuvist movement, and met in secret, at night, in the crypt of the Convent of Sainte Geneviève. Babeuf's paper, the *Tribune of the People*, was a sort of official organ and its articles served as a focus of discussion. The members, who numbered between 1000 and 2000, were not all of one mind, however. Many were disgruntled Jacobins who longed to return to the settlement of 1793 and the First Republic. Their social ideal was a society in which there was a fairly even but individual distribution of wealth and property, absolute equality of everyone before the law, and political democracy. They were certainly not prepared to abolish private property; they demanded, rather, the opportunity for everyone to acquire it. As a social group they were more hostile to the rich than favorable to the poor.

The leaders of the movement which became known as the Conspiracy of Equals were themselves not entirely united in ideas, although they did manage to co-ordinate their efforts. In 1796 Babeuf founded the Insurrectionary Committee, a secret inner group with the purpose of organizing a revolt. At this point, propaganda activity was emphasized and Sylvain Marechal drafted the *Manifesto of Equals*. Compared to the *Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx and Frederic Engels (1848), it was, in true utopian style, highly moralistic, abstract and ideal. It lacked two fundamental elements of later socialism: an historical base and an explanation of class conflict. And yet, it marked a major step in the history of socialism, if only because it was intended as a program for immediate action. An abridged version of it runs as follows:¹²

People of France!

For fifteen centuries you have lived as slaves and therefore in misery. For six years you have stood breathless, waiting for independence, happiness and equality.

Equality!! the first desire of nature, the first need of man, chief bond of all legitimate society! People of France! you have not been favoured above other nations which vegetate in this unhappy world! . . . From time immemorial we have been told—hypocritically—that men are

equal; and from time immemorial inequality of the most degrading and most monstrous kind has insolently weighed on mankind. . . .

We claim in future to live and die, as we are born, equals: we want true equality or death; that is what we must have. And we will have equality whatever the price. Woe to those who stand between it and us! Woe to whoever would resist a wish so pronounced!

The French Revolution is only the forerunner of another revolution far greater, far more solemn, which will be the last.

The people have trampled on the bodies of kings and priests allied against them: it will be the same for the new tyrants, the new political hypocrites sitting in the places of the old.

What is it that we need in addition to equality of rights?

We need not only that equality be written out in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, we want it in our very midst, in our hearths and homes. We will pay any price for it, to make a clean sweep so that we can cherish it alone. If need be let all the arts perish so long as true equality remains!

The agrarian law or the distribution of lands was the unconsidered wish of a few unprincipled soldiers, of a few small groups prompted by instinct rather than by reason. We aspire to something more sublime and more just, THE COMMON GOOD OR THE COMMUNITY OF GOODS! No more individual ownership of land, the land belongs to nobody. We claim to, we demand, common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth: these fruits exist for all.

We declare that we can no longer suffer the great majority of men to toil and sweat in the service of the few and for the pleasure of the small minority. . . . Begone, henceforth, monstrous distinctions of rich and poor, of great and small, of masters and servants, of rulers and ruled.

Let there be no differences between human beings other than age and sex. Since all have the same needs and the same faculties, let there be one education, one fare for all. They are satisfied with one sun, one air, why should not the same quantity and quality of food suffice for each? . . .

People of France!

No more vast design has ever been conceived and carried out. On rare occasions a few men of genius, a few wise men, have spoken of it in whispers, trembling. Not one had the courage to tell the whole truth.

The time for greatness has come. The evil is at its height; it covers the face of the earth. . . . The moment has come to found the REPUBLIC OF EQUALS, that great hospice open to all men. The days of general restitution have come. Come all ye in distress and be seated at the common table set by nature for all her children. . . .

The essential element in a revolution is will, the will of the people, proclaimed the real Babeuvians. Men consciously make their own

history, and so far the rich have made it at the expense of the poor. The time has come to change society, not merely to modify it by a few adjustments.

The *Manifesto* was a denunciation of both the distant and the immediate past. The Revolution, too, was a trick. The democratic constitution of 1793 was held up less as a model to be copied, and more as an indication of the laudable but limited goals of Jacobins. Here indeed was a conflict of goals because the Conspiracy of Equals was intended by the Babeuvians to initiate an alliance of socialists and Jacobins; it called for "bread and the Constitution of 1793." Perhaps for this reason the conspirators issued another document called simply the *Analysis of the Doctrine of Babeuf*. Nowhere did it call for collective ownership and it declared that the 1793 Constitution was the fundamental law of the land.

The conspirators, sensing that the police were closing in, became more active. They printed and distributed or posted on walls a great many copies of the *Manifesto* and the *Analysis*. They succeeded, with a very slim budget, in printing short pamphlets which they passed out in workshops and barracks. Recognizing the importance of military support, they concentrated on the soldiers stationed in Paris and were not loth to use prostitutes to get their message across. But, as was typical with most early utopians, they were too academic and abstract to arouse the mercenary soldiery that had its origins in the sluggish peasant class and its discontent in low pay and the harshness of army life. Soldiers, therefore, remained indifferent. In fact, an ex-captain in the army, who enjoyed a leading role among the conspirators, was an informer and gave the plot away.

By May 1796 the conspirators were prepared to act, but so were the forces of law. Although they had spies in the police administration the conspirators were not aware that even the owner of the café where they met to lay out plans was an informer. Before they could call out their revolutionary bands, they were caught, tried and either executed, jailed, or exiled.

Babeuvism as a revolutionary movement was an unmitigated failure. It did not even initiate a true revolt; it never got beyond the planning stage. Most likely Babeuf and his followers would have been forgotten, as were the planners of several other aborted uprisings, had not one of his disciples fled into exile and thereby survived to write a book about it. Philip Buonarroti published an account of the Babeuvist movement and entitled it *Histoire de la conspiration pour l'égalité, dite de Babeuf*. Published first in Brussels during 1828 and in Paris two years later, it

revived not the agrarian orientation of Babeuf, but the ideal of revolutionary action and the dictatorship of a socialistic elite.

The main beneficiary of this heritage was a young man of solid bourgeois roots, Louis Auguste Blanqui, the founder of Jacobin Communism. By this, he planned to seize power with a small group of highly devoted followers, set up a dictatorship, and literally create a socialist system. His is the utopianism of violence, the belief that a sudden act of violence can initiate a new turning in the course of history. This methodology is more one of means than goals: the belief that an advanced capitalist society can be drastically changed by a small group making up a revolutionary elite. The elite is to take advantage of the class struggle between the few owners of large property and the "proletariat", that is, the vast majority of persons with little or no property. The elite will seize power and begin the revolutionary process leading to the violent overthrow of the rich. The proletariat then will follow their lead and help in the building of an equalitarian society. Unlike other utopians, Blanqui did not draw up a blueprint of the future. Therefore it is difficult to discover the contours of his ideal society, given his view on class structure. For Blanqui included many petty middle class elements in his proletariat, and apparently failed to realize the fact that although this social group could be quite democratic in its politics, it tended to be quite moderate, even conservative, in its social and economic views. Many of them wanted and fought for a republic in 1848; not many looked to the republic to abolish private property. Babeuf discovered this latent anti-socialism too late.

Blanqui, too, was quite unsuccessful. But unlike Babeuf, his reputation is not based on one failure, but on a long line of them. Evidently he was luckier than his predecessor: the governments against which he conspired rarely executed their enemies. Long jail sentences seemed sufficient, and usually they were—for ordinary enemies—but not for a determined activist such as Blanqui. He spent an inordinately large part of his life going in and out of jail. No sooner was a secret society suppressed than he and his cohorts set up another. In the mid 1830's one was called the Society of Families, because it was based on small bands of conspirators called families. These bands set about acquiring arms and even created small factories for making powder and cartridges. Police spies, of course, penetrated the not-so-secret ranks, revealed the plot, and everyone was arrested, including Blanqui.

Released in 1837 his compulsion to conspiracy proved overwhelming; he was intellectually convinced that only a resort to arms would do away with bourgeois government; and his psychology was such that

once convinced he had to resort to action. Caught in the webb of his psyche, he and another compulsive activist, Armand Barbès, set up the Society of the Seasons. Of necessity, given the laws against public assembly, it was an underground affair. In the hope of avoiding detection it was organized in a hierarchy of groups and leaders named in descending order after the seasons, the months, and the days of the week. The members of each week, the smallest group, were known to themselves only and received orders from their month, unknown to them, who followed the instructions of his season, unknown to him.

Despite these precautions, informers wove their way into the weeks and one even made his way into the higher echelons. Yet the utopian activists were clever and by the use of fake alarms or mock insurrections, they befuddled the police. It was not by their plans, always elaborately drawn, that utopians failed, it was by their weak knowledge of human nature. Once a secret society had been created for eventual action, the day of action could not be too long postponed. And, as Alan Spitzer in his study of Blanqui has pointed out, the conspirator was impelled toward hasty decisions because of the need for action among his followers.

Probably for this reason the conspirators decided upon May 12, 1839 as the day to act. About six hundred men, mostly students and workers, went into the streets; invaded arms shops and even some arsenals, and subsequently tried to take over several police stations. Failing this they invaded a local town hall. By this time they had expected to be joined by workers of the neighborhood, but none rallied to their cause. Despite the plans of Blanqui the *coup de main* did not grow into a revolution as the result of mass support; their carefully laid plans failed to take into account the apathy of workers, even during a depression year. After his capture Blanqui was very nearly sent to his maker, Babeuf; but the king commuted his death sentence and he spent the next nine years in the damp cells of Mont-Saint-Michel.

While there Blanqui became a legend, inspirational to his small band of followers, distrusted by most republicans and horrifying to conservatives. However, after the 1839 fiasco he really did become a reluctant participant in revolution. As the saying goes, he had to run to catch up with his followers. He was caught in his image as an activist, as an unrelenting exponent of action for action's sake, of revolt for revolt's sake. The men who took him for their leader were not fitted by temperament "to wait and see," and their demands he could not ignore. Blanquism, therefore, became a utopia of conspiratorial planning, as abstract and arbitrary and unsuccessful as all other utopian planning.

This was not his intention, and, in a sense, he was the unwitting victim of a bad press that built him into a mythical figure. He suffered the same "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" as Cabet and Louis Blanc.

1848

The revolution of 1848 in France marked the peak of popularity of utopian socialism. The careers of its three most important exponents, Blanc, Cabet, and Blanqui, merged in a disharmonious relation. Their failure, first to unite for a common purpose, and then to transform utopian thought into a viable alternative to *laissez faire* brought this early reform effort to an end. A movement which had begun as a promise of a new era, a true utopia, ended with Blanc in exile, Cabet in the New World and Blanqui back in jail. Utopianism as an active force never recovered from this catastrophe. We have already noted its failure in the form of communitarian experiments. We can now study its failure as a revolutionary force in Europe itself.

The revolution that shook Europe in mid-century broke out in Paris on February 22, 1848. Almost immediately the issue of socialist reform came up and Louis Blanc, whose short book *Organization of Labor* had been widely read, assumed leadership of the socialist movement. Very short in stature he was carried, literally, on the shoulders of armed workers, and abruptly entered the Provisional Government that ruled France until elections could be held for a constituent assembly. His role in the government, studied against the background of events in Paris during the spring of 1848, makes clear the interplay between ideology and action.

The major problem for Blanc was the acquisition of power, both administrative and financial, to undertake experiments in socialist organization. He demanded that a ministry of progress be created for him, with a budget. But his only support in the government came from a worker named Albert; the moderate members rejected his proposal out of hand. He therefore turned to the workers in an ill disguised attempt to pressure his colleagues among whom were the poet, Alphonse de Lamartine, and the leader of the nonsocialist democrats, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin.

On February 29, about two thousand workers tramped onto the Place de Grève, in front of the city hall. They were dressed in their work smocks and many carried banners inscribed with "Ten-Hour Day," "Ministry of Labor," "Organization of Work," or "Abolition of Merchandise," a system by which middle men obtained labor for an

entrepreneur at the cheapest wage possible. Now the moderates, sensing a counterplot, added the bitterness of their frustration to the debate. Lamartine was Blanc's chief antagonist, insisting that a new ministry was not needed, and that he did not understand the meaning of organization of work. Moreover, the government, being only provisional, must leave such important issues to the decision of a national body representing all of France.

But Blanc, sensing himself strengthened by the crowd, desired to enlarge the authority arbitrarily limited by the Provisional Government. In this desire Ledru-Rollin tended to agree with him; however, Ledru-Rollin acted to extend authority chiefly in the field of politics, and concentrated most of his time and energy in reorganizing the administration and preparing for elections. He offered the socialist little support; in fact, he grew suspicious of him and sided with Lamartine. Like other radical republicans he had become increasingly moderate in regard to social reform, with the result that under the impact of the 1848 crisis the democratic movement split into mutually distrustful factions. Save for Albert, Blanc stood alone in the government when the issue at hand was basic social reform. Inevitably he turned to the sympathetic mob for support.

Outside the crowd had come to a halt. A worker was the chief petitioner and his attitude showed clearly that he and the others were not prepared to be packed off with empty promises. Unemployment was widespread, the insurrection having aggravated an already serious economic crisis, and the decision of the government to undertake a small public works program—the origin of the National Workshops—had not seemed very enterprising. If need be, the workers were ready to suffer certain privations for a republic; however, they were not prepared to starve for it. They were torn between the desperation of their condition and their hope in Louis Blanc, in his motto and in his proposed ministry of progress. They saw these things as their cure-all. Blanc had taught them to look to a republic as a benevolent force; they now came demanding benevolent action. Had they not fought on the barricades for a republic? Had they not compelled the moderates to declare France a republic? In their minds there could be no reversal of that declaration, and the Republic could not retreat or even hesitate in its foremost mission, the organization of work. A ministry of progress, then, would be a necessary part of it.

In the council room Blanc, too, argued that the "revolution had a social meaning" which must be defined. With this the moderates did not entirely agree, whereupon he bluntly threw out his intention of

resigning. This came as a shock. All at once the plot to oust him, secretly prepared by the moderates, evaporated before the realization that he was indispensable. Were he to walk out of the room and announce to the multitude that he, and therefore Albert, were no longer part of the council, a new insurrection would begin at once. With anxiety now the other members urged him to reconsider. A colleague came forward with the notion of a commission to study social conditions and to prepare legislative projects for the future constituent assembly. In this way, until the council could hand over its responsibilities to a stronger national body, Blanc could be kept busy and the pressure for socialist reform be diverted into innocuous paths.

Although Blanc saw through the subterfuge, he reluctantly consented. He drew up a proclamation which he read to the workers and they responded with shouts of joy, and, heeding his appeal that they set an example of orderly conduct, vacated the square. The streets resounded with their marching and with their singing of the *Marseillaise*. Shortly afterward the Luxembourg Commission was founded, so named because it met in the Luxembourg palace.

A firm believer in the power of ideas, Blanc saw in the Luxembourg Commission a great rostrum from which he would elaborate his doctrines. This rostrum would be his compensation for the absence of a budget and legislative powers. Consequently, while the commission was supposed to be merely a study group, he refused to limit its activities as prescribed during its short history. On the contrary, he came to see in it the means of carrying out a great historic mission which he blandly assigned himself.

Blanc was definitely not of a piece with Blanqui; indeed, it was his deep-seated distrust of the "Enfermé" which helped to compel his acceptance of the Luxembourg Commission. He used it in his effort to win the workers away from fanatical revolutionaries. Like most utopian reformers, he was just as fearful of the extremists on his left as of those on his right, and one of the forces motivating his action during the spring of 1848 was his suspicion that a renewal of civil war would either pave the way for the dictatorship of Blanqui or cause a conservative reaction. Whichever the result, men like himself would become the victims.

Perhaps Blanc's gravest error was to give in so quickly. Later, he reproached the workers for having too easily accepted the proposal of a commission. However, the crowd apparently considered itself at his orders, and did his bidding. Therefore, had he held out for a short while longer, he might have obtained his ministry. But it is doubtful that even with a ministry he could have accomplished much more than he did. Of

course, the Luxembourg Commission did not have a budget, but money was not the only necessity lacking; it was time that Blanc needed as well. He soon realized this and therefore used the commission in a desperate effort to gain time by retarding the elections to a National Assembly. Thus, the commission became a fundamental agency in the move to establish a temporary Jacobin dictatorship.

Certainly none of the delegates to the Commission dreamed of such an outcome on this first day of March. Dressed in worker's smocks their attention was focused on the diminutive man wearing the colorful uniform of a guardsman and surrounded by ushers dressed in the traditional black suit, white gloves and glittering sword. Blanc, in clear, simple statements, emphasized the historic significance of the occasion: for the first time in history manual laborers had been called upon to settle their own problems. He explained the purpose of the commission: the study of social conditions and the elaboration of projects of law for the future assembly. His speech now grew detailed as he explained his scheme of organization: each craft was to be entitled to three delegates, two of whom would form part of a large committee meeting periodically, while the third would belong to a small permanent body. He stressed the desirability of a small manageable body capable of arriving readily at proposals which would then be submitted to the large committee for discussion. The method of election, he concluded, would be announced. He then urged his audience to return to work.

Not until the seventeenth of March was there a general session of 242 worker delegates and 231 employer delegates. The latter co-opted ten from their number to form a permanent committee which generally met separately from that of the workers. On occasion, however, the two met in joint session to discuss important issues affecting capital and labor, and when this occurred, Blanc presided. His presence manifested itself everywhere, and it was largely through his personal efforts that the Luxembourg Commission was now almost as fully constituted as it would ever be. Unfortunately, it was never complete, some crafts having sent no representatives, while enthusiasm could not overcome the negligence and ill will of most employers and even of many workers.

Perhaps it was partly Blanc's fault that not all the schools of social reform were present, but on March 3 he certainly essayed to bring together a wide variety of thinkers: Saint-Simonians, Fourierists, Jacobin-socialists, and liberals sat face to face in another committee, one of experts chosen by Blanc. They were to present their ideas on social conditions, and to draw up a report for the future government. Blanc, too occupied with other pressing matters, was never able to play an

active role in this committee; he therefore relied on Vidal and Pecqueur to take charge of the final report. They eventually drew up the *Exposé général des travaux de la Commission du Luxembourg*, published in the *Moniteur*. The *Exposé* was by no means the work of the multifarious committee; it was rather an exposition of the theories Blanc, Vidal, and Pecqueur held in common, though its considerable attention to agrarian reorganization, which Blanc had almost ignored, particularly revealed the views of Vidal and Pecqueur. The report had no discernible influence at this time. It was an important landmark, however, in the development of utopian ideology.

More effective was the part Blanc took in the Luxembourg where, during March and early April, he expatiated on his ideas before audiences of workingmen. He used the commission for indoctrination, not investigation. Of course, on every occasion when he counseled his audience to be patient, he stressed the need for study, for discussion, as a means of discovering solutions; but this was a tactic, not a goal. Why waste time investigating? He had already exposed the poverty of the lower classes. Why search for a solution? He had one.

Unfortunately for Blanc, he could not inaugurate his socialist program at once; by accepting the Luxembourg Commission he gave up the budget for the word. This was, perhaps, a catastrophe, because not all of the plans he put forward were impractical. On March 5 he elaborated his plan for a workers' city, composed of large apartments, each housing some 400 families, with either communal or private kitchens and dining rooms. The cost of each building was estimated at about a million francs. The construction of these apartments would have been a useful public works project, giving worthwhile tasks to the men in the National Workshops, and would have been effective in relieving the economic crisis. The plan was approved by both the commission and the committee of experts; however, neither the Provisional Government nor the National Assembly, when it met, would grant the required funds. The moderates preferred to use the National Workshops as a means of discrediting labor and of undermining the influence of socialism.

When Louis Blanc entered, or rather forced his way into, the Provisional Government, he created the issue of socialist participation in a nonsocialist ministry. This issue would envenom the debates among socialists around the turn of the century, and he would be cited as its first example, favorably by Jean Jaurès, and unfavorably by Paul Lafargue. Revolutionary Marxians such as Lafargue would accuse him of having stupidly submitted to the machinations of bourgeois republicans who used him as a political opiate to benumb the revolutionary workers.

Now, in truth, his position within the council was most vague. He was a part of it, but not an integral part. He possessed voting rights, but never occupied a ministry or disposed of a budget. He consequently shared the responsibilities of the council without sharing all of its powers. This awkward position soon prompted him to use the Luxembourg Commission to propagate his ideas and subsequently to set up precursory workshops. Yet he never relinquished his belief that governmental aid was indispensable to the co-operative movement, and unable personally to convert his fellow members, he once more resorted to pressuring them by encouraging the workers to resort to street demonstrations.

In this endeavor he was considerably aided by several political clubs brought into existence during March. Cabet set up the Central Fraternal Society where he preached his brand of socialism and also helped to orchestrate the street demonstrations intended to push the moderates toward socialist goals. Cabet was a strong backer of Blanc, albeit not at all hesitant about criticizing him. Several other clubs were friendly and acted in accord with Blanc. The followers of Fourier, led by Victor Considerant, rallied to the republican idea, thereby abandoning their founder's indifference toward politics. They, too, sought to organize themselves and set up a Phalansterian Club. In its meetings the members were rather hostile toward Blanc and his desire to use the new state to achieve socialist goals. They therefore remained on the outskirts of the more aggressive utopian forces. Blanqui also founded a club, and he was even more hostile to utopian reformers, so much so that they, in turn, diverted no small part of their energy to combatting him. These divisions did not help the left achieve one of its immediate goals, the long postponement of all elections until ignorant peasants could be educated about democratic government and the benefits they would derive from it. Even the massive street rallies and demonstrations of workers to urge postponement, instead of bringing harmony, brought rather sharp internal conflict.

Indeed, the thought that Blanqui might profit from the demonstration planned by the clubs and the workers of the Luxembourg Commission for March 17 aroused Blanc's anxiety, and by the fourteenth he was troubled by the very audacity of his plan. His fears were apparently exaggerated, since Blanqui, at this early date, chose much the same tactic as Blanc himself: popular pressure rather than a *coup de main*. Nonetheless, Blanc felt that he was playing with revolutionary fire and he was not entirely sure that he could control the flames. Therefore, remaining in close contact with his men in the commission, he instructed them to beware of any effort to enlarge the limited role he envisioned for the demonstrators.

That same evening he, Ledru-Rollin, and Albert made a sincere and determined effort to convince the moderates of the danger their intransigence might entail. But by a vote of 8 to 3 delay of the elections was rejected, even though the mayor of the wealthy first district doubted that the lists of voters would be completed in time. Not until the next day, the fifteenth, when Marrast admitted that the registers could not be completed as planned, did the council decide to extend registration until the twenty-third and to postpone the elections until the twenty-fifth. Blanc, motivated perhaps by information that the Blanquists were organizing, accepted this palliative, this one step backward. At once the decision was made public.

Probably the demonstration of the clubs and the Luxembourg Commission would now have been called off had not another been organized by the elite national guardsmen, who strongly protested a decree providing for the dissolution of their companies. On the sixteenth they marched, dressed in their costly uniforms and tall shakos, the *bonnets à poils*, and halted before the City Hall. Probably they were protesting not only against the decree, but against the entire leftwing of the council. The threats which proliferated from the mass of black shakos, and the roughing of Ledru-Rollin, certainly left the radicals with little doubt as to the intent of the petitioners. The radicals' concern was heightened because this was the second hostile demonstration on the part of the wealthy middle class, the first having occurred only five days earlier. Moreover, Blanc was well aware that the protests against postponement of the elections came chiefly from middle class groups, organized in electoral committees, such as the Central Republican Committee, which had branches in the suburbs and *départements* and was in a position to swamp the government with petitions opposing delay. These petitions, either mailed or ostentatiously delivered by numerous delegations, had the effect of stiffening the moderates' resistance to the left. The keen opposition to an immediate election, emanating from the radicals, only increased their desire for haste.

Inevitably, therefore, Blanc proposed a more extensive delay when he met with the council that afternoon, the sixteenth. To the numerous objections raised he admitted he wanted a dictatorship, albeit one of progress, not of reaction. He averred that no one had more respect for popular sovereignty than himself; what he dreaded was its falsification. He reasoned that it would be a crime to deliver the Republic over to the eternal enemies of the people, who would then take advantage of their riches and influence in order to procure the people's votes. If the elections were not delayed they would assuredly be reactionary. This

Jacobinism, however, only aroused the resistance of the moderates, so Blanc and most democrats decided that the street demonstration must take place.

We do not know the extent to which Blanc participated directly in the preparations carried out at first by the corporations of the Luxembourg Commission. These were represented by fifteen delegates, who joined together during the stormy, wind-swept night of March 16, with a like number from the utopian clubs. This committee of thirty, in which the club delegates quickly assumed leadership, drew up a proclamation, posted on the walls of Paris in the early morning, calling upon the workers' corporations to meet at the Place de la Révolution at ten o'clock. Then, an hour before the scheduled assembly, it prepared a petition demanding the withdrawal of all troops from Paris, and adjournment of the general elections to May 31. These dates had been set by Cabet, not by Blanc.

At the appointed time and place, about 150,000 workers assembled and were formed into ranks by the Luxembourgers, who were under strict orders from their president to beware of extremists. With the clubbists at their head the corporations marched in a long, almost silent column toward the City Hall, arriving at about two in the afternoon. As they spread out over the Place de Grève they sang the *Marseillaise* and, unappropriately, the *Chante des Girondins*. Between these they interspersed vivas for Blanc and Ledru-Rollin. The Jacobin-socialist had just arrived from the Luxembourg Commission where he had been discoursing on the evils of competition before an audience of employers. Their response, more polite than fervent, had been as nothing compared to this massive ovation in the streets which, he hoped, would spread like a joyous wind and settle over France. As he listened, his emotions were mingled. He saw in the delegation "strange faces," men of Blanqui whom he distrusted. With one shout, he reasoned, these few men could transform a completely peaceful crowd into an insurrectionary mob. On the other hand, he was content to realize that he was the real intermediary between this fragile government and the politically carnivorous mass, momentarily tamed by the gentle music of promises.

The reading over, Blanc stepped forward, praised the people, and invited the delegates to depart. He and his colleagues would take up the people's will but they could not deliberate under pressure. The calmness of the people, he said, was the majesty of its force. Then, the most unexpected happened. Several delegates roared, "We'll not leave here without an answer to transmit to the People." But a voice relieved the tenseness with assurances that the people had confidence in all

members of the council. "Not in all! Not in all!" warned several other voices. "Yes, yes, in all! In all!" shouted the majority, drowning out the Blanquists.

The crowd had marched away filled with both the confidence of victory and the belief that its heroes, Blanc, Ledru-Rollin, and Albert, now had the force to impose their will on the moderates. We can only imagine what might have happened had all the socialists united behind Blanc to set up a real dictatorship in order to strike down their enemies and to initiate a utopian solution based on Blanc's and Cabet's programs. Undoubtedly they entertained the idea but rejected it because only terror and bloodshed could have resulted. Rather, they sought to propagandize through the clubs in the hope of winning over some of the peasants, and, at the same time, to increase pressure on the Provisional Government. They failed to achieve this goal, with the result that their power steadily waned. A quite large demonstration, probably instigated by Cabet, was carried out on April 16. It proved to be a fiasco. To oppose the mass of workers moderate republicans summoned the still predominantly middle class national guard and the lines of the lower class demonstrators were hemmed in between tightly closed ranks of well-armed guards. As the workers went angrily away cries came from the guard, "Down with Louis Blanc!" "Down with Cabet!" "Down with communism!"

Undoubtedly these tactics influenced the national elections of April 23. Moderate republicans were the victors, utopian socialists barely held their own. After another demonstration on May 15, when some workers invaded the Constituent Assembly, moderate republicans decided to end all socialist experiments and to close the National Workshops.

These so-called National Workshops are often confused with Blanc's social workshops. In reality, they were nothing more than a large and expensive public works program, organized by moderate republicans in the hope of discrediting Blanc. Socialism was depicted as a program whereby jobless workers were given two francs a day, out of taxpayers' money, for doing nothing. The entire program became extremely unpopular, yet over 200,000 unemployed were entirely dependent on it for their livelihood. Small wonder that when it was summarily ended the workers rose in a revolt called the "June Days."

The bloody suppression of this revolt really ended utopian socialism as an active force. Louis Blanc refused to join the workers, and was denounced by the survivors as a traitor. Without a following anywhere in France, he fled to England when the government won permission to prosecute him as an instigator. Cabet, who had failed to win a seat in

the April elections, went to join his followers in New Orleans. Victor Considérant was not persecuted because the phalansterians had not taken a particularly active role so far and he won a seat in the general elections of 1849. However, when conservatives sent troops to destroy the new republic in Rome he joined the Jacobins in an uprising in May. Since it failed to attract large support and was easily put down, he had to flee to Belgium. Quite clearly France, which the utopians had believed to be the leader that would liberate other peoples, did not choose to become the center of social experimentation.

8.

Recent Utopian and Co-operative Communities

The major utopian period, roughly the first half of the nineteenth century, witnessed the ideological outpouring of men who were hostile both to past forms of society and to the forms which they themselves experienced. They hoped to find, or believed that they had found, a new ideal with which they could lead the way toward the brotherhood of men. In their minds brotherhood meant equality, and not merely equality of opportunity which even many self-made capitalists accepted as gospel. Rather, they demanded an equality of condition which was intended to eliminate the extremes of wealth and poverty. Even Fourier, the least egalitarian among them, agreed that these extremes were not compatible with social justice. And even he envisioned a mild form of collective society.

In their emphasis upon collective ownership, the utopians went far beyond the Jacobin ideal of equality based on individual and private ownership of small property. For the Jacobins, later called Radicals, each citizen of the state was entitled to a morsel of property more or less even in size and value to those of his neighbors. For the utopians this morselism might work for one generation, but private property meant also the right of inheritance. And through the workings of inheritance differences of fortunes would reappear. The only way to preserve equality, therefore, was to abolish property. All men would own all wealth together, as a social group, and elect their leaders so as to prevent the concentration of property and power in a small elite. The utopians laid the basis for a thoroughly collectivist ideology and in consequence were the real founders of the modern socialist movement. They provided both an ideology and several forms of organization. The word "utopian," as applied to them, should have the meaning of fore-runner, or experimenter, not merely that of impractical or unrealistic idealist.

Because they held to their views the utopians were considered "misfits" by most of their contemporaries. Misfits (today we would say "alienated") were the families who emigrated to remote parts of the world in order to set up experimental communities. These people found life in Europe unbearable because they were often the victims of the economic transition from an artisan-peasant to an industrial and mechanical type of economy. In their minds utopianism was the outgrowth of a mystique of craftsmanship and the longing for an ideal community, close to the soil, and based on individual skill and human worth. Undoubtedly a serious weakness of the communitarian experiments was their acceptance of social misfits seeking escape from an aggressive, profit-oriented, hurry-paced society. Whether these persons were misfits because they were without energy or because their values cut them off, is a question we cannot answer. What is certain is that those who emigrated, and the thousands like them who remained in Europe, represented a social group ill-adapted to the growth of mechanized industry. They were captivated by utopian dreams as children are enchanted by fairy tales. Utopia for them was almost another world, a land of milk and honey, without witches and dragons, and where every man was a prince. Utopian planning, however, was not a fairy tale. The socialists wanted to change society; only in a social system providing equality could all peasants and workers become princes.

Nineteenth century utopian ideals even differed from those of preceding centuries. Earlier thinkers had either dreamed up exotic social systems, quite foreign to any European model, as a form of amusement and exercise in imagination, outerspace stories, if you like; or they had sketched an imaginary unattainable society which served both to criticize their own society and to create an ideal toward which men should aspire and thereby improve themselves. The socialists studied in this volume, however, fully intended to put their ideas into practice, and some of them did, with the results already indicated.

Now this last kind of utopianism came to an end as a distinct movement about mid-century. From this time on two trends became dominant in continental Europe. First, the progressive use of machine production brought forth a factory proletariat which increasingly replaced the artisan working class, and which no longer offered the creative raw material for serious communitarian planners. To be sure, Cabet was not a real communitarian; he intended to transform all of France. But he ended his last years as a leader of a small community, and early socialist thought had already become identified in the public mind with villages of co-operation. Nineteenth century utopian thinking, however

broad its goal, always ended up as the basis of experimental villages or small artisan co-operatives when put into action. That these experiments failed is not without relevance to our explanation of its decline. To the old saying "Nothing succeeds like success," one should add "Nothing fails like failure."

Second, concentration on the small community became increasingly anachronistic in a continent where the general tendency was toward relatively large national states. The idea of small community, so intimately fused with utopian ideology, became "utopian," that is, impractical, lacking in a sense of reality, and out of touch with the true nature of man and of the direction of history. The failure of the socialist movement in 1848, for which Louis Blanc was severely blamed, also weakened the belief that liberal capitalism could be ended by means of good will, reason and democratic suffrage. The Second Republic, viewed as a large-scale experiment in social reform, was as dismal a failure as small communities.

The mid-century revolutions throughout Europe, although chiefly political in their goals, formed a watershed in the course of socialist theory. Contemporary and succeeding social reformers became convinced that in some way the failure of these political revolutions was attributable to the utopians, to the unrealistic planners. What the socialist movement required henceforth was no longer the dreamers of new worlds but hardheaded leaders, revolutionary fervor, and a mass following. Utopian ideology appeared soft; its insistence upon the equality of all men and its refusal to preach class warfare and revolt made it appear a delusion likely to turn the proletariat away from its revolutionary role, made it appear, like religion, an opiate of the people.

The emerging socialist parties, as they fell under Marxist influence, heaped scorn on the utopians and considered them part of the infantile phase of the modern reform movement. The leading socialist parties sought to capture the national economy by taking over the national state. They preached "scientific socialism" based on the historical inevitability of class warfare, of revolution, and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In reality, these parties in western and central Europe, where they were more or less free to operate, became bureaucratic, interested in winning votes and in gaining seats in national parliaments. But even this change did not lessen their harsh criticism of Blanc's failure. To win votes they all rushed to put forward "realistic" or practical programs of nationalization and looked back with much embarrassment on the earlier utopians, none of whom had any positive, concrete gains to show for their efforts.

Recent Utopian Experiments

Did utopian thought and action, in consequence, have no impact on succeeding generations? The answer must be negative. The ideal of communal villages persisted, and merging with it was an anarchist ideal which sought fulfillment in the small group. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, small numbers of people sought to continue personal freedom and a sense of belonging by practicing group living. Undoubtedly many such villages came into life and went out of it without attracting public notice; a few examples will suffice. In 1902 a Society for the Creation of a Free Environment was set up to collect funds and members for a communal experiment. The next year it created an anarchist colony at Vaux, France, with a nucleus of seventeen members. The influence of Tolstoy was as strong as that of the utopians. Unlike the colony of Cabet where people felt themselves free, at least for a few years, because they willingly adapted themselves to numerous regulations, the utopians of Vaux had only the simplest of rules: one must freely work in the colony and not use violence against one's comrades. There would be no discipline save that imposed by oneself, no private property, and consumption of the collective produce was to be based exclusively on one's needs. During a brief while the members at Vaux worked diligently to produce food for their own consumption and to manufacture shoes and hosiery for sale outside. This community attracted some attention, at least several well-known writers visited it and Lucien Descaves based his play, *La Clairière* on it. After three years, however, internal dissension appeared, the founder and leader was accused of "dictatorship" and forced out. Whereupon the experiment collapsed and these anarchistic utopians scattered.

A similar community was founded and called Aiglemont. Here the members busied themselves with agriculture exclusively and repudiated the state and its laws. In fact, when a child was born in 1905, it was registered, contrary to official rules, simply as "born of parents unknown." Here too, the leader, who was the brother of an anarchist executed for throwing a bomb in the French chamber of deputies, was accused of overbearing behavior. He departed and the colony broke up. Just as short-lived was the "Cavern of Zoroaster" at Tourettes-sur-Loup, which had forty-six "cavemen" living a communal existence.

It would be tedious to continue this list. On the one hand, little is known about most of these communities, and, on the other hand, what is known indicates that they all were expressions of a continuous longing after fraternal ties, equality, freedom from the centralized administration, and the affirmation of individual worth in a small group.

However, individualism proved stronger than fraternal ties, with the inevitable result that conflict—always more bitter among brothers—led to collapse. These co-operative villages were never large and not particularly important in the larger context of European society. They existed on the fringes of society where the ideals of utopian community and anarchist freedom sought to blend, without much success. But then, the question of time was far more important for the original utopians than for their odd offspring who exalted spontaneity in their day-to-day existence and sought to safeguard themselves from the kind of extreme organization found in the writings of Cabet. In this sense, there is a link between the early libertarian utopians, these latter-day communitarians, and present-day hippies. The communes founded by hippies are, in a sense, anti-organization utopias, much closer to Fourier and Owen than to Cabet or Louis Blanc. Pleasure and character building stand in the forefront of their desiderata. But they too are on the fringes of society and, much like the latter-day communities, influenced by many forces not related to early utopian thought.

Familistère de Guise

The Utopian experiments we have investigated so far undoubtedly failed because they were undertaken by persons who were fleeing their societies and who imagined that life could be reduced to its simplest terms by the revival of folk culture. Utopianism in practice had become an escape from modern forms of social life rather than a movement to change these forms. This effort ran counter to the fundamental teaching of the true utopians who looked forward to improved standards of living in a modern society. Not even Fourier, the most pastoral of the group, wanted a return to the village conditions of the Old Regime, and it was the tradition laid down by him that led to the most successful and enduring of experiments in fraternal living.

The failure of the co-operative colony in Texas, where Considérant had revealed his lack of planning and organizational skill, had a sobering effect on latter-day disciples. One of these, Justin Godin, represented a new generation of more practical reformers. He had become a follower during the last years of Fourier's life. By mid-century he had acquired a sizable fortune and invested a third of it, 100,000 francs, in Considérant's fiasco, lost it and later wrote bitterly, "Not all men have the ability to carry out the plans they conceived. . . . Each talent has its limits, and the societarian school paid dearly for the fault of not having taken facts into account, of not having had a sufficiently mature opinion about the aptitudes of those who took in hand the direction of its material interests in this enterprise."¹³

Godin was himself a successful and astute businessman, indeed, the Robert Owen of France. He revealed what Owen might have accomplished had Owen turned his factory in Scotland into a co-operative rather than abandoning it and spending his wealth in New World colonies. But, of course, Godin had the advantage of hindsight, and lived on beyond the romantic era and into that of realism. With rare good sense, he adopted only those ideas of Fourier which could be applied to the conditions of life and work in a French town. In the end he proved to be a man of considerable imagination and generosity.

He certainly had a far better understanding of the abilities of his employees and workers. Reacting against the extravagant notions of his predecessors, he learned not to expect too much altruism from his fellow men in too short a time. One lesson he thoroughly learned from Fourier was to accept human nature as it is, and to arrange the phalanstery so that it would function effectively even with man as he is. Godin had, however, a truer view of human capacity for change, and most important, he looked upon himself as a leader and teacher. Therefore he never abandoned the phalanstery. After all, it became his life work; it was the mark of success of a truly self-made man.

Godin, much like Owen, came from a humble background, having been born into a family of poor rural craftsmen. From an early age he worked in the nearby fields as well as in his father's metal shop where he learned his trade. Like many of the village craftsmen of France Justin discovered that the local market was too limited for both father and son and he left for the city. There he became an apprentice. Quite early he grew appalled at the poverty of the workers and of the brutal competition which he believed characteristic of liberal capitalism. His experiences then were remarkably similar to those of Owen, Fourier and Louis Blanc. And again like them he early vowed to aid his fellow laborers if ever he acquired the means to do so.

By the time he was forty, he acquired the means. He had set himself up as a maker of enameled cast iron stoves when still a young man with a meagre capital investment. Before long his early success attracted more extensive financial backing, with the result that he became a rich manufacturer. In 1846 he moved his factory to the town of Guise in eastern France. There he initiated a reform program that went far beyond the one of Robert Owen at New Lanark. Owen had created a model community for his workers to live in; his partners never allowed him to set up a collectively owned industry. Godin, on the other hand, was really his own boss, provided he fulfilled his obligations to his capitalist backers. And what he set out to do was precisely what Fourier had

proposed, that is, to unify capital, talent and labor in one enterprise, a phalange, and mark out the trail toward collective ownership. This was the only way to correct the maldistribution of wealth.

An important step in this direction came with the founding of a kind of phalange which Godin called the *Familistère*. It consisted at first of a model community built piecemeal on the Oise River just opposite his stove factory. Godin laid the foundations in 1859 and the first building, made solidly of stone, became the main living quarters and was occupied the following year. The entire venture was completed only seventeen years later. By then it consisted of two more apartment buildings, a theatre, two school houses, a library, several shops for food, clothing and manufactured articles, various repair shops, baths, and washrooms, stables, cafés and a huge restaurant. All of these stores were, of course, based on the co-operative principle and provided the inhabitants with goods at low prices. The site was about twenty acres in size and surrounding the buildings were gardens of flowers and vegetables, shade trees, parks, and numerous paths for promenades. The apartment buildings were four stories high and there was a water tap at each level, as well as communal toilet facilities for the 1200 occupants. Considering the filth and decay in which most workers lived in industrial cities, the *Familistère* was a utopia come true. With its massive stone buildings, park-like surroundings, and extensive cleaning services of paid personnel, it was far removed from the crude wooden structures of the New World communities. Engineers, directors and the Godin family lived there and visitors of all classes marvelled at its success—and refused to imitate it.

As for Godin, he described accurately the style and character of life in the *Familistère*, where basic services were designed to satisfy man's several senses:¹⁴

The provisions and culinary services satisfy the needs for food and nourishment and [man's Sense] of *Taste*. These needs receive their indispensable complement in the consumption of pure drinking water.

By the hygienic use of water and the purity of the air the *Sense of Smell* is in a state to savor the perfumes of the gardens and flowers, also the windows of the Palace are constantly garnished with flowers and aromatic plants.

The *Familistère* gives satisfaction to the needs of our sense of sight by the elegance of its construction, by its space and the vastness of its proportions, by its general cleanliness, and by the large space it offers to light and to everything that delights the eyes.

Godin was particularly pleased with the influence which communal living had on children. His observations led him to believe that mothers

of the Familistère took better care of their offspring, if only to emulate the best mothers there and out of shame lest their own youngsters appear dirty and shabby in the school group. The happy result was that no children need feel neglected and unloved. He reasoned:

Such is the influence of a more favorable milieu that by urging each one to love the good, it contributes by every means to the disappearance of that hideous poverty from which children still in the midst of poverty suffer so much. . . . The child [of the Familistère] does not feel poverty, and lives truly happy with this plenitude of life that never leaves him. . . . General emulation . . . contributes to our taking care of our bodies and to the perfecting of our manners and bearing; . . . When an individual, instead of feeling crushed by poverty, can present himself with dignity in the eyes of his fellow men, he feels ennobled; this is the feeling the worker's child experiences in the Familistère: he no longer goes through, at the beginning of his life, the humiliation of poverty that so often brutalizes both body and soul.

Because of his concern for children, Godin provided an extensive education program. To relieve the working mother there was a nursery where infants and the very young were cared for during the day; a kindergarten called the "Pouponnat", and regular classes for youngsters up to the age of sixteen. At all times boys and girls were taught the same subjects in unsegregated classrooms. From the cradle onward there was no discrimination between the sexes, and in class the only separation was a physical one with boys on one side of the room and girls on the other. Here was a radical departure from the strict separation of the sexes in French schools.

What Godin called *éducation intégrale* or complete education consisted of the three R's as well as special subjects to qualify students for jobs in industry. But at the base was the principle that schooling must be open to everyone. "What we must discover," he affirmed, "is democratic education and teaching . . . for all the children of the people, without exception; that is, the full cultivation of the human spirit by the full cultivation of the entire species, . . . leading all men to useful and productive lives." Needless to say Godin's bias was utilitarian which probably explained the success of his school as a force contributing to the unity of the Familistère. Toward this latter goal the curriculum included: "Lessons of higher morals; explanations of the Laws of Life and of Work, so as to inspire in the student the desire to become useful to himself and to his fellowmen." The rather elaborate school system was financed from direct allocations in the community's budget and also from a sizable share of the profits accruing to co-operative stores.

The schools prepared children for adult life; there also existed a highly developed mutual aid program to protect everyone from the hazards of life. There was protection against sickness and infirmity, and provision for old age pensions. Unemployment insurance was not necessary because there was no unemployment. The costs in the late nineteenth century were borne by monthly premiums of 1 franc 50 from each worker and a matching sum from the company. The average was about 21,600 francs a year and benefits paid out normally came to 18,000 francs. This was not a company fund, so common in most of European industry and therefore controlled by company directors. This was a fund administered entirely by the workers through their elected representatives and, in fact, all activities of the *Familistère* affecting labor were directed by workers divided into series or by elected councils. The *Familistère*, therefore, was not really a company town in the usual sense; it was such a town only in the sense that it was created by Godin as a means of achieving worker ownership of the company.

Gradually the *Familistère* came to include, as Godin intended, both the community and the factory; it came to include, therefore, labor, talent and capital, the major aim of Fourier. But Godin was not the blind apostle of his prophet. He agreed with Fourier that men were not equal in talent and character—a belief common to most self-made men—but unlike Owen he did not believe that education was the great equalizer. Men were born with differences and the cultural forces of society could not and indeed should not attempt to abolish them. For this reason he opposed Owen and the communists who were, in his eyes, brutal levelers. On the other hand he accepted the major premise of nearly all nonviolent social reformers that the rich and the talented owed special obligations to their less gifted fellowmen. The problem was to create a hierarchy of merit and capacity and to change his employees living in the *Familistère* from the status of wage earners into that of associates.

In fact, even before he built his model community he tried, in order to fill managerial posts during the 1850's and 60's, various electoral procedures in his factory at Guise, but concluded that the most talented men were not chosen. In 1872, after the disaster of the Franco-Prussian war, he himself selected fifty-seven of his best workers and shared 12,000 francs among them. This, of course, was a form of top echelon profit-sharing which had little to do with Fourier. So Godin set out to found a system of sharing more in accord with his prophet's teachings. When the *Familistère* was nearing completion in 1877 he chose fifty-seven of his best workers and made them his associates (*associés*),

and finally in 1880 he created the Société de Familistère de Guise as a co-operative. To this society he contributed his factory at Guise and another in Belgium, and, in addition, 4,427,934 francs as working capital. The profits from these enterprises constituted the workers' contribution and by 1883, 864 workers became full-fledged members or *associés*. Henceforth, an employee would become an associate after attaining a fixed stage in his technical and social education. That is, after learning not only how to be productive but also how to live in a fraternal community. The associate rank was the uppermost of a simple hierarchy. Below it were the *sociétaires*, who might become *associés* after five years of training. Beneath them were the *participants* who had worked in the factory for at least one year. At the bottom were the *auxiliaires*, simple laborers who could rise in rank with effort and time.

The highest administration consisted of a director, and an administrative council of thirteen members, all elected by the associates meeting in general assembly. In his lifetime Godin had had misgivings about the elective principle, but apparently it worked quite well. The company grew and between 1880 and 1913 the working members of the Familistère were paid 83 million francs in wages while capital investors received 8,300,000 francs in interests. Of the profits, 13 million went to labor and talent and 700,000 to capital.

Profits were distributed on a pro rata basis depending on the wage of each worker, so there was not equality of income. In time, Godin's goal became increasingly socialistic in that he sought to reimburse capital and place the factory entirely in the hands of his workers. When he died in 1888 he hastened this trend by bequeathing to the Familistère 2,500,000 francs, about half of his total wealth. By this time the Familistère was more than an industrial enterprise; it was also the community where lived over 1000 persons who were becoming owners. Here was living proof that communitarian and co-operative utopianism could work.

There is a point here which must be emphasized. The Familistère probably succeeded because it was created by a man who was a first-rate organizer and who lived continuously in the community and guided it toward a collectivist goal. The role of the gifted individual was undoubtedly crucial. So was that of money, but only if wisely employed. Owen invested heavily in New Harmony but abandoned its direction to less competent delegates. Finally, Godin, and here he departed from Fourier, believed in big mechanized industry as the means to liberation from heavy labor, and its collective ownership as the means to the liberation of the laborer.

Kibbutzim

Mechanized large scale operation when under competent leadership was not the only key to success. We have previously indicated that the early utopian communities suffered from the absence of the kind of spiritual bond which could dampen the too eager desire for material comfort among the members and impose self discipline upon their intellectual exclusiveness and bitter debates. These spiritual bonds had existed in the form of rigid Christian beliefs in the more successful New World colonies, such as those of the Rappites and of the members of the Oneida group. The *kibbutz* is an example of successful community building based on religion in part but also on a feeling of national belonging. The Zionists who founded them, Jews and chiefly east European Jews, had been confined to their ghettos for centuries. Here they had acquired a sense of community, of self-devotion, of mutual aid, in short, of solidarity. They brought with them to their area of settlement, therefore, a group-oriented heritage, the tough-mindedness which had enabled them to resist extinction, as well as a sense of mission to rebuild what they fervently believed to be their original homeland. Even those who were Marxists and out of sympathy with all mystical religious beliefs looked upon themselves as chosen agents preparing the return home of a whole people. Their Zionism subtly fused with their Marxism to overcome an antireligious bias. All immigrants displayed, in consequence, a fervor and sense of mission that was too often either lacking or shortlived in the New World and European settlements.

Yet there is much in the *kibbutzim* that seems to connect them to utopian colonies of the early nineteenth century. Many of the Jewish scholars who emigrated to Palestine before and just after World War I were well-read in the early socialists. To what extent they were attracted and influenced is difficult to determine. In the writings of several of the early utopians there was a strain of anti-semitism sufficiently virulent to discourage even a sympathetic Jew. Nonetheless, among a few of the Zionist pioneers, there is mention of and even commentaries upon some of the utopians such as Fourier, Saint-Simon and Louis Blanc. Many of the post-1918 immigrants, however, were avowed Marxists and highly influenced by the Soviet revolutionaries. Others were not socialist at all and condemned both utopians and Marxists. They looked rather to a combination of co-operation and private enterprise as the basis of their communities.

Given this diversity it was natural that settlements in Palestine would have varied forms. The most collectivistic was the *kibbutz*, the common type among the early migrants. When discord broke out,

however, two other forms appeared, first the *Moshav Ovdim* or small holder settlement, then the *Moshav Shitufi* or the co-operative colony.

The *kibbutz* comes the closest to the early utopian ideals. Nearly all of them were created by east Europeans with the financial backing of various Jewish organizations. Probably a majority of the early settlers, called *chaverim* or comrades in each *kibbutz*, were openly Marxist and shared Marx's views on the utopians. And yet, the ideals and practices they imposed on themselves in their daily living, and which became a basic part of their ideology, were hardly orthodox Marxist. Rather they remind us of the ways of the first American communities practicing an undeniably primitive form of communism. There was a strong emphasis on hard physical labor, especially agricultural labor, and a disdain for easy jobs and leisure. This cult of work was certainly alien to Fourier and his pleasure principle, but reminiscent of the other utopians who glorified physical labor as a necessary force in the moulding of sound human personality. Moreover the fundamental social ideals of the *kibbutz* were as close to the early socialists as they were to Marx, and indeed could only be explained in the light of utopian socialist traditions. There was complete faith in the collectivist community as an autonomous body within a larger federal state and as the bearer of a message for all mankind. A fundamental part of that message was the doctrine of complete, or nearly complete, equality among members of the *kibbutz*. In the socialist ones there was complete equality among all members. Everyone had to work and the hiring of wage labor was strictly forbidden. There was to be no "exploitation of man by man." The motto they took up was that of the utopians: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. Wages were abolished along with money and all workers received clothing allotments, housing and food from the *kibbutz* according to their requirements. During the long years of foundation the only private property permitted was one's toothbrush and a pair of shoes. Clothing was of the simplest pattern and made of rough strong cloth and the only differentiation was that of size.

There was no effort to single out the individual; rather human relations were based on the group, which, of course, is the meaning of the word *kibbutz*. Not only clothing but housing also reflected this emphasis on the community. Clothing, housing and food were simple, crude, even primitive because of the limited resources of the first *kibbutzim*. But regardless of quality, the pattern of living, of working and of housing was arranged to absorb the individual into the group where he could find protection and guidance.

There were no private houses. *Chaverim*, whether married or single, lived in one or two rooms of a larger dormitory, and utilized them chiefly

for sleeping or for the occasional friendly visits in the evening after work. There were no facilities for cooking because, like the utopians, they took all their meals in a large dining hall. This hall also served as a place of relaxation. In it the *chaverim* entertained themselves with theatricals, films, lectures, group dancing and singing. They also carried on all of the communal business there.

The highest authority was the general assembly consisting of all adults, female and male. Each had the right to vote, to be elected to economic and administrative posts and to lay down the regulations governing conduct. This general assembly was also the highest court. But the harshest sentence it could impose for malpractice was isolation; that is, the convicted culprit found himself completely cut off from his comrades. In a *kibbutz*, where each individual existed for the group, this was considered a very severe punishment and, indeed, it was.

In such an establishment the family underwent considerable modification. Marriage, of course, was not changed and the birth of babies was still regarded as a blessing. However, the family ceased to be an economic and cultural unit. The care of children, from a very early age, was taken over by the *kibbutz*, as was their education. And it took care of them in a quite literal sense: it removed them from their parents' room and placed them in nurseries or dormitories for sleeping and in classrooms for learning. Children could visit parents in their rooms for about one or two hours each day, and longer on holidays. Freed of child care, as well as of food preparation, both wife and husband were fully free to devote their long days of labor to the *kibbutz*.

Labor in the early *kibbutzim* meant chiefly labor on the land. Here too these Zionist socialists remind one of the utopians with their emphasis on the tilling of soil. They were almost Owenite, but for reasons that neither Owen nor the anti-semitic Fourier could have understood: these east European Jews, like all Jews, had never been permitted legal title to the land. Confined to ghettos and to urban trades, they had become stereotyped in the gentile mind as being good for nothing but commerce, industry and money-lending. The Jews, to liberate themselves from both the pogroms and the image, sought to bring the ghetto to the land. The soil and its cultivation loomed as an object almost sacred and yet as something to be conquered. Living on it required a way of life quite different from that of their European parents. Individual ownership seemed a violation of its all-embracing character, private tillage a violation of a whole people's right. To identify truly with the soil the *chaverim* often set up their villages near sterile swamp land, where only collective and back-breaking work could transform it into the fertile fields it eventually became. The soil was theirs, they created it. Their

cult of the soil, in consequence, was far more emphatic in the *kibbutzim* than in the utopian villages of Owen and Cabet.

This emphasis resulted from the patriotic fervor of the Jews. The utopians, to be sure, had their patriotic leanings, but the *chaverim* existed as integral parts of the Jewish nationality. Even though many of their members did not practice the Jewish religion, the creation of a Jewish homeland was the ultimate purpose of their sacrifice and hard work. As frontier communities they were the first victims of Arab attacks and among the first fighters, long before a Jewish national state was formed in 1948. Collective living and austerity, however much they might have risen from European socialist doctrines, were also the Jewish response to the needs of nation building.

Probably this is part of the explanation for the difference between frontier villages in the desert area that became Israel and those in the deep forests of America. The individualism of the New World pioneer was irresistible and was undoubtedly a force undermining utopian communities. The argument that expediency determines life styles is only partly true. Neither the challenge of the frontier nor the menace of Indians encouraged American pioneers to resort to socialist communities. In the Near East, the challenge of the desert and the attacks of Arabs undoubtedly weighed for something in the decision of Jews to live collectively. But most of them also arrived with an ideal of community living and a multitude of early immigrants stuck to that ideal long after the need for it seemed less compelling.

Some of the original settlers, however, and a majority of newcomers preferred greater individual freedom, and separated from the *chaverim* in the 1930's. Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 the *kibbutz* movement itself has undergone certain transformations. There has been a steady rise in the standard of living, on the one hand, and growing internal discontent on the other.

As the standard of living improved, the early *chaverim* became increasingly fearful that the old spirit of equality would decay. Crises arose over events that, to outsiders, seemed most trivial. If one comrade received a radio or an electric tea kettle, there was an outcry because no one else enjoyed these "luxuries." Either the novelty had to be rotated among all members for a specified time, or the *kibbutz* must provide everyone with it. Such conditions provoked animosity and mutual disrespect. When the *kibbutz* could provide everyone with, say, a radio, the crisis ended; but there were instances when the problem could not be settled so easily. Housing was far more expensive and when new living quarters were built, usually the older members moved into them.

Dissent arose among younger people, even many who shared the hardships of war and toil. Conflict between the generations, of course, is worldwide. In the *kibbutzim* it often results from the socialist traditionalism of the older folk, their glorification of the soil and distrust of urbanism and the capitalist industries growing in Israel, their insistence on complete equality and firm social control over the individual. As occurred in Cabet's colony in Nauvoo, Illinois, there arose resistance to the uniformity and low quality of life. A sense of shame grew among some of the adults who had formally to ask the *kibbutz* leaders for the price of a ticket to see a movie in town. Probably the most compelling urge to dissent is the lack of private or adequate housing and the separation of children from parents.

The *kibbutzim* have not been indifferent to this criticism and since the late 1950's their standards of living have risen sharply as regards housing, food and clothing. Today the people of the *kibbutzim* are looked upon by many outsiders as almost a rich aristocracy. They are now allowed to have personal property such as furniture, radios, even record players, in addition to private showers and toilets for the older members. Complaints now seem to come more from the earlier founders who see in these changes an erosion of their socialist ideology.

Ideological erosion, of course, has gone well beyond the few simple changes mentioned above. The *kibbutzim* which emphasized industry had become remarkably well-off, self-made groups comparable to the self-made men of the capitalist world. They have resorted to the wage system, and to hiring laborers from outside the community and who are no different from wage laborers in non-socialist economic systems. Economic development has also weakened the highly democratic character of the early *kibbutzim*. Formerly the general assembly met at least once a week and everyone decided on work plans. But as agriculture and especially industry have grown more complex, these decisions have fallen into the hands of skilled managers and technicians. Since the 1950's attendance at weekly meetings has gone down and managers not only enjoy considerable power but also a monopoly of elected posts requiring technical knowledge. Even the most egalitarian of the *kibbutzim* have come to resemble co-operatives. Since the war of 1948, the membership of the *Moshav Shitufi*, or co-operative settlements, has grown faster than that of the *kibbutzim*.

Co-operative Movements

The persistence of communitarian movements in Europe and under European leadership in foreign areas indicated that the collectivist strand of western culture was by no means crushed by the weight of

capitalist individualism. This yearning for a society of mutual aid and trust was so strong that it expressed itself in ways other than communitarianism. Sometimes it resorted to the use of violence against the defenders of *laissez faire*; assassinations, riots, strikes and revolution, more often and more successfully it turned to co-operative organization within the bounds of society rather than in far away communities.

The filiation between utopian and co-operative movements is clear during the earlier nineteenth century, but it is important not to exaggerate its continuity beyond that period. There were embryonic producers and sellers associations during the time of Fourier; it is likely that he picked up certain of his communitarian ideas from his acquaintance with them in Lyons and in eastern France. Workers untutored in socialism tended to set up consumers societies in order to make purchases directly from the producer. Economies and lower prices could be obtained by large-scale buying and also by eliminating the middle men whose profits increased the costs of all articles. Utopians were rather scornful of this limited goal. Their influence lay rather in their teaching the workers to set up producers co-operatives to make goods which could be sold directly to consumers, also bypassing the middle men. Workers could share the profits of production and consumers enjoy lower prices. In this way socialism would take over both production and commerce and peacefully eliminate capitalism.

Utopians generally did not believe that independent co-operatives could bring about the fundamental changes they sought. Owen argued that socialist communities must be set up first, then co-operatives could be organized within them to facilitate the manufacture of goods. After the failure of his experimental colonies, however, he returned to England in the 1830's and rapidly spread his influence among workers. He now put forward the notion of a labor exchange, that is, a central warehouse where craftsmen could exchange their products among themselves, using as the basis of evaluation the amount of labor contained in each article. Louis Blanc, on the other hand, insisted that innovation must begin with the state. It would then set up industrial associations.

Various kinds of reformers, it is evident, came forward with ideals based on the co-operative. Even many philanthropists and democrats, not at all socialist in their views, favored producers and, above all, consumers societies. The utopians went far beyond them however, seeing in these societies—especially those for production—the nucleus of an entirely socialist society.

What, then, was the connection between the utopians on the one hand and, on the other, the persons who were instrumental in organiz-

ing co-operatives? Perhaps the clearest connection lay precisely in the collectivistic or communistic aim which utopians offered to co-operators, or, at any rate, to those who were seeking something more than the cheap sale of goods within a capitalistic economy. In particular, Owen and Blanc taught that the co-operative, within a socialist society, would become the chief form of production and exchange. In fact, Louis Blanc and his collaborators of the Luxembourg Commission were hardly interested in communitarian experiments. They emphasized the importance of co-operative enterprise along craft lines set up in large cities rather than in isolated villages. It was in the producers association, the social workshop as Blanc called it, that they discerned the true germ of socialism.

When Blanc was a member of the Provisional Government in March 1848 he decided to put his theories into practice. When a new decree against imprisonment for debt was promulgated, it emptied the Clichy debtors' prison. At once Blanc decided to use this place, the symbol of bankruptcy, as an experimental workshop where the remedy of socialism would be applied to the ills of capitalism. This dramatic, unprecedented turnabout struck him as being most auspicious, especially when he learned that the city of Paris was about to furnish the newly democratized National Guard with uniforms. There were some 100,000 men to outfit, and the government had intended, when acceding to the popular demand for free uniforms, to create a sartorial relief program. It was Blanc, however, who decided to use the plan as a means of fostering socialism in Europe.

He had heard about a tailor named Philippe Bérard. Summoning him to the Luxembourg Commission, Blanc explained his project for a co-operative. Bérard asked if the government would advance the capital, an embarrassing question which the socialist hesitantly answered in the negative. He had also to point out that the commission did not possess a ministerial budget, so all that he could offer was the building and the plan of organization. Neither of the men allowed these obstacles to dampen their determination. Bérard got together a group of about fifty journeymen tailors and they obtained the contract, chiefly through Blanc's intercession. Their capital came from an unexpected source: 11,600 francs from the master-tailors who feared that the order might fall to the clothiers (middlemen) whom they despised.

On March 28 Bérard and his small band moved into their new workshop. Before long, their number jumped to 800, then by mid-May to almost 1600 men. This rapid increase resulted from the willingness of the association to accept all who applied for jobs, even the unskilled,

whose work had at times to be redone. There was some inefficiency and waste, both inevitable, given the haste and novelty of the experiment. Organized in accordance with Blanc's ideal of a social workshop, the workday was limited to ten hours, and the salary of two francs was equal for everyone. The administrative hierarchy was elected. Bérard remained in charge and, although in ill health, proved to be a remarkably active and capable chief.

One of his major obstacles was widespread opposition to the experiment. Although it was an independent co-operative, it was greeted with marked hostility not merely by orthodox liberals, but also by the so-called friends of association. One of them, Lamennais, accused workers of laziness and inefficiency but his charges were disproved by the administrators of the tailors. Marrast, mayor of Paris, and the municipal council revealed their aversion by retarding as long as possible the payments due, refusing to advance a *sou* until the order was filled. The association attempted to get around this obstacle by issuing script (*bons*), which local merchants accepted in lieu of cash. Eventually all of these debts were paid in full. At the same time, many of the young hoodlums taken into the newly organized Mobile National Guard were excited against the tailors by equally exaggerated stories of their laziness and corruption and were allowed to filch cloth from the workshop.

The desire for associations among the working class was nonetheless fired by this experiment, with the result that Blanc was overwhelmed with demands for his aid. He was, in fact, so pressed that he had to announce once more in the *Moniteur* that the commission's chief task was the preparation of reform bills for the assembly. Still, he helped to found other co-operatives: one of spinners, for whom he obtained another government contract, another of saddlers, and another of machinists. But these too were weakened by the lack of adequate capital, for while government contracts gave them a start, they received no continuing subsidies; the government preferred to spend vast sums upon the unproductive National Workshops. The National Workshops, growing rapidly in size, offered fertile ground for anti-socialistic indoctrination, whereas the co-operatives, whether or not directly founded by Blanc, were all inspired by his *Organization of Labor*. Even in the provinces, especially in Lyon, his ideas were dominant, the goal of the associations being social solidarity through the elimination of competition.

By the summer of 1849, however, a general reaction appeared throughout Europe. The conservative forces who now captured control on the Continent dispersed the socialist co-operatives and even many

that had no collectivist goals. Any assembly of workers was suspect in their eyes, and laws specifically designed to prohibit such assemblies were either revived or created. The first age of utopian social experiment died, both in Europe and America, and the founders dispersed. Only fragments of the communitarian movement remained and these chiefly in America where their influence was negligible. Most producers' associations with origins directly and clearly in utopian writings either collapsed or were dissolved by the police.

After mid-century the filiation between the co-operative and utopian movements became less clear. The most important advocates and organizers of worker association came to see in their co-operative aims the hallmark of a force at least partly independent of utopian thought. Utopian influence was steadily watered down by the conditions of life in Europe: the centralization and concentration of industry and trade, the rise of powerful national states, the emergence of trade unions seeking immediate benefits for workers, and the failures of the early utopians to carry out their own ideas. This trend can be found even before mid-century in one of the most influential of workers co-operatives, the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers (1844). Robert Owen had smiled upon its creation, but its creators insisted that his order of precedence was unrealistic: community had not led to co-operation so co-operation would perhaps lead to community. On the Continent, workers' disenchantment was deepened by political conflicts, and they now reasoned that Blanc's assumptions about the social role of the state were false. The state, whatever its form, was their enemy. They could only look to themselves, not to the rich, not to the politicians, for their social salvation, and this idea, which came to be called *ouvriérisme* (workerism) in France, struck deep roots in the labor movement after mid-century. Grafted onto the activist fervor of Blanqui, it flowered into the revolutionary syndicalism of the later nineteenth century.

There were other ideas acting on the early co-operative movement. There were even anti-socialist agrarian conservatives whose main objective was to ally with workers in their struggle against the urban capitalist and liberal middle class. These were the Christian Socialists who distrusted collectivist ideas, yet who were quite sympathetic to the poor and active in the formative of co-operatives similar in form and scope to medieval guilds.

And yet, even in the midst of this retreat from early socialism the teaching and goals of the utopians were never completely cast away. They continued to appear in the numerous programs and constitutions

of workers societies. Even the Rochdale Pioneers had pledged themselves to found a home colony.

England was the land of experiment, and successful sales co-operatives did not lead to an anti-utopian commercial mentality. The socialist ideal of community persisted. Several consumers' societies came together in the 1860's and formed themselves into a federation called the North of England Co-operative Wholesale Society. In the next decade the Wholesale Society encouraged some miners and textile workers to form producers' associations. Unfortunately most of these enterprises failed during the depression of the 1870's (as did many private concerns). In the years following, when business conditions picked up, consumers' associations persisted in looking upon themselves as harbingers of a new egalitarian society, and they continued to finance efforts to form producers' societies. Around the turn of the century, they were active in a wide variety of products: candy making, biscuits, textiles, clothing, shoes, underwear, bicycles, brushes, harnesses and building. Before the nationalization program of 1944-45 there were 111 co-operative factories, employing 80,000 workers, with a total production above 26 million pounds. Of course, this total represented only a fraction of British industrial output, and the co-operative movement was far more successful in sales or consumption than in manufacturing. Also its appeal remained confined to the lower classes. In 1930-31 fully 85 percent of the co-operative membership of 20 million had incomes under 250 pounds and 60 percent earned less than 122 pounds.

In France, where individualism was deeply rooted in the public mind, social change came more slowly. For one thing, the authoritarian Second Empire continued the conservative policies of the Second Republic. At the very time when new forms of economic and worker organizations were appearing more or less freely in England, reformers in France were usually prohibited from social experimentation, at least until the mid-1860's. In addition, consumers' co-operatives were far more timid in aiding producers' societies. Capital for workers' societies was therefore short until Third Republic, founded in 1871, decided to follow a policy of encouragement to co-operatives, if only to turn workers from Marxism. Therefore in its 1893 budget there was provision for a subsidy of 140,000 francs, and such a grant became a fixed budgetary item; it seemed that the influence of Louis Blanc had come back to life. The state also granted 50,000 francs to a Co-operative Bank of Workers Associations, a small sum when compared to the gift of 500,000 francs made by a latter-day phalansterian, Faustin Moigneu. This bank, even with its limited means, was quite active either in aiding in the founding of

producers' associations or in saving others on the point of bankruptcy. It could not, however, underwrite a vast movement, and co-operatives founded with insufficient financial support rarely enjoyed a long life. Some of them, unable to borrow from banks, managed to get started with the aid of individual gifts. The bottle works at Albi, created after a long strike in 1895, was the most successful and well-known example of this situation. Thousands of small donations, sent in by workers and trade unions from all over France, gave it a shaky start. In its formative years it was attacked by the glass monopoly and capitalist banks. It was fortunate in that recently founded co-operative wineries bought from it extensively to satisfy their needs. Moreover, it managed to acquire the means to mechanize the manufacture of bottles and considerably lowered its costs. It became one of France's largest glass producers during the 1930's. It stood beside the *Familistère* of Guise as a major socialist success.

Glass works in wine producing countries proved to be especially suitable for socialist organization. The one in Albi, France, got started when all the workers were locked out by a cantankerous employer. In Italy a similar situation occurred in 1902. Shortly after a long strike, a co-operative was founded, and in 1911 it produced nearly 60 percent of the national output in wine bottles. At this point the combined efforts of big banks and a trust of capitalists forced it to liquidate for lack of capital to pay its current debts. This act had the effect of reinforcing its socialist character, and was a dismal failure anyway. The next year a co-operative bank financed four new glass works and their success was so pronounced that they reimbursed the workers who had lost their shares in the first co-operative. Milan was the major center of socialist co-operation for Italy.

Germany and eastern Europe were not important centers of the co-operative movement before 1914, partly for the same reasons that had inhibited the spread of utopian ideology east of the Rhine; that is, the repressive policies of autocratic monarchies. Ferdinand Lassalle had borrowed certain of Louis Blanc's ideas and acquired a fairly extensive influence over the workers. However, he was killed in a duel and his teachings were effectively replaced by those of Marx. Naturally the Marxists repudiated any utopian heritage; not by founding communities and co-operatives but by the seizure of the state would the workers usher in the new era of socialism.

Socialist co-operation, therefore, grew principally where there was a utopian heritage, and in its growth it produced numerous disunited groups of producers and consumers. To inhibit these small and medium-

sized associations from becoming too dispersed and losing sight of their socialist features, federal organs appeared to serve as centers of force and propaganda, and it is in them that we find a residue of utopian goals. In Britain, the Co-operative Central Board was set up as early as 1870 and later changed its name to the Co-operative Union. In France a Consultative Chamber was created for the same purposes and especially to keep the movement on the road toward socialism. In both countries doctrines were spelled out in the annual congresses of the federations. Rejected repeatedly was the notion that associated labor could exist chiefly to enrich a few lucky workers. Underscored was the ultimate aim: the end of wage labor and the transformation of wage workers into mutually helpful and loving brothers.

In Italy, the move toward federation came in 1885 with the First Congress of Italian Co-operators. More than two hundred associations were represented, and John Jacob Holyoake as well as Vansittart Neale were there, an indication of English influence and of the spread of the spirit of Rochedale Pioneers. In 1893 the entire movement took the name of National League of Co-operation and in 1921 it had 1,050,000 members. Here too the socialist tradition pervaded the ideology and this is why the fascists abolished the League when they assumed power in the early 1920's. Similar federations were set up in the Scandinavian states where the number of co-operatives of all sorts and the size of their membership placed them among the front runners of the movement.

It must be pointed out that the greater number of co-operatives in Europe in their day-to-day business have done little to bring about a society based on strictly utopian principles. Unlike the nineteenth century followers of Blanc, Fourier, and Owen, the members of a co-operative often are not ideologically motivated. More and more people have joined them, especially since World War I, because of their increased efficiency and because of the economies obtained from membership in them. Each member, after paying an entrance fee, receives an annual dividend based on the total amount of his purchases. This system, originated by the Rochedale Pioneers, applies to consumer co-ops and it is their ability to sell cheaper than retailers that has enhanced their popularity. About half of the families in Scotland belonged by the 1930's and a third of those in Austria before the German nazi takeover. Consumers' co-ops were also extremely popular in Scandinavia, Belgium, and Germany during the Weimar Republic.

Scandinavia offers a good example of co-operative enterprise that is far removed from utopian principles. Numerous dairy farmers, firmly attached to private land ownership, set up a wholesale co-operative

which collects the raw milk of their cows, processes it into butter, finished milk and cheese, sells it under a common label, and then pays each farmer a share of the common income in accord with his contribution of milk. Many small grape growers follow the same process in France, Italy and Germany when they set up co-operatives to make wine from their grapes and to sell it for them. The co-operative, in these two examples, is an agent for private-interest groups rather than a means of achieving collective ownership and a new society. It seeks to by-pass the middlemen, the wholesalers and retailers, and sell directly to the consumers.

Many vinicultural co-operatives have tried to provide co-operative grocery stores with inexpensive, well-made wine and the aim here is the creation of an industrial-commercial socialism that will undermine the firm grip that commercial capitalists have over wine producers. The first of these wineries appeared in the early twentieth century, but their number remained small until the depression following World War I. Since then they have increased their operations considerably.

Whatever their distance from utopian doctrines the growth of these co-operatives has fostered a leaning toward socialism, or at least toward parties which, rightly or wrongly, put the words "social," "socialist," or "social democratic" in their titles.

Town Planning

Utopian ideals, then, can be traced into the twentieth century, but rarely in a pure form. For example, it is undoubtedly true that their spirit pervades those numerous groups of persons seeking to escape the pressures of the industrial age. We have already noted the small, short-lived communes set up around the turn of the century in a kind of *fin de siècle* spirit. This tendency was revived after 1918 in the form of small agricultural societies, and represented a desperate desire to escape the centralized, omnipresent state and the blatancy of mass society. Encouragement of them came from neo-agrarians such as D. H. Lawrence and G. K. Chesterton, as well as from the guild socialists such as G. D. H. Cole. The intellectual origins of this move to the land as a form of realization of the self were quite complex and, in consequence, many of the land colonies did not provide for collective ownership of the land; in some cases the goal was a corporate and traditionalist organism rather than a truly communist one. In the former property was individually owned but its exploitation controlled by the group according to the needs of each profession and of the group as a whole. Each individual's place in the group was determined by his

function or profession. This form of corporatism was a reaction to liberal or *laissez faire* capitalism, and was absorbed by various, usually authoritarian, nationalist movements. The truly collectivist communities, in contrast, were based on common ownership and the brotherhood of all men, whatever their professions. With the guild socialists their leaders sought autonomy and, as far as possible, self-subsistence; beyond these immediate steps the communes had as an ultimate objective a federal form of government. An effort was made to federate them but since most failed, or were ended by World War II, this effort was useless.

Perhaps their most lasting influence was the idea of garden towns, an idea that gained considerable importance. The creation of garden cities received its widest application after World War II, because of the destruction of so many old cities, and because of the growing desire to escape from the monstrous megalopolis. The utopians were aware of environmental problems and there is a line of descent from their architectural concepts to modern planning. Of course, there are numerous other antecedents of the garden city and the utopians cannot claim a special or unique parentage. Nonetheless, it was the utopian mind that early conceived of environmental management in the form of model communities. Several of them sought an entirely new approach to group living; that is, they saw little use in patching up the old cities which they condemned so they laid out elaborate plans for new communes. These consisted of almost sumptuous apartment houses, broad streets, industrial parks, conveniently located shops and schools, and the whole town set in a garden atmosphere, with flower beds and forests and shaded walks forming a green belt.

Such plans were far ahead of the experimental colonies in America, none of which advanced much beyond a rather primitive stage of architecture, while those in Europe rarely lasted long enough to achieve the building of a real community. The ideal was there nonetheless, and Godin made it into reality at Guise. Of course, not all town planners have been socialists and most consider themselves hard-headed realists; but there is a utopian tradition in urban architecture as there is in human relations. In recent times Martin Meyerson has looked upon it as a process by which the imagination liberates itself from tradition, from the beaten path. He sees it as a way of looking at new urban problems, as a form of creativity for environment management rather than as a model for an unrealistic finished product. The degree of management, of course, remains a matter of speculation and debate, and city planners are not more united on whether men should live in model cities, in garden towns or in villages than were the later utopian writers.

9.

Recent Utopian Thinkers

The passing of the great utopian age did not signify the disappearance of imaginative socialist thinkers, but rather a decline of their influence. It also meant, if we exclude the French anarchist movement, a shift of the locus of utopian thought from France to Anglo-Saxon countries. To be sure, anarchist thought, whether French, Italian, Spanish or Russian, contained a utopian character as regards both objectives and methods. It sought a highly idealized society in which individuality could achieve fully its long-suppressed aspirations, where the increasingly centralized forms of society would be replaced with federative forms and the local community would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. As regards methods of action the revolutionary anarchists were, in several ways, the continuators of that activist utopianism inaugurated by Babeuf and Blanqui.

We are excluding anarchist movements from our study for the same reason that we have set a date to its beginning. We prefer to recognize anarchism as simply a brother of utopianism, as a distinct movement with a history and dimensions of its own. Since it is a brother we cannot ignore it; on the contrary, its consanguinity keeps cropping up, as it did in the conflict between Edward Bellamy and William Morris.

In the later nineteenth century Bellamy and Morris really continued two of the fundamental strains of reform thought, Bellamy representing the more statist and centralized society, Morris the more anarchist and decentralized. Bellamy was in the tradition of Babeuf, Cabet and Blanc, while Morris was in that of Fourier. Morris wrote his *News from Nowhere* (1890) precisely to refute Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1889) and, consciously or otherwise, reawakened the hostility that Fourier had once vehemently expressed against the statists.

Means to Achieve Utopia

Bellamy was typically American in his repudiation of violence as a means to achieve social change. Probably he picked up several notions

about change from the Marxists; his highly industrialized and mechanized society of the year 2000 was closer to the Marxian ideal. However, Bellamy was neither a disciple of Marx nor a revolutionary. To be sure he asserted that socialism would arrive as a result of capitalist concentration of ownership; he sounded almost like Marx when he stated that private corporations grew into giant trusts. But he removed himself decisively from the theses of *Capital* when he stated that the trusts gradually absorbed one another until there was only one left, and it was transformed into the new socialist state. There was no revolution, no bloodshed, no dictatorship of the proletariat. Once economic concentration reached its final stages, the old arguments in defense of private property lost meaning. Public opinion became ripe for collective ownership and the shift from the old to the new forms of life came about without bitterness, almost by magic. It was the work of the National Party, not the Labor Party. With the end of class conflict the social atmosphere of the year 2000 did not acquire a proletarian character. Rather, everyone in Bellamy's utopia appears as distinguished bourgeois—cultivated, gentlemanly, and perfectly at ease.

Quite different is the picture of Morris. He was decidedly influenced by Marx, belonged for a while to the socialist party in England, and held that a violent revolution had been necessary to destroy the capitalist state and economy. Capitalist concentration has crushed out much of the middle class, leaving the rich face to face with a vast multitude of exploited workers. Efforts by liberals of the ruling class to reform social conditions had failed and the proletariat continued to suffer. Finally it rose in revolt, with the result that the new society was built on the ashes of the old.

Economic Organization

The belief that the concentration of wealth would lead to utopia, either peacefully or by revolution, was clearly stated by several early socialists, Fourier and Blanc, for example. However, Marx made it an integral part of his economic analysis and the later utopians probably picked it up from him.

But by a strange twist of temperament these later thinkers, after recognizing the importance of economic concentration, returned to pre-Marxist traditions. Morris' ideal society even came to resemble a vast almost rural phalanstery rather than the highly industrialized society that would logically result from the extreme concentration of wealth. In fact, Raymond Ruyer has accused Morris of being not a Marxist but a conservative. *News from Nowhere*, he asserted, "is of anti-utopian inspiration. . . . It is, in any case, anti-modern and, in a

true sense, reactionary." A. L. Morton, on the other hand, came to the defense of Morris and did so as a member of the British communist party. He wrote, "Morris' is the first Utopia which is not utopian. In all its predecessors it is the details which catch our attention, but here . . . the important things are the sense of historical development and the human understanding of the quality of life in a classless society."

Happily we need not enter into this doctrinal combat, other than to disagree with the widely accepted belief that Morris represented a return to a medieval utopia. Unlike other socialists, he was not aggressively hostile toward Europe's agrarian and guild traditions. But the social conditions and structure in *News from Nowhere* does not in any sense resemble those of the Middle Ages. There is neither the feudal hierarchy, nor the authority arrangements of the manor, nor the poverty, superstition and ignorance which were intrinsic to medieval ways of life. Morris' ideal is rather a modern semi-rural community in which man discovers the harmony between himself and nature.

Bellamy, on the other hand, envisioned utopia as the outcome not of man's harmony with nature but of his conquest over it. Because Bellamy imagined the advent of collective life as a form of nonviolent conquest he naturally viewed the new society organized along military lines. The essential institution in his utopia is the "industrial army." It came into existence to exploit the collective property, and all economic activity is now organized and centralized by means of its hierarchy of commands. At each level of this extensive bureaucracy is a group of administrators who resemble an officer corps. At the top is the president, a veritable commander-in-chief, and a cabinet made up of the heads of the "ten grand divisions" to which all workers belong. This hierarchy, formidable to say the least, does not constitute an aristocracy but rather an elite, and a constantly shifting one because each member of it must rise through the ranks from the lowest depths of society.

The rank and file of the industrial army is also divided into ranks:¹⁵

First comes the unclassified grade of common labourers, men of all work, to which all recruits during their first three years belong. This grade is a sort of school, and a very strict one, in which the young men are taught habits of obedience, subordination, and devotion to duty. While the miscellaneous nature of the work done by this force prevents the systematic grading of the workers which is afterwards possible, yet individual records are kept, and excellence receives distinction corresponding with the penalties that negligence incurs. It is not, however, policy with us to permit youthful recklessness or indiscretion, when not

deeply culpable, to handicap the future careers of young men, and all who have passed through the unclassified grade without serious disgrace have an equal opportunity to choose the life employment they have most liking for. Having selected this, they enter upon it as apprentices. The length of the apprenticeship naturally differs in different occupations. At the end of it the apprentice becomes a full workman, and a member of his trade or guild. Now not only are the individual records of the apprentices for ability and industry strictly kept, and excellence distinguished by suitable distinctions, but upon the average of his record during apprenticeship the standing given the apprentice among the full workmen depends.

While the internal organizations of different industries, mechanical and agricultural, differ according to their peculiar conditions, they agree in a general division of their workers into first, second, and third grades, according to ability, and these grades are in many cases sub-divided into first and second classes. According to his standing as an apprentice a young man is assigned his place as a first, second, or third grade worker. Of course only young men of unusual ability pass directly from apprenticeship into the first grade of the workers. The most fall into the lower grades, working up as they grow more experienced, at the periodical regradings. These regradings take place in each industry at intervals corresponding with the length of the apprenticeship to that industry, so that merit never need wait long to rise, nor can any rest on past achievements unless they would drop into a lower rank. One of the notable advantages of a high grading is the privilege it gives the worker in electing which of the various branches or process of his industry he will follow as his speciality. Of course it is not intended that any of these processes shall be disproportionately arduous, but there is often much difference between them, and the privilege of election is accordingly highly prized. So far as possible, indeed, the preferences even of the poorest workmen, are considered in assigning them their line of work, because not only their happiness but their usefulness is thus enhanced. While, however, the wish of the lower grade man is consulted so far as the exigencies of the service permit, he is considered only after the upper grade men have been provided for, and often has to put up with second or third choice, or even with an arbitrary assignment when help is needed. The privilege of election attends every regrading, and when a man loses his grade he also risks having to exchange the sort of work he likes for some other less to his taste. The results of each regrading, giving the standing of every man, in his industry, are gazetted in the public prints, and those who have won promotion since the last regrading receive the nation's thanks and are publicly invested with the badge of their new rank.

It was this centralization and the high degree of control exercised over the economy that provoked a reaction in Morris. Consequently he set

forth a utopia—England in the future—in which all forms of centralization had vanished. The revolution carried out by workers not only destroyed the bourgeois state in good Marxian fashion, it dismantled the ugly factories as well. Consequently, Morris' utopia is peopled largely by artisans and service personnel. Industry is now centered wherever a person may choose to work and most choose to work in small shops. Concentration hardly exists save where there is a central building with the tools or machines required for a particular trade. But here each person carries out his own project and comes together with others merely to use the tools. For example, those in glassblowing will come to a shop containing an oven in order to heat glass or, if in ceramics, to bake pots and bowls.

Morris had an aversion for factories, for big cities, smoke, crowds and noise. England, having become utopia, has also become green; under her blue skies people live in houses of an old style either in the country or in garden towns, are generally dispersed, move from place to place on foot, or in horsedrawn carriages or in row boats. The only form of mechanical locomotion visible is the "force barge" which moves mysteriously on the Thames. Morris offers no explanation of it save that it carries merchandise. Morris, then, does seem a throwback to earlier centuries. His modernism, however, is quite apparent in his concept of work.

Concept of Work

All utopian writers insist that in their ideal societies work will become a pleasure. The work-pleasure principle is the hallmark of their style. For Bellamy, pleasure will derive presumably from the freedom to choose one's career. He never does explain just how work is accomplished, whether on an assembly line or not; rather, he limits himself to the role of labor as a function in the new society. In a dialogue between Dr. Leete, a native Bostonian of the year 2000, and the narrator, Julian West, a newcomer, Bellamy explains his new system of labor recruitment:¹⁶

"But you have not yet told me how you have settled the labour problem. It is the problem of capital which we have been discussing," I said. "After the nation had assumed conduct of the mills, machinery, railroads, farms, mines and capital in general of the country, the labour question still remained. In assuming the responsibilities of capital the nation had assumed the difficulties of the capitalist's position."

"The moment the nation assumed the responsibilities of capital those difficulties vanished," replied Dr. Leete. "The national organization of labour under one direction was the complete solution of

what was, in your day and under your system, justly regarded as the insoluble labour problem. When the nation became the sole employer, all the citizens, by virtue of their citizenship, became employes, to be distributed according to the needs of industry."

"That is," I suggested, "you have simply applied the principle of universal military service, as it was understood in our day, to the labour question."

"Yes," said Dr. Leete, "that was something which followed as a matter of course as soon as the nation had become the sole capitalist. The people were already accustomed to the idea that the obligation of every citizen, not physically disabled, to contribute his military services to the defence of the nation was equal and absolute. That it was equally the duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of industrial or intellectual services to the maintenance of the nation was equally evident, though it was not until the nation became the employer of labour that citizens were able to render this sort of service with any pretence either of universality or equity. No organization of labour was possible when the employing power was divided among hundreds or thousands of individuals and corporations, between which concert of any kind was neither desired, nor indeed feasible. It constantly happened then that vast numbers who desired to labour could find no opportunity, and on the other hand, those who desired to evade a part or all of their debt could easily do so."

"Service, now, I suppose, is compulsory upon all," I suggested.

"It is rather a matter of course than of compulsion," replied Dr. Leete. "It is regarded as so natural and reasonable that the idea of its being compulsory has ceased to be thought of. He would be thought to be an incredibly contemptible person who should need compulsion in such a case. Nevertheless, to speak of service being compulsory would be a weak way to state its absolute inevitableness. Our entire social order is so based upon and deduced from it that if it were conceivable that a man could escape it, he would be left with no possible way to provide for his existence. He would have excluded himself from the world, cut himself off from his kind, in a word, committed suicide."

"Is the term of service in this industrial army for life?"

"Oh, no; it both begins later and ends earlier than the average working period in your day. Your workshops were filled with children and old men, but we hold the period of youth sacred to education, and the period of maturity, when the physical forces begin to flag, equally sacred to ease and agreeable relaxation. The period of industrial service is twenty-four years, beginning at the close of the course of education at twenty-one and terminating at forty-five. After forty-five, while discharged from labour, the citizen still remains liable to special calls, in case of emergencies causing a sudden great increase in the demand for labour, till he reaches the age of fifty-five, but such calls are rarely, in

fact almost never, made. The fifteenth day of October of every year is what we call Muster Day, because those who have reached the age of twenty-one are then mustered into the industrial service, and at the same time those who, after twenty-four years' service, have reached the age of forty-five, are honourably mustered out. It is the great day of the year with us, whence we reckon all other events, our Olympiad, save that it is annual."

If it was not a major difficulty to set up an industrial labor force along military lines, there still remained the problem of putting the right worker in the right job. Here, of course, Bellamy departed from the military when he devised a volunteer system. If work is to be a pleasure, no one can be forced to perform a task that is not to his liking. There are, of course, limits to the freedom of choice:¹⁷

"The supply of volunteers is always expected to fully equal the demand," replied Dr. Leete. "It is the business of the administration to see that this is the case. The rate of volunteering for each trade is closely watched. If there be a noticeably greater excess of volunteers over men needed in any trade, it is inferred that the trade offers greater attractions than others. On the other hand, if the number of volunteers for a trade tends to drop below the demand, it is inferred that it is thought more arduous. It is the business of the administration to seek constantly to equalize the attractions of the trades as far as the conditions of labour in them are concerned, so that all trades shall be equally attractive to persons having natural tastes for them. This is done by making the hours of labour in different trades to differ according to their arduousness. The lighter trades, prosecuted in the most agreeable circumstances, have in this way the longest hours, while an arduous trade, such as mining, has very short hours. . . . The principle is that no man's work ought to be, on the whole, harder for him than any other man's for him, the workers themselves to be the judges. There are no limits to the application of this rule. If any particular occupation is in itself so arduous or so oppressive that, in order to induce volunteers, the day's work in it had to be reduced to ten minutes, it would be done. . . .

"When there are more who want to enter a particular trade than there is room for, how do you decide between the application?" I inquired.

"Preference is given to those who have acquired the most knowledge of the trade they wish to follow. No man, however, who through successive years remains persistent in his desire to show what he can do at any particular trade, is in the end denied an opportunity. Meanwhile, if a man cannot at first win entrance into the business he prefers, he has usually one or more alternative preferences, pursuits for which he has some degree of aptitude, although not the highest. . . .

Morris is far less concerned—almost whimsical—about the best way to recruit workers; he lets them select whatever craft they wish. There is no central administration, no bureaucracy, to balance supply and demand in the job market; there is no job market. Morris really has a Fourierist concept of work and he, more so than Bellamy, emphasizes the pleasure principle. For him, all labor is pleasant, whether serving in the public restaurants, selling tobacco and pipes, rowing boats, harvesting hay, digging with pick-axes in roads or performing a craft. Since work is no longer a constraint, it is no longer degrading. The pick-ax for Morris is comparable to the spade for Robert Owen, a happy tool giving men work. Labor itself has become an art. Morris, using an aged and experienced utopian named Hammond, explains:¹⁸

"You must not suppose that the new form of art was founded chiefly on the memory of the art of the past; although, strange to say, the civil war was much less destructive of art than of other things, and though what of art existed under the old forms, revived in a wonderful way during the latter part of the struggle, especially as regards music and poetry. The art or work-pleasure, as one ought to call it, of which I am now speaking, sprung up almost spontaneously, it seems, from a kind of instinct amongst people, no longer driven desperately to painful and terrible over-work, to do the best they could with the work in hand—to make it excellent of its kind; and when that had gone on for a little, a craving for beauty seemed to awaken in men's minds, and they began rudely and awkwardly to ornament the wares which they made; and when they had once set to work at that, it soon began to grow. All this was much helped by the abolition of the squalor which our immediate ancestors put up with so coolly; and by the leisurely, but not stupid, country-life which now grew (as I told you before) to be common amongst us. Thus at last and by slow degrees we got pleasure into our work; then we became conscious of that pleasure, and cultivated it, and took care that we had our fill of it; and then all was gained, and we were happy. So may it be for ages and ages!"

Naturally these latter day utopians, like the earlier ones, believe that socialism will change the character of man by letting his natural goodness emerge. As work becomes a form of amusement, the utopian acquires an entirely changed notion about its rewards. Old Hammond explains this novel system to a man who has dreamed his way into utopia and who opens the dialogue:¹⁹

"Now, this is what I want to ask you about—to wit, how you get people to work when there is no reward of labor, and especially how you get them to work strenuously?"

"No reward of labor?" said Hammond, gravely. "The reward of labor is *life*. Is that not enough?"

"But no reward for especially good work," quoth I.

"Plenty of reward," said he—"the reward of creation. The wages which God gets, as people might have said time agone. If you are going to ask to be paid for the pleasure of creation, which is what excellence in work means, the next thing we shall hear of will be a bill sent in for the begetting of children."

"Well, but," said I, "the man of the nineteenth century would say there is a natural desire towards the procreation of children, and a natural desire not to work."

"Yes, yes," said he, "I know the ancient platitude—wholly untrue; indeed, to us quite meaningless. Fourier, whom all men laughed at, understood the matter better."

"Why is it meaningless to you?" said I.

He said: "Because it implies that all work is suffering, and we are so far from thinking that, that, as you may have noticed, whereas we are not short of wealth, there is a kind of fear growing up amongst us that we shall one day be short of work. It is a pleasure which we are afraid of losing not a pain."

"Yes," said I, "I have noticed that, and I was going to ask you about that also. But in the meantime, what do you positively mean to assert about the pleasurableness of work amongst you?"

"This, that *all* work is now pleasurable; either because of the hope of gain in honor and wealth with which the work is done, which causes pleasurable excitement, even when the actual work is not pleasant; or else because it has grown into a pleasurable *habit*, as in the case with what you may call mechanical work; and lastly (and most of our work is of this kind) because there is conscious sensuous pleasure in the work itself; it is done, that is, by artists."

"I see," said I. "Can you now tell me how you have come to this happy condition?..."

"Briefly," said he, "by the absence of artificial coercion, and the freedom for every man to do what he can do best, joined to the knowledge of what productions of labor we really wanted. I must admit that this knowledge we reached slowly and painfully....

"The wares which we make are made because they are needed; men make for their neighbors' use as if they were making for themselves, not for a vague market of which they know nothing, and over which they have no control: as there is no buying and selling, it would be mere insanity to make goods on the chance of their being wanted; for there is no longer anyone who can be *compelled* to buy them. So that whatever is made is good, and thoroughly fit for its purpose.

Wages, as they were traditionally known, disappeared in both utopias. But here too, Morris was more radical than Bellamy. Morris abolished money in the most absolute sense. In as much as each person makes

articles both for the pleasure of his fellowman and for his own, he expects no compensation for them. Wares of every sort are put in stores and people come in and help themselves. Like all utopians Morris had a particular horror of selling; all dishonesty stemmed from the cheating and lying that was natural in capitalist commerce. Bellamy agreed, but in place of coin he set up a kind of ration card. Purchasers simply gave a coupon of their card in return for consumable goods. Everyone had an ample supply of coupons to live a good life. Yet, there was an annual limit, the same limit for everyone, high and low, and no one was allowed to spend beyond his means, at least not without special permission.

What then motivated workers in Bellamy's utopia? Let us take up again his enlightening dialogue:²⁰

"I suppose you mean that you have no money to pay wages in," said I. "But the credit given the worker at the government storehouse answers to his wages with us? How is the amount of the credit given respectively to the workers in different lines determined? By what title does the individual claim his particular share? What is the basis of allotment?"

"His title," replied Dr. Leete, "is his humanity. The basis of his claim is the fact that he is a man." . . .

"But what inducement," I asked, "can a man have to put forth his best endeavours when, however much or little he accomplishes, his income remains the same? High characters may be moved by devotion to the common welfare under such a system, but does not the average man tend to rest back on his oar, reasoning that it is of no use to make a special effort, since the effort will not increase his income, nor its withholding diminish it?"

"Does it then really seem to you," answered my companion, "that human nature is insensible to any motives save fear of want and love of luxury, that you should expect security and equality of livelihood to leave them without possible incentives to effort? Your contemporaries did not really think so, though they might fancy they did. When it was a question of the grandest class of efforts, the most absolute self-devotion, they depended on quite other incentives. Not higher wages, but honour and the hope of gratitude, patriotism, and the inspiration of duty, were the motives which they set before their soldiers when it was a question of dying for the nation, and never was there an age of the world when those motives did not call out what is best and noblest in men. . . . The coarser motives, which no longer move us, have been replaced by higher motives wholly unknown to the mere wage-earners of your age. Now that industry of whatever sort is no longer self-service, but service of the nation, patriotism, passion for humanity, impel the worker as in your day they did the soldier. The

army of industry is an army, not alone by virtue of its perfect organization, but by reason also of the ardour of self-devotion which animates its members."

The writings of Bellamy and of Morris showed some of the basic differences characteristic of nineteenth century utopian ideas. Yet they also shared the fundamental unity of socialist thought: belief in collective ownership, relative or absolute equality of enjoyment, and, above all, the goodness of man.

Because man is basically good, utopians enjoy that pinnacle of happiness denied to capitalists, the supreme joy of being rich without having to fear thieves. In a capitalist society criminal acts result from want, from the several levels of poverty common to an individualistic system. The rich, living in the midst of poverty, must constantly guard themselves against theft and live in a state of unrelenting fear. But in utopia there is no reason to steal because each person has all that he can desire. Wrongdoing, in consequence, is treated as an aberration for which the perpetrator expresses immediate remorse. Particularly repugnant to Morris is the assertion that crime and violence are the necessary results of human nature. Against it he has his wise old utopian angrily cry out: "What human nature? The human nature of paupers, of slaves, of slave-holders, or the human nature of wealthy freemen?"

Government

Because there is practically no crime or perversion in utopia there is no need for law. Even in Bellamy's ideal society, government exists more to organize the economy than to make and enforce laws. This latter task is the president's; congress meets only once every five years because there is little need for it. Morris, with his usually sly humor, has had the houses of parliament turned into dung depots; they have now become much more useful to society than when they were the places where rich men enacted laws to oppress poor men. The legislative branch of government has disappeared for Morris and has become unimportant for Bellamy. Their utopias, they felt, are so well ordered that laws are not needed, neither are law-making bodies. Neither are police because there is no crime and neither are armies and navies since there is no longer any warfare.

The state is hardly evident in Morris's utopia. Decentralization is so vast that people do very much as their good nature directs them. Ruyer is not far off the mark when he accused Morris of having no sense of community. What the reader senses in *News from Nowhere* is a feeling of being lost in the separate divisions of society, of being precisely

nowhere, and that somewhere, in the shadows, there is another side of utopia quite neglected by Morris. It is in the shadows that all the handsome and well-made articles are distributed (on the "force barges" silently plying the rivers), that food and other necessities are put into the stores where people help themselves at will, that issues of a national character are decided and acted on.

Bellamy at least has a government visible to all, and it is elected indirectly. All the workers who must retire at forty-five years of age elect the generals of their guilds or trades, and these generals elect their superiors, the cabinet members who, in turn, choose the president. Below these top echelons is a hierarchy of administrators whose main purpose is to preserve the equilibrium between supply and demand for both consumable goods and jobs. In this system political and social hierarchies have merged into one.

All administrative posts are staffed by workers, that is, by men who began at the bottom in industry and rose through ability and public service. All careers are open to talent.

Because they have abolished oppressive institutions as well as poverty the utopians are free. Their liberty consists precisely of their right to make all the choices by which man acquires control over himself, over his personality and his actions. Of course, his choices are possible only within the context of a socialist society. For him to act against the interests of his fellow man will destroy this context and the freedom it bears, will be an act of abnegation of freedom, a form of moral suicide. For such persons Bellamy recommends a special prison and a diet of bread and water. This sounds harsh, but he assures us that such cases are almost unknown.

Education

The near absence of crime and of government is attributable to the goodness of man. But these utopians do not have in mind the natural man, the noble savage of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. They place their hopes rather on the new man, and he is an educated man. Bellamy, being a rationalist reformer, envisioned a well organized system of schools to train both high administrators and workers. Their training, and this was typical of utopians, consisted not merely of the formal mastery of subject-matter, but of the development of personality and physical prowess. Character training and athletics stand in as high esteem as academic subjects, sometimes even higher. The whole man is as important as his mind. According to Bellamy, speaking through Dr. Leete:²¹

"There are three main grounds on which our educational system rests; the right of every man to the completest education the nation can give him on his own account, as necessary to his enjoyment of himself; second, the right of his fellow-citizens to have him educated, as necessary to their enjoyment of his society; third, the right of the unborn to be guaranteed an intelligent and refined parentage." . . .

"The facility of education," Dr. Leete explained, "is held to the same responsibility for the bodies as for the minds of its charges. The highest possible physical, as well as mental, development of everyone is the double object of a curriculum which lasts from the age of six to that of twenty-one."

The magnificent health of the young people in the schools impressed me strongly. My previous observations not only of the notable personal endowments of the family of my host, but of the people I had seen in my walks abroad, had already suggested the idea that there must have been something like a general improvement in the physical standard of the race since my day.

As might be expected, Morris's libertarian society gives formal education short shrift, comes the closest to the natural society of Rousseau. Hammond, the old utopian, is quite perplexed by the idea that pre-utopian children used to learn in schools.²²

"School?" he said; "yes, what do you mean by that word? I don't see how it can have anything to do with children. We talk, indeed, of a school of herring, and a school of painting, and in the former sense we might talk of a school of children—but otherwise," said he, laughing, "I must own myself beaten."

Hang it! thought I, I can't open my mouth without digging up some new complexity; . . . so I said after a little fumbling, "I was using the word in the sense of a system of education."

"Education?" said he, meditatively, "I know enough Latin to know that the word must come from *educere*, to lead out; and I have heard it used; but I have never met anybody who could give me a clear explanation of what it means."

You may imagine how my new friends fell in my esteem when I heard this frank avowal; and I said, rather contemptuously, "Well, education means a system of teaching young people."

"Why not old people also?" said he with a twinkle in his eye. "But," he went on, "I can assure you our children learn, whether they go through a 'system of teaching' or not. Why, you will not find one of these children about here, boy or girl, who cannot swim; and every one of them has been used to tumbling about the little forest ponies—there's one of them now! They all of them know how to cook; the bigger lads can mow; many can thatch and do odd jobs at carpentering;

or they know how to keep shop. I can tell you they know plenty of things."

"Yes, but their mental education, the teaching of their minds," said I, kindly translating my phrase.

"Guest," said he, "perhaps you have not learned to do these things I have been speaking about; and if that's the case, don't you run away with the idea that it doesn't take some skill to do them, and doesn't give plenty of work for one's mind: you would change your opinion if you saw a Dorsetshire lad thatching, for instance. But, however, I understand you to be speaking of book-learning; and as to that, it is a simple affair. Most children, seeing books lying about, manage to read by the time they are four years old; though I am told it has not always been so. As to writing, we do not encourage them to scrawl too early (though scrawl a little they will), because it gets them into a habit of ugly writing; and what's the use of a lot of ugly writing being done, when rough printing can be done so easily. You understand that handsome writing we like, and many people will write their books out when they make them, or get them written; I mean books of which only a few copies are needed—poems, and such like, you know. However, I am wandering from my lambs; but you must excuse me, for I am interested in this matter of writing, being myself a fair writer."

"Well," said I, "about the children; when they know how to read and write, don't they learn something else—languages, for instance?"

"Of course," he said; "sometimes even before they can read, they can talk French, which is the nearest language talked on the other side of the water; and they soon get to know German also, which is talked by a huge number of communes and colleges on the mainland. These are the principal languages we speak in these islands, along with English or Welsh, or Irish, which is another form of Welsh; and the children pick them up very quickly, because their elders all know them; and besides our guests from oversea often bring their children with them, and the little ones get together, and rub their speech into one another."

"And the older languages?" said I.

"Oh yes," said he, "they mostly learn Latin and Greek along with the modern ones, when they do anything more than merely pick up the latter."

"And history?" said I; "how do you teach history?"

"Well," said he, "when a person can read, of course he reads what he likes to; and he can easily get someone to tell him what are the best books to read on such or such a subject, or to explain what he doesn't understand in the books when he is reading them."

"Well," said I, "what else do they learn? I suppose they don't all learn history?"

"No, no," said he; "some don't care about it; if fact, I don't think

many do. I have heard my great-grandfather say that it is mostly in periods of turmoil and strife and confusion that people care much about history; and you know," said my friend, with an amiable smile, "we are not like that now. No; many people study facts about the make of things and the matters of cause and effect, so that knowledge increases on us, if that be good; and some, as you heard about friend Bob yonder, will spend time over mathematics. 'Tis no use forcing people's tastes."

Said I: "But you don't mean that children learn all these things?"

Said he: "That depends on what you mean by children; and also you must remember how much they differ. As a rule, they don't do much reading, except for a few storybooks, till they are about fifteen years old; we don't encourage early bookishness: though you will find some children who *will* take to books very early; which perhpas is not good for them; but it's no use thwarting them; and very often it doesn't last long with them, and they find their level before they are twenty years old. You see, children are mostly given to imitating their elders, and when they see most people about them engaged in genuinely amusing work, like housebuilding and street-paving, and gardening, and the like, that is what they want to be doing; so I don't think we need fear having too many book-learned men."

Women

As discrimination disappeared from education so did it give way to equality between the sexes. In the modern as in the older utopias girls enjoy the same educational opportunities as boys and, when grown to womanhood, receive equal wages for equal work. They also enjoy as much personal freedom as men.

However, the sexual equality in utopia is not complete. For Bellamy, women "constitute rather an allied force than an integral part of the army of the men." They are never allowed to assume jobs "not perfectly adapted, both as to kind and degree of labor, to [their] sex." They must work shorter hours and take more frequent vacations. Representing them is a woman general-in-chief who sits in the president's cabinet, who is elected by all the women in retirement after age forty-five, and who may exercise a veto over measures affecting female labor. Most beneficial in their eyes is their liberation from housework, an occupation carried out exclusively by women specialists who chose it as a trade.

In Morris's remarkably individualistic society, women do the housework and love it. It is considered a skilled trade and highly regarded. Housework, Morris insisted, is no longer drudgery. He would be more convincing if he explained the ways in which it ceased to be a drudgery, but he did little more than blissfully affirm that women are no longer

drudges, for they are beloved by their husbands, they are handsome, and they are free. That is, they are free to obtain a divorce, and have no financial worries. They have been liberated from the old legal and social customs that forced them to play a secondary role in society, even in the family; they are no longer the property of their husbands.

Freedom has not meant the extinction of motherhood. On the contrary, maternity is as highly esteemed as housework. Therefore women readily occupy themselves with the home and raising children, and neither of these tasks discourage them from also performing a trade such as storekeeping or serving in the public restaurants or whatever they like.

Above all, neither women nor men in utopia can be the victims of family tyranny. In the new society, with its encouragement of mutual help and esteem, it is love, not money, that brings a young couple to marriage and that binds the family together. And most wonderful is the result of these love matches; they have led to both mental and physical advances, and utopians are really more beautiful, strong and healthy. Love has led to an undeniable improvement of the race.

Semi-Socialist Utopias

Thus far we have concentrated on authentic socialist utopians, those who openly declared that the highest form of social life is based on collective rather than private ownership of the means of production. However there grew up in Europe a utopian tradition that may be classed as semi-socialist. The problem of definition here is partly one of terminology. What is called semi-socialist can also be called semi-capitalist. But the hope for accuracy must lead us beyond terminology to substance. The utopia of Saint-Simon, compared to that of, say Cabet, certainly does not appear socialist. But then, neither does Fourier's. If we wished to follow the bent of Fourier for extreme classification we could satisfy ourselves by placing Cabet on the left of the utopian movement, Fourier in the center and Saint-Simon on the right. If we judge by the influence and disciples of these three thinkers, there is more truth than whimsy to the above arrangement. Cabetists proudly called themselves communists, harmonians emphasized communal ownership even when they favored private financing, as did the Owenites, but true Saint-Simonians, after a most brief socialist phase, became important capitalist entrepreneurs and sublimated their utopian drives by digging canals, founding banks, and building railroads, activities which made them quite wealthy.

The Saint-Simonian tradition popularized a utopian ideal combining

a mixed economy; that is, public control and even ownership of certain industries, with the remainder under private ownership and subject only to certain controls by the state. The state itself was to be under the rule of semi-private, semi-public men, the captains of industry, big bankers, scientists and a few philosophers. These constituted a new priesthood and power elite. Under the direction of this utilitarian ruling group the economy would function in the best interests of society at large, without, be it noted, reduction of private profits.

This kind of utopia was revived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its revival resulted precisely from a desire to create in utopia greater freedom, especially economic freedom, for the individual. Hence it also divested itself of most of the totalitarian state inherent in Saint-Simonism.

Out of a mass of reformist literature, most of it unimaginative, mediocre and soon forgotten, two examples stand out. One was the product of an Austrian economist, Theodor Hertzka, who published *Freeland, A Social Anticipation* (1890), the other of H. G. Wells, who brought out his *Modern Utopia* in 1905. Both books were best-sellers and widely translated.

Hertzka was certainly the closest to the typical nineteenth century utopian. His major innovation was his effort to combine the Jacobin ideal of property for everyone with the socialist desire for co-operative enterprise. In his ideal community, situated by him in the wilderness of East Africa, private ownership and self-interest are the two most potent stimulants to productivity and happiness. Private property is characteristic of small-scale production. By no means does it preclude co-operatives and these, created as joint-stock companies, carry out large-scale operations. They are composed of everyone interested in a particular trade. Their highest authority is the general assembly in which every member enjoys an equal vote, and management is elected by and responsible to this body. Since remuneration is taken from the profits and paid on the basis of time worked, each member is enjoined by his own interest to work well and long enough to provide himself with a comfortable income. Self-interest therefore serves the public good by augmenting productivity and the goods available for general consumption.

In good utopian fashion Freeland has democratic government, progressive education, equality—more or less—of the sexes, happy marriages and high standards of living.

Hertzka was so convincing and Africa so inviting to colonial-minded Europeans that an actual effort was made to set up a real Freeland.

Nearly a thousand local societies were set up, consisting of members of all classes, to collect money for the experiment. A central committee of them laid out plans and obtained a large tract of land in British East Africa. But before operations became extensive, difficulties grew in number and the plan failed. This failure, however, did not put a stop to speculation about social reform, but perhaps it did urge a greater awareness of real conditions.

In H. G. Wells' *Modern Utopia* the achievements of his world-wide ideal society are far more modest than its predecessors. All the utopias of the past are redolent of an almost Hollywoodian aura: everyone is handsome, healthy, good, heroic and altruistic. Wells, at least in 1905, sought to imagine a utopia of people not much different from his contemporaries; improvement of utopian proportions, therefore, was less the result of an improved human nature and more the outcome of the steady correction of institutions and ways of life already in existence.

Because of his refusal to give free play to his imagination, Wells created a quite realistic utopia, one that, viewed over sixty-five years later, seems little more than the welfare state of the post-World War II era minus the world-wide dimensions. At heart Wells was very much of a nineteenth century liberal; in fact, he has been credited—or accused, depending on one's point of view—with inspiring the anti-utopia movement of recent date.

He had a particular aversion for the extreme leveling of his predecessors, and, in consequence, affirmed the freedom and individuality of each utopian citizen. He did not want the strong and intelligent sacrificed to satisfy the weak and mediocre. In his "modern utopia" the freedom to express one's personality and the enjoyment of privacy were basic to a good life.

Property became necessary to freedom, became indeed the measure of it. In more affirmative tones than Hertzka he proclaimed the right to legitimate property, consisting of all the income and things resulting from toil, skill and planning. The state of course must limit certain acquisitions lest inequality become a menace to the freedom of the less fortunate. Personal property and goods purchased with money might be transmitted to the next generation. But shares in business adventures, in concessions, land leases and factories revert to the state at death. By no means, then, does Wellsian utopianism mean an end of private entrepreneurship. His unreformed man still requires the stimulus of monied income, of material gains. Honors and prestige are of little value in the business world.

Wells reserves them, rather, for governance. His utopia is to be ruled

by an elite that he called the *samurai*. They remind one of Saint-Simon's ruling class, a kind of priesthood of puritanical, public-minded men and women who eschew private business, wealth and luxuries in order to put all their energies and intelligence at the service of the public. This is a voluntary corps, but only those who willingly conform to its rigid code of conduct and who meet its high standards of intelligence are admitted into its ranks. Their power is vast; they rule the world state which Wells called utopia.

Above all, their task is to maintain justice in an economy as vast as the state. Clearly their powers extend less into the private lives of the utopians than into the factories where machines of the most perfect sort perform the hard work, in fact most of the work. Only *samurai* are allowed to be administrators, professionals and employers of large numbers of workers. Only they possess the expertise and sense of service that can make big industry compatible with the good life.

Epilogue

The years following World War I made up an era that may be characterized as anti-utopian. In 1923 Wells published the last of his major utopian works, *Men Like Gods*, and it was almost the climax of its genre. For Wells it was the consummation of a cycle that had begun in 1895 with his *Time Machine*. Before 1914, Wells had warned that an ideal society, without some forms of competition and individual drive, would decay. In the *Time Machine* he described the decline of a once flourishing ideal society in which all that remained were a languid fragile population, living amidst ruins on the surface of their planet, and steadily being devoured by a brute, savage people dwelling underground. This was the year 800,000, and the surface people, having attained perfection, had lost the force that made for life and creativity. *Modern Utopia*, although published ten years later in 1905, depicted the blueprint for a beginning utopia combining new forms of life with older concepts of human motivation, when it was at the start of its move toward perfection.

Finally, in 1923 Wells' *Men Like Gods* came to European readers still not quite recovered from the war. It described a full grown society far more advanced than the *Modern Utopia*. In the new work, government has withered away; lawmakers and the men who sit in judgment have disappeared because there is no longer a need for them. In the details and the broad strokes of his description Wells joined the great nineteenth century socialist utopians. His leading characters represent the well-meaning experts who have replaced the politicians and, using science, technology and reason, direct the people in a wondrous world of peace and stability. The *samurai* no longer exist as such since each person has attained the high moral quality of the old elite and there is hardly need of formal leadership. There is not only an absence of government—and here utopia has rejoined the anarchist tradition—there is "no private wealth, no business competition, no police nor prisons, no lunatics, no defectives nor cripples."

Mechanization and science have certainly contributed to this new perfection, so has education and conditioning. Almost the motto of

Wells' new world is "Our education is our government." Eugenics and the advancement of learning have eliminated the inferior individuals who could never have become *samurai* in the *Modern Utopia*. "War, pestilence, and malaise, famine and poverty had been swept out of human experience."

Anti-Utopians and Mechanized Progress

It was precisely this enduring faith in progress and in man's ability to achieve it that the anti-utopians have always attacked. Not only have all conservatives ridiculed, either in great wrath or in pungent satire, the notion that man can achieve a perfect society but also the notion that a perfect society is desirable. This kind of opposition is of course as old as utopian schemes. Sometimes it was purely verbal, sometimes more direct. In the earlier nineteenth century both conservatives and *laissez faire* liberals, especially those on the Continent, harassed idealistic reformers in direct ways: persecution, imprisonment or exile. Latter day utopians perhaps became concentrated in Anglo-Saxon countries because of the freedom they found there. Consequently most of the significant anti-utopians were similarly located there.

In England Samuel Butler set the tone with his satire *Erewhon* (1872). Many British anti-utopians were not hostile to progress as such, but to progress involving the increased mechanization of life. Butler was one of the first to envision a society in which machines might develop a will all their own and make men their servants. This vision was soon taken up by a generation of neo-romantics, especially in Central Europe where the new horror was no longer the fanged demon and the chain clanking ghost, but the man-destroying machine. Karel Capek in his play *R.U.R.* (1921) is a good example of this trend.

The real onslaught upon imaginary socialist societies arrived with the post-1900 reaction against the dominant positivism of earlier generations and their faith in machines as instruments of progress. Wells, the arch-positivist, was the chief object of attack. He was, after all, in the tradition that emphasized science and machinery as the means to achieve and preserve utopia. He was a particularly forceful, imaginative writer and he created the most effective and convincing form for ideal worlds, that of science fiction. Certainly Jules Verne was just as important in creating the genre, but Wells gave it the idealist goal by going far beyond the mere adventure story set in unusual time and space. And for this reason, his giving science a social and even, in *Men Like Gods*, a socialist goal, he bore the brunt of anti-utopian thunder.

The first reaction came from E. M. Forster. In his story "The Machine Stops" (1909) he underlined his fear that men, having become entirely dependent on the machine, would fall into a synthetic, uncreative existence, each willingly isolated and exiled in an underground cell-like habitation, and doomed to destruction once the central life-giving machine stops. In attacking Wells, Forster was in the line of nineteenth century romantics and esthetes who gloried in their sense of freedom and identified it with spontaneity, absence of planning and unmechanized nature.

This same theme was taken up by a Russian fleeing the communist revolution and the soviet dictatorship. Evgenii Zamyatin published *We* in 1924. He put his society not underground but in a huge glass city called the Single State. Progress has brought absolute security, health, abundant although artificial food, and a dull life of sameness and regimentation. Ruled over by the Well-Doer, people wear identical clothing, have numbers instead of names, march in formation, even chew food the number of times imposed by the Hour Tables. Only from 4 to 5 and 9 to 11 P.M. may they pull the curtains of their glass dwellings and even have intercourse—provided they have the pink tickets which the state requires because sex has become rationed! Depicting this drab existence Zamyatin was really attacking the Soviet Union for betraying the revolution. He actually admired Wells and in his case it was not machinery but the evil use of machinery that he sought to warn others against.

Somewhat different in goal if not in form and imagery was the young Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932). His was a direct attack on the Wellsian image of the future and, like Forster, his attack is on progress and science and big cities. Mechanized life seemed to him a standardizer, a dehumanizer, a fearful threat to originality and creativity. If Mark Helligas is correct his hostility to the machine was not only his fear of standardization but also his dislike of the idea that it would bring abundance and leisure to everyone, thereby removing these privileges of his own class. Since he found no middle ground between the extremes of utopia and central planning on the one hand, and poverty and inequality on the other, he preferred the latter. He did not see how one could end human suffering; in fact, he felt it desirable, a necessary force in moulding character.

Forster and Huxley would have attacked Wells even if there had been no totalitarian regimes like those of the nazis and communists to arouse their dislike of regimentation. Forster's story preceded both regimes and Huxley's description of the frivolous, dull existence of his brave

new worlders does not necessarily refer to the totalitarian societies of his own time. George Orwell, however, was a militant with democratic and socialist leanings, and after his sad experiences with communists in Spain during the civil war, the horrors of the dictatorships and the atomic bomb, he grew deeply distrustful of the Wellsian vision. In particular, he denied Wells' assertion that men using the powers of science, would use them in a rational and humane way, would use them to bring freedom and happiness. Although a socialist, Orwell was convinced that men would use the unleashed powers of science to create the nightmares he depicted in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949). Despite this agonizing fear Orwell, like Zamyatin and unlike the esthetes, could not bring himself to break machines, to suggest even a return to the crafts and farms so dear to William Morris. Consequently he faced a dilemma that left him no peace of mind. Perhaps the extreme horror of life in his novel, the undiluted exercise of total power for its own sake, the irrationality of Big Brother who rules and the mute obedience of those who are ruled by him was a desperate effort of Orwell to solve his dilemma. His was no esthete's retreat into the ivory tower of art for art's sake, but the longing of a democrat to warn his fellow men about the peril to humanity and freedom.

Huxley and Orwell were skilled writers and enjoyed a wide public applause. Both were looked to with admiration and their fame was enhanced by the post World War II reaction against the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Capitalistic Hollywood even made a movie of the socialist Orwell's "Animal Farm." Also influenced were the rising generation of science fiction writers who now joined the chorus of "counter-Wellsian anti-utopians." With science fiction the onslaught against socialist ideal societies found a home in the United States where Communism was equated with utopianism and fear of the former naturally led to distrust of the latter.

On the whole the decades since World War I have not been favorable to utopian dreams and least of all to socialist utopian dreams. The rise of totalitarian regimes and their use of science and machines for furthering their domestic and foreign goals frightened many idealist reformers; tampering with the human condition seemed to upset certain necessary balances in society and to let loose the monster dwelling in mass man. The large number of studies on social reform with the word "nightmare" or its equivalent in their titles is indicative of the mental state that existed.

There was also a growing distrust of science and reason. The "intellectual revolution" of the early twentieth century had involved a shift

from rationalism as the basis of thought to irrationalism, from a fairly widespread belief that man is good and the machine is an instrument of progress to a deep fear that man is beset by unconscious irrational forces and that the machine is a menace to individual freedom and art. The decades of murderous war, economic catastrophe, and the white-hot hatreds of the "isms" destroyed the buoyant optimism of earlier times that had made utopia seem an almost normal projection of the present.

And yet, there is perhaps a rebirth of idealism, and its source seems to be the new behavioral psychology. Earlier socialists were convinced that man is naturally good and a better environment would release his innate character. B. F. Skinner in *Walden Two* (1948) and *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (1971) believes that community living and rational organization can create a new style utopia. There is no doubt that Henry Thoreau would leap with anger at Skinner's use of the name *Walden*, because *Walden Two* has little resemblance to the first. Rather than an unspoilt place in nature it is a society designed to condition men to do good. Through a process of human and social "engineering", members acquire desirable traits. It is particularly the young who are submitted to a system of education created to produce very specific personality traits. In this respect Skinner is firmly in the utopian tradition. He differs, however, in one extremely important respect: where his forerunners had generally believed that human nature is innately good, Skinner rejects such naiveté and looks upon human beings as creatures to be formed through a process of carefully planned conditioning, with emphasis on positive reinforcement. Man is neither innately good or bad, he must be created, and in the utopian community, *Walden Two*, this creation is implemented by a functional elite of behavioralists. *Walden Two* is not a democracy because democracy has not led to the kind of society in which the gigantic powers of science are used for man's improvement rather than his destruction. Frazier, the fictional founder and head of *Walden Two*, explains to a visitor, Burris, that the major goal of social engineering is to create human happiness by recreating man:²³

"I'll let you in on a secret," he continued, lowering his voice dramatically. "You have just described the *only* side of *Walden Two* that really interests me. To make men happy, yes. To make them productive in order to assure the continuation of that happiness, yes. But what else? Why, to make possible a genuine science of human behavior!"

"These things aren't for the laboratory, Burris. They're not 'academic questions.' What an apt expression! They concern our very lives!"

We can study them only in a living culture, and yet a culture which is under experimental control. Nothing short of *Walden Two* will suffice. It must be a real world, this laboratory of ours, and no foundation can buy a slice of it."

Frazier dropped the brush he had been using and thrust his hands into his pockets. He held himself rigid, as if to divert all his energy into speech.

"What remains to be done?" he said, his eyes flashing. "Well, what do you say to the design of personalities? Would that interest you? The control of temperament? Give me the specifications, and I'll give you the man! What do you say to the control of motivation, building the interests which will make men most productive and most successful? Does that seem to you fantastic? Yet some of the techniques are available, and more can be worked out experimentally. Think of the possibilities! A society in which there is no failure, no boredom, no duplication of effort!

"And what about the cultivation of special abilities? Do we know anything about the circumstances in the life of the child which give him a mathematical mind? Or make him musical? Almost nothing at all! These things are left to accident or blamed on heredity. I take a more optimistic view: we can analyze effective behavior and design experiments to discover how to generate it in our youth. Oh, our efforts will seem pretty crude a hundred years hence. They may seem crude now to the expansive soul. But we've got to make a start. There's no virtue in accident. Let us control the lives of our children and see what we can make of them."

Frazier began to pace back and forth, his hands still thrust in his pockets.

"My hunch is—and when I feel this way about a hunch, it's never wrong—that we shall eventually find out, not only what makes a child mathematical, but how to make better mathematicians! If we can't solve a problem, we can create men who can! And better artists! And better craftsmen!" He laughed and added quietly, "And better behaviorists, I suppose!"

"And all the while we shall be improving upon our social and cultural design. We know almost nothing about the special capacities of the *group*. We all recognize that there are problems which can't be solved by an individual—not only because of limitations of time and energy but because the individual, no matter how extraordinary, can't master all the aspects, can't think thoughts big enough. Communal science is already a reality, but who knows how far it can go? Communal authorship, communal art, communal music—these are already exploited for commercial purposes, but who knows what might happen under freer conditions?

"The problem of efficient group structure alone is enough to absorb anyone's interest. An organization of a committee of scientists of a panel of script writers is far from what it could be. But we lack control in the world at large to investigate more efficient structures. Here, on the contrary—here we can begin to understand and build the Super-organism. We can construct groups of artists and scientists who will act as smoothly and efficiently as champion football teams.

"And all the while, Burris, we shall be increasing the net power of the community by leaps and bounds. Does it seem to you unreasonable to estimate that the present efficiency of society is of the order of a fraction of one per cent? *A fraction of one per cent!* And you ask what remains to be done!"

Conditioning has won its place in modern society, and in the form of environmentalism has stood at the base of Marxist ideology. Recently even the Soviet Union has removed its disapproval of utopian fantasy in literature. In 1957 Ivan Yefremov published *Andromeda*. It has been translated into several languages and rather widely read. It was undoubtedly inspired by the Wells of *Men Like Gods*, and reaffirms that man is the measure of all things, Science exists to serve him, not to dominate him or subvert his freedom. The goal of the new world state is to train the young in a new science of society so that their growth into adulthood will become a flowering of their social consciousness, an elating expansion. Coming out of the Soviet Union *Andromeda* received a mixed reaction. Its idealism seemed to conflict with the power politics of the very men who permitted its publication, and their motivation is not clear.

Perhaps the conversion of Aldous Huxley was more significant. The author of *Brave New World* published another book, *Island*, in 1962. Although it has no clear socialist goal, it seems to be more in the Fourier tradition and in keeping with the recent emphasis on pleasure for its own sake, escape from dull reality and the search for self or self-realization. The utopian ideal has been taken up by the hip culture, and the search for love, pleasure and awareness are all rolled into one happy time in *Island*. Utopia, welcomed into the mazes and rat-runs of psychology and even into the flashing, bright-colored depths and heights of psychedelics, seems to have become less a social ideal than a therapy, both of the personal and group type. Yet Aldous Huxley's conversion is incomplete, for he still remains pessimistic about man's fate. His novel does not close on a happy note; rather the evil forces of authority and suppression win out in the end. A feeling of doom seems almost complete as these forces erupt out of the night with the glare of white lights

and the blare of loudspeakers. As they take over the island in their armored cars they command everyone to be obedient.

Huxley notwithstanding, the utopian ideal persists and continues to serve as a needed counter-weight to the anti-utopian roots that have sunk deeply into western culture during the last half century. Whatever form it may take (and it extends from communal living with emphasis on freedom and love to personality manipulation), it retains its fundamental belief in progress, happiness, mutual love among humans and a sense of oneness with all things.

Notes

1. (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 43–44.
2. Quoted in Marie Bernari, *Journey Through Utopia* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 101.
3. Quoted in Edouard Dolléans, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1948), vol. I, pp. 16–17.
4. The brief quotes are from Donald Wagner, editor and translator, *Social Reformers* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 223–25.
5. (London: Everyman, 1927), p. 278.
6. Wagner, pp. 236–39.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
8. Owen, pp. 265–67.
9. 5th ed. (Paris: Société de l'Industrie Fraternelle, 1847), pp. 102–11, 115–16.
10. Frank Manuel, editor and translator, *French Utopias* (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 333–38.
11. Blanc, pp. 14–15.
12. Quoted and translated in David Thomson, *The Babeuf Plot* (London: Routledge, 1947), pp. 29–32.
13. J. B. Godin, *Solutions sociales* (Paris: A. Le Chevalier, 1871), p. 150.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 513.
15. E. Bellamy, *Looking Backward* (London: Routledge and Sons, N.D.), pp. 91–93.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–50.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–54.
18. W. Morris, *News From Nowhere* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), pp. 164–65.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 113–15.
20. Bellamy, pp. 70–74.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
22. Morris, pp. 38–41.
23. B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 291–93.

Bibliography

Angrand, Pierre. *Etienne Cabet et la République de 1848*. Paris, 1948.

Bassett, T. D. Seymour. "The Secular Utopian Socialists," chap. 5, vol. II in D. D. Egbert and S. Persons, eds. *Socialism and American Life*. Princeton, 1952.

Beecher, Jonathan and Richard Bienvenu, eds. *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier*. Boston, 1971.

Berner, Marie L. *Journey Through Utopia*. London, 1950.

Bestor, Arthur. *Backwoods Utopias*. Philadelphia, 1950.

Bourgin, Hubert. *Fourier*. Paris, 1905.

Buber, Martin. *Paths in Utopia*. Boston, 1958.

Cole, G. D. H. *History of Socialist Thought*, vol. I, *The Forerunners, 1789-1850*. London, 1953.
— *Life of Robert Owen*. Rev. ed. London, 1930.
— *A Century of Co-operation*. London, 1945.

Duveau, Georges. *Sociologie de l'Utopie*. Paris, 1961.

Eisenstein, Elizabeth. *The First Professional Revolutionist. Filippo Michele Buonarroti, 1761-1837*. Cambridge, Mass., 1959.

Fotion, Janice E. "Cabet and Icarian Communism," Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, State University of Iowa, 1966.

Gerber, R. *Utopian Fantasy*. London, 1955.

Gide, Charles. *Communist and Co-operative Colonies*. New York, [1928].

Harrison, John F. C. *Quest for the New Moral World. Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America*. New York, 1969.

Hertzler, Joyce O. *The History of Utopian Thought*. New York, 1965.

Hillegas, Mark R. *The Future as Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the Anti-Utopians*. New York, 1967.

Holloway, Mark. *Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America, 1680-1880*. 2nd ed., New York [1966].

Hoog, George. *La Cooperation de production*. Paris, 1942.

Iggers, Georg, editor and translator. *The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition, First Year, 1828-29*. Boston, 1958.

Johnson, Christopher. "Communism and the Working Class before Marx: The Icarian Experience." *American Historical Review*, 76 (June 1971), 642-689.

Kateb, G. *Utopia and Its Enemies*. Glencoe, Ill., 1963.

Lehouck, Emile. *Fourier aujourd'hui*. Paris, 1966.

Lichtheim, George. *The Origins of Socialism*. New York, 1969.

Loubere, Leo. *Louis Blanc*. Evanston, Ill., 1961.

Manuel, Frank, ed. *French Utopias*. New York, 1966.

—. *Utopias and Utopian Thought*. Boston, 1966.

Meyerson, M. "Utopian Traditions and the Planning of Cities," in Lloyd Rodwin, ed., *The Future Metropolis*. New York, 1961. Pp. 233-50.

Morgan, A. L. *Edward Bellamy*. New York, 1944.

Morton, A. L. *The English Utopia*. London, 1952.

Mumford, Lewis. *The Story of Utopias*. Gloucester, Mass., 1959.

Negley, Gless and Max Patrick, eds. *The Quest for Utopia. An Anthology of Imaginary Societies*. New York, 1952.

Pinloche, Auguste. *Fourier et le Socialism*. Paris, 1933.

Poster, M., ed. *Harmonian Man. Selected Writings of Charles Fourier*. New York, 1971.

Prudhommeaux, Jules. *Icarie et son fondateur Etienne Cabet*. 2^d ed., Paris, 1927.

Ramm, Thilo, ed. *Der Frühsozialismus. Ausgewählte Quellentexte*. Stuttgart [1956].

Riasanovsky, Nicholas. *The Teaching of Charles Fourier*. Berkeley, 1969.

Rosenau, Helen. *The Ideal City in Its Architectural Evolution*. London, 1959.

Ruyer, Raymond. *L'Utopie et les Utopistes*. Paris, 1950.

Sourine, G. *Le Fourierisme en Russie*. Paris, 1936.

Spiro, Melford. *Kibbutz, Venture in Utopia*. Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

Spitzer, Alan. *The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui*. New York, 1957.

Thompson, E. P. *William Morris*. London, 1955.

Thomson, David. *The Babeuf Plot*. London, 1947.

Tuveson, Ernest Lee. *Millenium and Utopia*. New York, 1964.

Venturi, Franco. *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment*. Cambridge, Eng., 1970.

Wagar, W. Warren. *H. G. Wells and the World State*. New Haven, 1961.

Walsh, Chad. *From Utopia to Nightmare*. New York, 1962.

Wilson, William E. *The Angel and the Serpent: The Story of New Harmony*. Bloomington, Ind., 1964.

Wittke, Carl. *The Utopian Communist. A Biography of Wilhelm Weitling, Nineteenth Century Reformer*. Baton Rouge, La., 1950.

Woodcock, George. "Utopias in Negative," *Sewanee Review*, LXIV (1956), 81-97.

Wooster, Ernest. *Communities of the Past and Present*. Newllano, La., 1924.

Utopian thought is as old as man's social consciousness. Throughout history, utopian ideas have been tempered by events and technologies, by ever-developing philosophies and specific ideologies. In *Utopian Socialism*, Dr. Leo Loubere examines those utopians who provided elaborate descriptions of their ideal societies, and those who, without detailing future social conditions, believed that some simple event would reveal the rottenness of existing social foundations and bring about a new age. Seeing no promise of future good within their society, both groups, pragmatists and idealists, believed that society would have to be completely rebuilt.

In examining utopian organization, society politics, and experimental communities, Dr. Loubere analyzes the various ideological differences that existed in the utopian thinking of such men as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, Etienne Cabet and Louis Blanc. The thoughts and works of these men are also studied in the context of the revolutionary movement in France in 1879 and in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. Louis Blanc and Etienne Cabet, for example, were intimately involved in the progressive movements of France during the turbulent years of the Revolution of 1848.

Periods of stress and rapid change have been the periods richest in utopian thought, and the twentieth century certainly has been no exception. The quickening pace of industrial society, the widening of world communications by means of invention, and the technologies that have created a new concept of world war have prompted the further development of utopian ideas and communities. Such thinkers as Edward Bellamy, William Morris, Theodore Hertzka and H. G. Wells, although differing as much in their specific recommendations as did the utopians before them, and such experiments as Goden's *Familistère*, Israel's *kibbutzim*, and experimental communities in America, have continued the search for utopia.

Dr. Loubere's analysis of utopian thinking, with his cogent comparisons of theories, actions, and events, makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the relationship between utopian ideas and the social forces that surround them. Despite the lack of tangible achievements produced by the utopias discussed in this book, utopian ideals have been an important element in western culture. Acting both as a reflector of social norms and as a catalyst for social change, utopianism has provided a continual response to society's need to understand existing conditions and to experiment with alternatives to those conditions.